diff options
| author | John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> | 2015-11-17 08:35:54 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com> | 2015-11-17 23:58:52 +0000 |
| commit | a9ac1262ce80c287562e604f3bb24f232fcb686e (patch) | |
| tree | 406a18c61bb0855a31c2941aae8226a3c7623b33 | |
| parent | 0549ddb90f1553553dcb1b348e2884076e7cba3e (diff) | |
ANDROID: exec_domains: Disable request_module() call for personalities
With Android M, Android environments use a separate execution
domain for 32bit processes.
See:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/122131/
This results in systems that use kernel modules to see selinux
audit noise like:
type=1400 audit(28.989:15): avc: denied { module_request } for
pid=1622 comm="app_process32" kmod="personality-8"
scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tclass=system
While using kernel modules is unadvised, some systems do require
them.
Thus to avoid developers adding sepolicy exceptions to allow for
request_module calls, this patch disables the logic which tries
to call request_module for the 32bit personality (ie:
personality-8), which doesn't actually exist.
Change-Id: I6885347e69d5778e69ad5312f56f389be7bb4883
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/exec_domain.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/exec_domain.c b/kernel/exec_domain.c index 83d4382f5699..e0a3c71f2734 100644 --- a/kernel/exec_domain.c +++ b/kernel/exec_domain.c @@ -68,7 +68,14 @@ lookup_exec_domain(unsigned int personality) goto out; } -#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES +/* + * Disable the request_module here to avoid trying to + * load the personality-8 module, which doesn't exist, + * and results in selinux audit noise. + * Disabling this here avoids folks adding module_request + * to their sepolicy, which is maybe too generous + */ +#if 0 read_unlock(&exec_domains_lock); request_module("personality-%d", pers); read_lock(&exec_domains_lock); |