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-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c31
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/auth.c92
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c68
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c11
-rw-r--r--fs/open.c31
-rw-r--r--include/linux/audit.h22
-rw-r--r--include/linux/capability.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/cred.h44
-rw-r--r--include/linux/init_task.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key.h22
-rw-r--r--include/linux/sched.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h178
-rw-r--r--init/main.c1
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c42
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c78
-rw-r--r--kernel/cred-internals.h21
-rw-r--r--kernel/cred.c321
-rw-r--r--kernel/exit.c9
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c7
-rw-r--r--kernel/kmod.c30
-rw-r--r--kernel/ptrace.c9
-rw-r--r--kernel/signal.c10
-rw-r--r--kernel/sys.c450
-rw-r--r--kernel/user.c37
-rw-r--r--kernel/user_namespace.c12
-rw-r--r--lib/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/ar-key.c6
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c21
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c265
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h17
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c25
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c95
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c14
-rw-r--r--security/keys/permission.c24
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c333
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c29
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c41
-rw-r--r--security/security.c58
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c286
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c82
41 files changed, 1603 insertions, 1239 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a5330e1a221..9bd3559ddec 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1007,13 +1007,12 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
*/
current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
- if (bprm->e_uid != current_euid() || bprm->e_gid != current_egid()) {
- suid_keys(current);
+ if (bprm->e_uid != current_euid() ||
+ bprm->e_gid != current_egid()) {
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
} else if (file_permission(bprm->file, MAY_READ) ||
(bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP)) {
- suid_keys(current);
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
}
@@ -1096,10 +1095,8 @@ void compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int unsafe;
- if (bprm->e_uid != current_uid()) {
- suid_keys(current);
+ if (bprm->e_uid != current_uid())
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
- }
exec_keys(current);
task_lock(current);
@@ -1709,8 +1706,9 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
struct linux_binfmt * binfmt;
struct inode * inode;
struct file * file;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+ struct cred *cred;
int retval = 0;
- int fsuid = current_fsuid();
int flag = 0;
int ispipe = 0;
unsigned long core_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur;
@@ -1723,12 +1721,20 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
binfmt = current->binfmt;
if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump)
goto fail;
+
+ cred = prepare_creds();
+ if (!cred) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* If another thread got here first, or we are not dumpable, bail out.
*/
if (mm->core_state || !get_dumpable(mm)) {
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ put_cred(cred);
goto fail;
}
@@ -1739,12 +1745,16 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
*/
if (get_dumpable(mm) == 2) { /* Setuid core dump mode */
flag = O_EXCL; /* Stop rewrite attacks */
- current->cred->fsuid = 0; /* Dump root private */
+ cred->fsuid = 0; /* Dump root private */
}
retval = coredump_wait(exit_code, &core_state);
- if (retval < 0)
+ if (retval < 0) {
+ put_cred(cred);
goto fail;
+ }
+
+ old_cred = override_creds(cred);
/*
* Clear any false indication of pending signals that might
@@ -1835,7 +1845,8 @@ fail_unlock:
if (helper_argv)
argv_free(helper_argv);
- current->cred->fsuid = fsuid;
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ put_cred(cred);
coredump_finish(mm);
fail:
return retval;
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
index 808fc03a6fb..836ffa1047d 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
@@ -27,55 +27,67 @@ int nfsexp_flags(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
{
- struct cred *act_as = current->cred ;
- struct svc_cred cred = rqstp->rq_cred;
+ struct group_info *rqgi;
+ struct group_info *gi;
+ struct cred *new;
int i;
int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
int ret;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new->fsuid = rqstp->rq_cred.cr_uid;
+ new->fsgid = rqstp->rq_cred.cr_gid;
+
+ rqgi = rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info;
+
if (flags & NFSEXP_ALLSQUASH) {
- cred.cr_uid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
- cred.cr_gid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
- cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(0);
+ new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+ new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+ gi = groups_alloc(0);
} else if (flags & NFSEXP_ROOTSQUASH) {
- struct group_info *gi;
- if (!cred.cr_uid)
- cred.cr_uid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
- if (!cred.cr_gid)
