diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/threat_model/threat_model_arm_cca.rst')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/threat_model/threat_model_arm_cca.rst | 225 |
1 files changed, 225 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/docs/threat_model/threat_model_arm_cca.rst b/docs/threat_model/threat_model_arm_cca.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fbf3327b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/threat_model/threat_model_arm_cca.rst @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +Threat Model for TF-A with Arm CCA support +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Introduction +************ + +This document provides a threat model of TF-A firmware for platforms with Arm +Realm Management Extension (RME) support which implement Arm Confidential +Compute Architecture (Arm CCA). + +Although it is a separate document, it references the :ref:`Generic Threat +Model` in a number of places, as some of the contents is commonly applicable to +TF-A with or without Arm CCA support. + +Target of Evaluation +******************** + +In this threat model, the target of evaluation is the Trusted Firmware for +A-class Processors (TF-A) with RME support and Arm CCA support. This includes +the boot ROM (BL1), the trusted boot firmware (BL2) and the runtime EL3 firmware +(BL31). + +Assumptions +=========== + +We make the following assumptions: + +- :ref:`Realm Management Extension (RME)` is enabled on the platform. + +- Arm CCA Hardware Enforced Security (HES) is available on the platform, as + recommended by `Arm CCA security model`_: + + *[R0004] Arm strongly recommends that all implementations of CCA utilize* + *hardware enforced security (CCA HES).* + +- All TF-A images run from on-chip memory. Data used by these images also live + in on-chip memory. This means TF-A is not vulnerable to an attacker that can + probe or tamper with off-chip memory. + + These are requirements of the `Arm CCA security model`_: + + *[R0147] Monitor code executes entirely from on-chip memory.* + + *[R0149] Any monitor data that may affect the CCA security guarantee, other* + *than GPT, is either held in on-chip memory, or in external memory but with* + *additional integrity protection.* + + Note that this threat model hardens *[R0149]* requirement by forbidding to + hold data in external memory, even if it is integrity-protected - except for + GPT data. + +- TF-A BL1 image is immutable and thus implicitly trusted. It runs from + read-only memory or write-protected memory. This could be on-chip ROM, on-chip + OTP, locked on-chip flash, or write-protected on-chip RAM for example. + + This is a requirement of the `Arm CCA security model`_: + + *[R0158] Arm recommends that all initial boot code is immutable on a* + *secured system.* + + *[R0050] If all or part of initial boot code is instantiated in on-chip* + *memory then other trusted subsystems or application PE cannot modify that* + *code before it has been executed.* + +- Trusted boot and measured boot are enabled. This means an attacker can't boot + arbitrary images that are not approved by platform providers. + + These are requirements of the `Arm CCA security model`_: + + *[R0048] A secured system can only load authorized CCA firmware.* + + *[R0079] All Monitor firmware loaded by PE initial boot is measured and* + *verified as outlined in Verified boot.* + +- No experimental features are enabled. These are typically incomplete features, + which need more time to stabilize. Thus, we do not consider threats that may + come from them. It is not recommended to use these features in production + builds. + +Data Flow Diagram +================= + +Figure 1 shows a high-level data flow diagram for TF-A. The diagram shows a +model of the different components of a TF-A-based system and their interactions +with TF-A. A description of each diagram element is given on Table 1. On the +diagram, the red broken lines indicate trust boundaries. Components outside of +the broken lines are considered untrusted by TF-A. + +.. uml:: ../resources/diagrams/plantuml/tfa_arm_cca_dfd.puml + :caption: Figure 1: Data Flow Diagram + +.. table:: Table 1: Data Flow Diagram Description + + +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ + | Diagram Element | Description | + +=================+========================================================+ + | DF1 | | Refer to DF1 description in the | + | | :ref:`Generic Threat Model`. Additionally TF-A | + | | loads realm images. | + +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ + | DF2-DF6 | | Refer to DF2-DF6 descriptions in the | + | | :ref:`Generic Threat Model`. | + +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ + | DF7 | | Boot images interact with Arm CCA HES to record boot | + | | measurements and retrieve data used for AP images | + | | authentication. | + | | | + | | | The runtime firmware interacts with Arm CCA HES to | + | | obtain sensitive attestation data for the realm | + | | world. | + +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ + | DF8 | | Realm world software (e.g. TF-RMM) interact with | + | | TF-A through SMC call interface and/or shared | + | | memory. | + +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ + +Threat Analysis +*************** + +In this threat model, we use the same method to analyse threats as in the +:ref:`Generic Threat Model`. This section only points out differences where +applicable. + +- There is an additional threat agent: *RealmCode*. It takes the form of + malicious or faulty code running in the realm world, including R-EL2, R-EL1 + and R-EL0 levels. + +- At this time we only consider the ``Server`` target environment. New threats + identified in this threat model will only be given a risk rating for this + environment. Other environments may be added in a future revision + +Threat Assessment +================= + +General Threats for All Firmware Images +--------------------------------------- + +The following table analyses the :ref:`General Threats` in the context of this +threat model. Only deltas are pointed out. + + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | ID | Applicable? | Comments | + +====+=============+=======================================================+ + | 05 | Yes | | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 06 | Yes | | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 08 | Yes | Additional diagram element: DF8. | + | | | | + | | | Additional threat agent: RealmCode. | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 11 | Yes | | Misconfiguration of the Memory Management Unit | + | | | (MMU) may allow a **normal/secure/realm** world | + | | | software to access sensitive data, execute arbitrary| + | | | code or access otherwise restricted HW interface. | + | | | | + | | | | **Note that on RME systems, MMU configuration also | + | | | includes Granule Protection Tables (GPT) setup.** | + | | | | + | | | | Additional diagram elements: DF4, DF7, DF8. | + | | | | + | | | | Additional threat agents: SecCode, RealmCode. | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 13 | Yes | Additional diagram element: DF8. | + | | | | + | | | Additional threat agent: RealmCode. | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 15 | Yes | Additional diagram element: DF8. | + | | | | + | | | Additional threat agent: RealmCode. | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + +Threats to be Mitigated by the Boot Firmware +-------------------------------------------- + +The following table analyses the :ref:`Boot Firmware Threats` in the context of +this threat model. Only deltas are pointed out. + + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | ID | Applicable? | Comments | + +====+=============+=======================================================+ + | 01 | Yes | Additional diagram element: DF8. | + | | | | + | | | Additional threat agent: RealmCode. | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 02 | Yes | Additional diagram element: DF8. | + | | | | + | | | Additional threat agent: RealmCode. | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 03 | Yes | | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 04 | Yes | | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + +Threats to be Mitigated by the Runtime EL3 Firmware +--------------------------------------------------- + +The following table analyses the :ref:`Runtime Firmware Threats` in the context +of this threat model. Only deltas are pointed out. + + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | ID | Applicable? | Comments | + +====+=============+=======================================================+ + | 07 | Yes | Additional diagram element: DF8. | + | | | | + | | | Additional threat agent: RealmCode. | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 09 | Yes | Additional diagram element: DF8. | + | | | | + | | | Additional threat agent: RealmCode. | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 10 | Yes | Additional diagram element: DF8. | + | | | | + | | | Additional threat agent: RealmCode. | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 12 | Yes | Additional diagram element: DF8. | + | | | | + | | | Additional threat agent: RealmCode. | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + | 14 | Yes | | + +----+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ + +*Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* + +.. _Arm CCA Security Model: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/DEN0096/A_a |