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authorJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>2012-06-06 12:12:57 -0400
committerJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>2012-07-10 16:41:35 -0400
commitd91d0b569044ab366895d587d4811b154dd7d7f5 (patch)
tree3b1877f782ad3aa9345637c454b4b298a14da0f7 /fs/nfsd
parent74dbafaf5d84b5187e50dbe82442ec8df66d55b3 (diff)
nfsd: allow owner_override only for regular files
We normally allow the owner of a file to override permissions checks on IO operations, since: - the client will take responsibility for doing an access check on open; - the permission checks offer no protection against malicious clients--if they can authenticate as the file's owner then they can always just change its permissions; - checking permission on each IO operation breaks the usual posix rule that permission is checked only on open. However, we've never allowed the owner to override permissions on readdir operations, even though the above logic would also apply to directories. I've never heard of this causing a problem, probably because a) simultaneously opening and creating a directory (with restricted mode) isn't possible, and b) opening a directory, then chmod'ing it, is rare. Our disallowal of owner-override on directories appears to be an accident, though--the readdir itself succeeds, and then we fail just because lookup_one_len() calls in our filldir methods fail. I'm not sure what the easiest fix for that would be. For now, just make this behavior obvious by denying the override right at the start. This also fixes some odd v4 behavior: with the rdattr_error attribute requested, it would perform the readdir but return an ACCES error with each entry. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nfsd')
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/vfs.c10
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index c8bd9c3be7f..3256b5c324b 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -757,8 +757,16 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
* If we get here, then the client has already done an "open",
* and (hopefully) checked permission - so allow OWNER_OVERRIDE
* in case a chmod has now revoked permission.
+ *
+ * Arguably we should also allow the owner override for
+ * directories, but we never have and it doesn't seem to have
+ * caused anyone a problem. If we were to change this, note
+ * also that our filldir callbacks would need a variant of
+ * lookup_one_len that doesn't check permissions.
*/
- err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, type, may_flags | NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE);
+ if (type == S_IFREG)
+ may_flags |= NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE;
+ err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, type, may_flags);
if (err)
goto out;