- cred.cr_gid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
- gi = groups_alloc(cred.cr_group_info->ngroups);
- if (gi)
- for (i = 0; i < cred.cr_group_info->ngroups; i++) {
- if (!GROUP_AT(cred.cr_group_info, i))
- GROUP_AT(gi, i) = exp->ex_anon_gid;
- else
- GROUP_AT(gi, i) = GROUP_AT(cred.cr_group_info, i);
- }
- cred.cr_group_info = gi;
- } else
- get_group_info(cred.cr_group_info);
-
- if (cred.cr_uid != (uid_t) -1)
- act_as->fsuid = cred.cr_uid;
- else
- act_as->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
- if (cred.cr_gid != (gid_t) -1)
- act_as->fsgid = cred.cr_gid;
- else
- act_as->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+ if (!new->fsuid)
+ new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+ if (!new->fsgid)
+ new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
- if (!cred.cr_group_info)
- return -ENOMEM;
- ret = set_groups(act_as, cred.cr_group_info);
- put_group_info(cred.cr_group_info);
- if ((cred.cr_uid)) {
- act_as->cap_effective =
- cap_drop_nfsd_set(act_as->cap_effective);
+ gi = groups_alloc(rqgi->ngroups);
+ if (!gi)
+ goto oom;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rqgi->ngroups; i++) {
+ if (!GROUP_AT(rqgi, i))
+ GROUP_AT(gi, i) = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+ else
+ GROUP_AT(gi, i) = GROUP_AT(rqgi, i);
+ }
} else {
- act_as->cap_effective =
- cap_raise_nfsd_set(act_as->cap_effective,
- act_as->cap_permitted);
+ gi = get_group_info(rqgi);
}
+
+ if (new->fsuid == (uid_t) -1)
+ new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+ if (new->fsgid == (gid_t) -1)
+ new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+
+ ret = set_groups(new, gi);
+ put_group_info(gi);
+ if (!ret)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (new->uid)
+ new->cap_effective = cap_drop_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective);
+ else
+ new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
+ new->cap_permitted);
+ return commit_creds(new);
+
+oom:
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
index 632a50b4b37..9371ea12d7f 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
@@ -54,20 +54,26 @@
static struct path rec_dir;
static int rec_dir_init = 0;
-static void
-nfs4_save_user(uid_t *saveuid, gid_t *savegid)
+static int
+nfs4_save_creds(const struct cred **original_creds)
{
- *saveuid = current->cred->fsuid;
- *savegid = current->cred->fsgid;
- current->cred->fsuid = 0;
- current->cred->fsgid = 0;
+ struct cred *new;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new->fsuid = 0;
+ new->fsgid = 0;
+ *original_creds = override_creds(new);
+ put_cred(new);
+ return 0;
}
static void
-nfs4_reset_user(uid_t saveuid, gid_t savegid)
+nfs4_reset_creds(const struct cred *original)
{
- current->cred->fsuid = saveuid;
- current->cred->fsgid = savegid;
+ revert_creds(original);
}
static void
@@ -129,10 +135,9 @@ nfsd4_sync_rec_dir(void)
int
nfsd4_create_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
+ const struct cred *original_cred;
char *dname = clp->cl_recdir;
struct dentry *dentry;
- uid_t uid;
- gid_t gid;
int status;
dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_create_clid_dir for \"%s\"\n", dname);
@@ -140,7 +145,9 @@ nfsd4_create_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp)
if (!rec_dir_init || clp->cl_firststate)
return 0;
- nfs4_save_user(&uid, &gid);
+ status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
+ if (status < 0)
+ return status;
/* lock the parent */
mutex_lock(&rec_dir.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
@@ -168,7 +175,7 @@ out_unlock:
clp->cl_firststate = 1;
nfsd4_sync_rec_dir();
}
- nfs4_reset_user(uid, gid);
+ nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_create_clid_dir returns %d\n", status);
return status;
}
@@ -211,20 +218,21 @@ nfsd4_build_dentrylist(void *arg, const char *name, int namlen,
static int
nfsd4_list_rec_dir(struct dentry *dir, recdir_func *f)
{
+ const struct cred *original_cred;
struct file *filp;
struct dentry_list_arg dla = {
.parent = dir,
};
struct list_head *dentries = &dla.dentries;
struct dentry_list *child;
- uid_t uid;
- gid_t gid;
int status;
if (!rec_dir_init)
return 0;
- nfs4_save_user(&uid, &gid);
+ status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
+ if (status < 0)
+ return status;
filp = dentry_open(dget(dir), mntget(rec_dir.mnt), O_RDONLY,
current_cred());
@@ -250,7 +258,7 @@ out:
dput(child->dentry);
kfree(child);
}
- nfs4_reset_user(uid, gid);
+ nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
return status;
}
@@ -312,8 +320,7 @@ out:
void
nfsd4_remove_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
- uid_t uid;
- gid_t gid;
+ const struct cred *original_cred;
int status;
if (!rec_dir_init || !clp->cl_firststate)
@@ -323,9 +330,13 @@ nfsd4_remove_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp)
if (status)
goto out;
clp->cl_firststate = 0;
- nfs4_save_user(&uid, &gid);
+
+ status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
+ if (status < 0)
+ goto out;
+
status = nfsd4_unlink_clid_dir(clp->cl_recdir, HEXDIR_LEN-1);
- nfs4_reset_user(uid, gid);
+ nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
if (status == 0)
nfsd4_sync_rec_dir();
mnt_drop_write(rec_dir.mnt);
@@ -402,16 +413,21 @@ nfsd4_recdir_load(void) {
void
nfsd4_init_recdir(char *rec_dirname)
{
- uid_t uid = 0;
- gid_t gid = 0;
- int status;
+ const struct cred *original_cred;
+ int status;
printk("NFSD: Using %s as the NFSv4 state recovery directory\n",
rec_dirname);
BUG_ON(rec_dir_init);
- nfs4_save_user(&uid, &gid);
+ status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
+ if (status < 0) {
