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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2012-04-04 15:01:42 -0400
committerEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2012-04-09 12:23:00 -0400
commit602a8dd6ea6abd463bc26310c4a1b44919f88e68 (patch)
tree426df8399ff298942a7e30c3a360a666e51ba920 /security
parent2e33405785d3eaec303c54b4a10afdebf3729da7 (diff)
SELinux: remove inode_has_perm_noadp
Both callers could better be using file_has_perm() to get better audit results. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c28
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c99027dc0b3..8417a6afaf3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1488,20 +1488,6 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
}
-static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
- struct inode *inode,
- u32 perms,
- unsigned flags)
-{
- struct common_audit_data ad;
- struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
-
- COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
- ad.u.inode = inode;
- ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
- return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
-}
-
/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
pathname if needed. */
@@ -2128,21 +2114,17 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
- struct inode *inode;
/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
- Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
+ Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
file may belong to another process and we are only
interested in the inode-based check here. */
file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
struct tty_file_private, list);
file = file_priv->file;
- inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
- FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
+ if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
drop_tty = 1;
- }
}
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
tty_kref_put(tty);
@@ -3276,12 +3258,10 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
- struct inode *inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
fsec = file->f_security;
- isec = inode->i_security;
+ isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
/*
* Save inode label and policy sequence number
* at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
@@ -3299,7 +3279,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
* new inode label or new policy.
* This check is not redundant - do not remove.
*/
- return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
+ return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
}
/* task security operations */