aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>2012-10-25 13:37:34 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-10-25 14:37:52 -0700
commit8c9506d16925f1b1314d93af383ca3134eb534d8 (patch)
treee14dbc5816b375463b8d37eda0f79bcd0ea96a3b /security
parentef5d437f71afdf4afdbab99213add99f4b1318fd (diff)
cgroup: fix invalid rcu dereference
Commit ad676077a2ae ("device_cgroup: convert device_cgroup internally to policy + exceptions") removed rcu locks which are needed in task_devcgroup called in this chain: devcgroup_inode_mknod OR __devcgroup_inode_permission -> __devcgroup_inode_permission -> task_devcgroup -> task_subsys_state -> task_subsys_state_check. Change the code so that task_devcgroup is safely called with rcu read lock held. =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 3.6.0-rc5-next-20120913+ #42 Not tainted ------------------------------- include/linux/cgroup.h:553 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by kdevtmpfs/23: #0: (sb_writers){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8116873f>] mnt_want_write+0x1f/0x50 #1: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811558af>] kern_path_create+0x7f/0x170 stack backtrace: Pid: 23, comm: kdevtmpfs Not tainted 3.6.0-rc5-next-20120913+ #42 Call Trace: lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130 devcgroup_inode_mknod+0x19d/0x240 vfs_mknod+0x71/0xf0 handle_create.isra.2+0x72/0x200 devtmpfsd+0x114/0x140 ? handle_create.isra.2+0x200/0x200 kthread+0xd6/0xe0 kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c15
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 44dfc415a37..46d01fcc0d1 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -533,10 +533,10 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = {
*
* returns 0 on success, -EPERM case the operation is not permitted
*/
-static int __devcgroup_check_permission(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
- short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
+static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
short access)
{
+ struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
struct dev_exception_item ex;
int rc;
@@ -547,6 +547,7 @@ static int __devcgroup_check_permission(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
ex.access = access;
rcu_read_lock();
+ dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
rc = may_access(dev_cgroup, &ex);
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -558,7 +559,6 @@ static int __devcgroup_check_permission(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
- struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
short type, access = 0;
if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
@@ -570,13 +570,12 @@ int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
if (mask & MAY_READ)
access |= ACC_READ;
- return __devcgroup_check_permission(dev_cgroup, type, imajor(inode),
- iminor(inode), access);
+ return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, imajor(inode), iminor(inode),
+ access);
}
int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
{
- struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
short type;
if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
@@ -587,7 +586,7 @@ int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
else
type = DEV_CHAR;
- return __devcgroup_check_permission(dev_cgroup, type, MAJOR(dev),
- MINOR(dev), ACC_MKNOD);
+ return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev),
+ ACC_MKNOD);
}