+ printk("NFSD: Unable to change credentials to find recovery"
+ " directory: error %d\n",
+ status);
+ return;
+ }
status = kern_path(rec_dirname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY,
&rec_dir);
@@ -421,7 +437,7 @@ nfsd4_init_recdir(char *rec_dirname)
if (!status)
rec_dir_init = 1;
- nfs4_reset_user(uid, gid);
+ nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
}
void
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
index e67cfaea086..f0da7d9c3a9 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
@@ -186,9 +186,14 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp)
* access control settings being in effect, we cannot
* fix that case easily.
*/
- current->cred->cap_effective =
- cap_raise_nfsd_set(current->cred->cap_effective,
- current->cred->cap_permitted);
+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return nfserrno(-ENOMEM);
+ new->cap_effective =
+ cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
+ new->cap_permitted);
+ put_cred(override_creds(new));
+ put_cred(new);
} else {
error = nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(rqstp, exp);
if (error)
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index f96eaab280a..c0a426d5766 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -425,30 +425,33 @@ out:
*/
asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
+ struct cred *override_cred;
struct path path;
struct inode *inode;
- int old_fsuid, old_fsgid;
- kernel_cap_t uninitialized_var(old_cap); /* !SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP */
int res;
if (mode & ~S_IRWXO) /* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */
return -EINVAL;
- old_fsuid = cred->fsuid;
- old_fsgid = cred->fsgid;
+ override_cred = prepare_creds();
+ if (!override_cred)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- cred->fsuid = cred->uid;
- cred->fsgid = cred->gid;
+ override_cred->fsuid = override_cred->uid;
+ override_cred->fsgid = override_cred->gid;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
/* Clear the capabilities if we switch to a non-root user */
- if (current->cred->uid)
- old_cap = cap_set_effective(__cap_empty_set);
+ if (override_cred->uid)
+ cap_clear(override_cred->cap_effective);
else
- old_cap = cap_set_effective(cred->cap_permitted);
+ override_cred->cap_effective =
+ override_cred->cap_permitted;
}
+ old_cred = override_creds(override_cred);
+
res = user_path_at(dfd, filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (res)
goto out;
@@ -485,12 +488,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode)
out_path_release:
path_put(&path);
out:
- cred->fsuid = old_fsuid;
- cred->fsgid = old_fsgid;
-
- if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
- cap_set_effective(old_cap);
-
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ put_cred(override_cred);
return res;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 6fbebac7b1b..0b2fcb698a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -454,8 +454,10 @@ extern int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_pr
extern int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio, const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout);
extern int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification);
extern int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat);
-extern void __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, kernel_cap_t *pP, kernel_cap_t *pE);
-extern int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *eff, kernel_cap_t *inh, kernel_cap_t *perm);
+extern int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ const struct cred *new,
+ const struct cred *old);
+extern int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
static inline int audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
@@ -522,16 +524,20 @@ static inline int audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
*
* -Eric
*/
-static inline void audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, kernel_cap_t *pP, kernel_cap_t *pE)
+static inline int audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ const struct cred *new,
+ const struct cred *old)
{
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
- __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, pP, pE);
+ return __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
+ return 0;
}
-static inline int audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *eff, kernel_cap_t *inh, kernel_cap_t *perm)
+static inline int audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, const struct cred *new,
+ const struct cred *old)
{
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
- return __audit_log_capset(pid, eff, inh, perm);
+ return __audit_log_capset(pid, new, old);
return 0;
}
@@ -566,8 +572,8 @@ extern int audit_signals;
#define audit_mq_timedreceive(d,l,p,t) ({ 0; })
#define audit_mq_notify(d,n) ({ 0; })
#define audit_mq_getsetattr(d,s) ({ 0; })
-#define audit_log_bprm_fcaps(b, p, e) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_log_capset(pid, e, i, p) ({ 0; })
+#define audit_log_bprm_fcaps(b, ncr, ocr) ({ 0; })
+#define audit_log_capset(pid, ncr, ocr) ({ 0; })
#define audit_ptrace(t) ((void)0)
#define audit_n_rules 0
#define audit_signals 0
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 7f26580a5a4..e22f48c2a46 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -519,8 +519,6 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
-kernel_cap_t cap_set_effective(const kernel_cap_t pE_new);
-
/**
* has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
* @t: The task in question
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 62b9e532422..eaf6fa695a0 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ struct thread_group_cred {
struct key *process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process */
struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU deletion hook */
};
+
+extern void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred);
#endif
/*
@@ -137,11 +139,30 @@ struct cred {
struct user_struct *user; /* real user ID subscription */
struct group_info *group_info; /* supplementary groups for euid/fsgid */
struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU deletion hook */
- spinlock_t lock; /* lock for pointer changes */
};
extern void __put_cred(struct cred *);
extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long);
+extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
+extern struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void);
+extern int commit_creds(struct cred *);
+extern void abort_creds(struct cred *);
+extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *) __deprecated;
+extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *) __deprecated;
+extern void __init cred_init(void);
+
+/**
+ * get_new_cred - Get a reference on a new set of credentials
+ * @cred: The new credentials to reference
+ *
+ * Get a reference on the specified set of new credentials. The caller must
+ * release the reference.
+ */
+static inline struct cred *get_new_cred(struct cred *cred)
+{
+ atomic_inc(&cred->usage);
+ return cred;
+}
/**
* get_cred - Get a reference on a set of credentials
@@ -150,10 +171,9 @@ extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long);
* Get a reference on the specified set of credentials. The caller must
* release the reference.
*/
-static inline struct cred *get_cred(struct cred *cred)
+static inline const struct cred *get_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
- atomic_inc(&cred->usage);
- return cred;
+ return get_new_cred((struct cred *) cred);
}
/**
@@ -166,6 +186,8 @@ static inline struct cred *get_cred(struct cred *cred)
static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
+
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(cred)->usage) <= 0);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(cred)->usage))
__put_cred(cred);
}
@@ -250,13 +272,13 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
__groups; \
})
-#define task_cred_xxx(task, xxx) \
-({ \
- __typeof__(task->cred->xxx) ___val; \
- rcu_read_lock(); \
- ___val = __task_cred((task))->xxx; \
- rcu_read_unlock(); \
- ___val; \
+#define task_cred_xxx(task, xxx) \
+({ \
+ __typeof__(((struct cred *)NULL)->xxx) ___val; \
+ rcu_read_lock(); \
+ ___val = __task_cred((task))->xxx; \
+ rcu_read_unlock(); \
+ ___val; \
})
#define task_uid(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), uid))
diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
index 5e24c54b6df..08c3b24ad9a 100644
--- a/include/linux/init_task.h
+++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ extern struct cred init_cred;
.sibling = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.sibling), \
.group_leader = &tsk, \
.cred = &init_cred, \
+ .cred_exec_mutex = \
+ __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tsk.cred_exec_mutex), \
.comm = "swapper", \
.thread = INIT_THREAD, \
.fs = &init_fs, \
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 0836cc838b0..69ecf0934b0 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ struct key;
struct seq_file;
struct user_struct;
struct signal_struct;
+struct cred;
struct key_type;
struct key_owner;
@@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ struct key {
extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
const char *desc,
uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
- struct task_struct *ctx,
+ const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags);
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ extern int key_unlink(struct key *keyring,
struct key *key);
extern struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
- struct task_struct *ctx,
+ const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags,
struct key *dest);
@@ -276,22 +277,12 @@ extern ctl_table key_sysctls[];
/*
* the userspace interface
*/
-extern void switch_uid_keyring(struct user_struct *new_user);
-extern int copy_keys(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk);
-extern void exit_keys(struct task_struct *tsk);
-extern int suid_keys(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred);
extern int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk);
extern void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk);
extern void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk);
extern void key_init(void);
-#define __install_session_keyring(keyring) \
-({ \
- struct key *old_session = current->cred->tgcred->session_keyring; \
- current->cred->tgcred->session_keyring = keyring; \
- old_session; \
-})
-
#else /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#define key_validate(k) 0
@@ -303,11 +294,6 @@ extern void key_init(void);
#define make_key_ref(k, p) NULL
#define key_ref_to_ptr(k) NULL
#define is_key_possessed(k) 0
-#define switch_uid_keyring(u) do { } while(0)
-#define __install_session_keyring(k) ({ NULL; })
-#define copy_keys(f,t) 0
-#define exit_keys(t) do { } while(0)
-#define suid_keys(t) do { } while(0)
#define exec_keys(t) do { } while(0)
#define key_fsuid_changed(t) do { } while(0)
#define key_fsgid_changed(t) do { } while(0)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 2913252989b..121d655e460 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1145,7 +1145,8 @@ struct task_struct {
struct list_head cpu_timers[3];
/* process credentials */
- struct cred *cred; /* actual/objective task credentials */
+ const struct cred *cred; /* actual/objective task credentials (COW) */
+ struct mutex cred_exec_mutex; /* execve vs ptrace cred calculation mutex */
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path
- access with [gs]et_task_comm (which lock
@@ -1720,7 +1721,6 @@ static inline struct user_struct *get_uid(struct user_struct *u)
return u;
}
extern void free_uid(struct user_struct *);
-extern void switch_uid(struct user_struct *);
extern void release_uids(struct user_namespace *ns);
#include <asm/current.h>
@@ -1870,6 +1870,8 @@ static inline unsigned long wait_task_inactive(struct task_struct *p,
#define for_each_process(p) \
for (p = &init_task ; (p = next_task(p)) != &init_task ; )
+extern bool is_single_threaded(struct task_struct *);
+
/*
* Careful: do_each_thread/while_each_thread is a double loop so
* 'break' will not work as expected - use goto instead.
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7e9fe046a0d..68be1125144 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -53,24 +53,21 @@ extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-extern int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-extern void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern int cap_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
+extern int cap_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
-extern int cap_task_post_setuid(uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
-extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p);
+extern int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags);
extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
extern int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
extern int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
extern int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -170,8 +167,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* Compute and set the security attributes of a process being transformed
* by an execve operation based on the old attributes (current->security)
* and the information saved in @bprm->security by the set_security hook.
- * Since this hook function (and its caller) are void, this hook can not
- * return an error. However, it can leave the security attributes of the
+ * Since this function may return an error, in which case the process will
+ * be killed. However, it can leave the security attributes of the
* process unchanged if an access failure occurs at this point.
* bprm_apply_creds is called under task_lock. @unsafe indicates various
* reasons why it may be unsafe to change security state.
@@ -593,15 +590,18 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
* @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @cred_alloc_security:
- * @cred contains the cred struct for child process.
- * Allocate and attach a security structure to the cred->security field.
- * The security field is initialized to NULL when the task structure is
- * allocated.
- * Return 0 if operation was successful.
* @cred_free:
* @cred points to the credentials.
* Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
+ * @cred_prepare:
+ * @new points to the new credentials.
+ * @old points to the original credentials.
+ * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set.
+ * @cred_commit:
+ * @new points to the new credentials.
+ * @old points to the original credentials.
+ * Install a new set of credentials.
* @task_setuid:
* Check permission before setting one or more of the user identity
* attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates
@@ -614,15 +614,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @id2 contains a uid.
* @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_post_setuid:
+ * @task_fix_setuid:
* Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
* identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter
* indicates which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If
- * @flags is LSM_SETID_FS, then @old_ruid is the old fs uid and the other
- * parameters are not used.
- * @old_ruid contains the old real uid (or fs uid if LSM_SETID_FS).
- * @old_euid contains the old effective uid (or -1 if LSM_SETID_FS).
- * @old_suid contains the old saved uid (or -1 if LSM_SETID_FS).
+ * @new is the set of credentials that will be installed. Modifications
+ * should be made to this rather than to @current->cred.
+ * @old is the set of credentials that are being replaces
* @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
* Return 0 on success.
* @task_setgid:
@@ -725,13 +723,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @arg3 contains a argument.
* @arg4 contains a argument.
* @arg5 contains a argument.
- * @rc_p contains a pointer to communicate back the forced return code
- * Return 0 if permission is granted, and non-zero if the security module
- * has taken responsibility (setting *rc_p) for the prctl call.
- * @task_reparent_to_init:
- * Set the security attributes in @p->security for a kernel thread that
- * is being reparented to the init task.
- * @p contains the task_struct for the kernel thread.
+ * Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value to
+ * cause prctl() to return immediately with that value.
* @task_to_inode:
* Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's
* security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes.
@@ -1008,7 +1001,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a
* key.
* @key_ref refers to the key (key pointer + possession attribute bit).
- * @context points to the process to provide the context against which to
+ * @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to
* evaluate the security data on the key.
* @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key.
* Return 1 if permission granted, 0 if permission denied and -ve it the
@@ -1170,6 +1163,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @child process.
* Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
* during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of
+ * tracing check during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of
* binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security
* attributes would be changed by the execve.
* @child contains the task_struct structure for the target process.
@@ -1193,19 +1187,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
* @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
* Return 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained.
- * @capset_check:
- * Check permission before setting the @effective, @inheritable, and
- * @permitted capability sets for the current process.
- * @effective contains the effective capability set.
- * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
- * @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @capset_set:
+ * @capset:
* Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
* the current process.
+ * @new contains the new credentials structure for target process.
+ * @old contains the current credentials structure for target process.
* @effective contains the effective capability set.
* @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
* @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
+ * Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
* @capable:
* Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability.
* @tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
@@ -1297,12 +1287,11 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- int (*capset_check) (const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- void (*capset_set) (const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+ int (*capset) (struct cred *new,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
int (*acct) (struct file *file);
int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
@@ -1314,7 +1303,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*bprm_alloc_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void (*bprm_free_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- void (*bprm_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
+ int (*bprm_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
void (*bprm_post_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int (*bprm_set_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -1405,11 +1394,13 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
- int (*cred_alloc_security) (struct cred *cred);
void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred);
+ int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp);
+ void (*cred_commit)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
- int (*task_post_setuid) (uid_t old_ruid /* or fsuid */ ,
- uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
+ int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int flags);
int (*task_setgid) (gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags);
int (*task_setpgid) (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int (*task_getpgid) (struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1429,8 +1420,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*task_wait) (struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_prctl) (int option, unsigned long arg2,
unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
- unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
- void (*task_reparent_to_init) (struct task_struct *p);
+ unsigned long arg5);
void (*task_to_inode) (struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
@@ -1535,10 +1525,10 @@ struct security_operations {
/* key management security hooks */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- int (*key_alloc) (struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags);
+ int (*key_alloc) (struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags);
void (*key_free) (struct key *key);
int (*key_permission) (key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *context,
+ const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm);
int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
@@ -1564,12 +1554,10 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_acct(struct file *file);
@@ -1583,7 +1571,7 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages);
int security_bprm_alloc(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void security_bprm_free(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-void security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
+int security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
void security_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int security_bprm_set(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -1660,11 +1648,12 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
-int security_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
+int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
+void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
-int security_task_post_setuid(uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
- uid_t old_suid, int flags);
+int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int flags);
int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags);
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1683,8 +1672,7 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid);
int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
-void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p);
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
@@ -1759,18 +1747,13 @@ static inline int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static inline int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return cap_capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
-}
-
-static inline void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
- cap_capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
static inline int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
@@ -1837,9 +1820,9 @@ static inline int security_bprm_alloc(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
static inline void security_bprm_free(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{ }
-static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
+static inline int security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
- cap_bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+ return cap_bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
}
static inline void security_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -2182,13 +2165,20 @@ static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred)
+static inline void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
-{ }
+static inline void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new,
+ const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
static inline int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
int flags)
@@ -2196,10 +2186,11 @@ static inline int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_task_post_setuid(uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
- uid_t old_suid, int flags)
+static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ int flags)
{
- return cap_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, flags);
+ return cap_task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
}
static inline int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2,
@@ -2286,14 +2277,9 @@ static inline int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4,
- unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
-{
- return cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg3, arg5, rc_p);
-}
-
-static inline void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
+ unsigned long arg5)
{
- cap_task_reparent_to_init(p);
+ return cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg3, arg5);
}
static inline void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
@@ -2719,16 +2705,16 @@ static inline void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags);
+int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags);
void security_key_free(struct key *key);
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm);
+ const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm);
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
#else
static inline int security_key_alloc(struct key *key,
- struct task_struct *tsk,
+ const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
return 0;
@@ -2739,7 +2725,7 @@ static inline void security_key_free(struct key *key)
}
static inline int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *context,
+ const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 7e117a231af..db843bff573 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -669,6 +669,7 @@ asmlinkage void __init start_kernel(void)
efi_enter_virtual_mode();
#endif
thread_info_cache_init();
+ cred_init();
fork_init(num_physpages);
proc_caches_init();
buffer_init();
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ae8ef88ade3..bc1e2d854bf 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2546,18 +2546,17 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
/**
* __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
- * @bprm pointer to the bprm being processed
- * @caps the caps read from the disk
+ * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
+ * @new: the proposed new credentials
+ * @old: the old credentials
*
* Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
* store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
*
- * this can fail and we don't care. See the note in audit.h for
- * audit_log_bprm_fcaps() for my explaination....
- *
* -Eric
*/
-void __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, kernel_cap_t *pP, kernel_cap_t *pE)
+int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -2566,7 +2565,7 @@ void __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, kernel_cap_t *pP, kernel_
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ax)
- return;
+ return -ENOMEM;
ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
@@ -2581,26 +2580,27 @@ void __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, kernel_cap_t *pP, kernel_
ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
- ax->old_pcap.permitted = *pP;
- ax->old_pcap.inheritable = current->cred->cap_inheritable;
- ax->old_pcap.effective = *pE;
+ ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
+ ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
+ ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
- ax->new_pcap.permitted = current->cred->cap_permitted;
- ax->new_pcap.inheritable = current->cred->cap_inheritable;
- ax->new_pcap.effective = current->cred->cap_effective;
+ ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
+ ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
+ ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
+ return 0;
}
/**
* __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
- * @pid target pid of the capset call
- * @eff effective cap set
- * @inh inheritible cap set
- * @perm permited cap set
+ * @pid: target pid of the capset call
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the old (current) credentials
*
* Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
* audit system if applicable
*/
-int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *eff, kernel_cap_t *inh, kernel_cap_t *perm)
+int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
+ const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
struct audit_aux_data_capset *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -2617,9 +2617,9 @@ int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *eff, kernel_cap_t *inh, kernel_c
context->aux = (void *)ax;
ax->pid = pid;
- ax->cap.effective = *eff;
- ax->cap.inheritable = *eff;
- ax->cap.permitted = *perm;
+ ax->cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
+ ax->cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
+ ax->cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index a404b980b1b..36b4b4daebe 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -15,12 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
-
-/*
- * This lock protects task->cap_* for all tasks including current.
- * Locking rule: acquire this prior to tasklist_lock.
- */
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock);
+#include "cred-internals.h"
/*
* Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
@@ -128,12 +123,11 @@ static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy)
}
/*
- * If we have configured with filesystem capability support, then the
- * only thing that can change the capabilities of the current process
- * is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code at the
- * same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities in this
- * process. The net result is that we can limit our use of locks to
- * when we are reading the caps of another process.
+ * The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current
+ * process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code
+ * at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities
+ * in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of
+ * locks to when we are reading the caps of another process.
*/
static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp)
@@ -143,7 +137,6 @@ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) {
struct task_struct *target;
- spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
@@ -153,34 +146,12 @@ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
- spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
} else
ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp);
return ret;
}
-/*
- * Atomically modify the effective capabilities returning the original
- * value. No permission check is performed here - it is assumed that the
- * caller is permitted to set the desired effective capabilities.
- */
-kernel_cap_t cap_set_effective(const kernel_cap_t pE_new)
-{
- kernel_cap_t pE_old;
-
- spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
-
- pE_old = current->cred->cap_effective;
- current->cred->cap_effective = pE_new;
-
- spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
-
- return pE_old;
-}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_set_effective);
-
/**
* sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
* @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
@@ -208,7 +179,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
return -EINVAL;
ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP);
-
if (!ret) {
struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
unsigned i;
@@ -270,6 +240,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
unsigned i, tocopy;
kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
+ struct cred *new;
int ret;
pid_t pid;
@@ -284,8 +255,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current))
return -EPERM;
- if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy
- * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct)))
+ if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data,
+ tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct)))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
@@ -300,24 +271,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
i++;
}
- ret = audit_log_capset(pid, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
- if (ret)
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(),
+ &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = audit_log_capset(pid, new, current_cred());
+ if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- /* This lock is required even when filesystem capability support is
- * configured - it protects the sys_capget() call from returning
- * incorrect data in the case that the targeted process is not the
- * current one.
- */
- spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
-
- ret = security_capset_check(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
- /* Having verified that the proposed changes are legal, we now put them
- * into effect.
- */
- if (!ret)
- security_capset_set(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
- spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
+ return commit_creds(new);
+
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred-internals.h b/kernel/cred-internals.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2dc4fc2d0bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/cred-internals.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* Internal credentials stuff
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * user.c
+ */
+static inline void sched_switch_user(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_SCHED
+ sched_move_task(p);
+#endif /* CONFIG_USER_SCHED */
+}
+
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index ac73e361768..cb6b5eda978 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
+#include "cred-internals.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
/*
* The common credentials for the initial task's thread group
@@ -64,7 +68,7 @@ static void release_tgcred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
/*
* Release a set of thread group credentials.
*/
-static void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred)
+void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = cred->tgcred;
@@ -81,79 +85,322 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
- BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
+ if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
+ panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
+ cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
+ security_cred_free(cred);
key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
release_tgcred(cred);
put_group_info(cred->group_info);
free_uid(cred->user);
- security_cred_free(cred);
- kfree(cred);
+ kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred);
}
/**
* __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials
- * @sec: The record to release
+ * @cred: The record to release
*
* Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain.
*/
void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
{
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
+
call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
+/**
+ * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
+ *
+ * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds
+ * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to
+ * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
+ * calling commit_creds().
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
+ */
+struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task = current;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
+
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->cred->usage) < 1);
+
+ new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new)
+ return NULL;
+
+ old = task->cred;
+ memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
+
+ atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+ get_group_info(new->group_info);
+ get_uid(new->user);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ key_get(new->thread_keyring);
+ key_get(new->request_key_auth);
+ atomic_inc(&new->tgcred->usage);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ new->security = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
+ goto error;
+ return new;
+
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
+
+/*
+ * prepare new credentials for the usermode helper dispatcher
+ */
+struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL;
+#endif
+ struct cred *new;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!tgcred)
+ return NULL;
+#endif
+
+ new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new)
+ return NULL;
+
+ memcpy(new, &init_cred, sizeof(struct cred));
+
+ atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+ get_group_info(new->group_info);
+ get_uid(new->user);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ new->thread_keyring = NULL;
+ new->request_key_auth = NULL;
+ new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT;
+
+ atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
+ spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
+ new->tgcred = tgcred;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ new->security = NULL;
+#endif
+ if (security_prepare_creds(new, &init_cred, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) != 1);
+ return new;
+
+error:
+ put_cred(new);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/*
* Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
+ *
+ * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
+ * set.
*/
int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- struct cred *pcred;
- int ret;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
+#endif
+ struct cred *new;
+
+ mutex_init(&p->cred_exec_mutex);
- pcred = kmemdup(p->cred, sizeof(*p->cred), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!pcred)
+ if (
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ !p->cred->thread_keyring &&
+#endif
+ clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
+ ) {
+ get_cred(p->cred);
+ atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) {
- atomic_inc(&pcred->tgcred->usage);
- } else {
- pcred->tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cred), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!pcred->tgcred) {
- kfree(pcred);
+ /* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
+ * had one */
+ if (new->thread_keyring) {
+ key_put(new->thread_keyring);
+ new->thread_keyring = NULL;
+ if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
+ install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
+ }
+
+ /* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
+ * a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
+ * bit */
+ if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
+ tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tgcred) {
+ put_cred(new);
return -ENOMEM;
}
- atomic_set(&pcred->tgcred->usage, 1);
- spin_lock_init(&pcred->tgcred->lock);
- pcred->tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
- pcred->tgcred->session_keyring =
- key_get(p->cred->tgcred->session_keyring);
+ atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
+ spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
+ tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
+ tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
+
+ release_tgcred(new);
+ new->tgcred = tgcred;
}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
- pcred->security = NULL;
-#endif
+ atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
+ p->cred = new;
+ return 0;
+}
- ret = security_cred_alloc(pcred);
- if (ret < 0) {
- release_tgcred(pcred);
- kfree(pcred);
- return ret;
+/**
+ * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
+ * @new: The credentials to be assigned
+ *
+ * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
+ * the old set.
+ *
+ * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
+ *
+ * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end
+ * of, say, sys_setgid().
+ */
+int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task = current;
+ const struct cred *old;
+
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->cred->usage) < 1);
+
+ old = task->cred;
+ security_commit_creds(new, old);
+
+ /* dumpability changes */
+ if (old->euid != new->euid ||
+ old->egid != new->egid ||
+ old->fsuid != new->fsuid ||
+ old->fsgid != new->fsgid ||
+ !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) {
+ set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ task->pdeath_signal = 0;
+ smp_wmb();
}
- atomic_set(&pcred->usage, 1);
- get_group_info(pcred->group_info);
- get_uid(pcred->user);
- key_get(pcred->thread_keyring);
- key_get(pcred->request_key_auth);
+ /* alter the thread keyring */
+ if (new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
+ key_fsuid_changed(task);
+ if (new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
+ key_fsgid_changed(task);
+
+ /* do it
+ * - What if a process setreuid()'s and this brings the
+ * new uid over his NPROC rlimit? We can check this now
+ * cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
+ * we should be checking for it. -DaveM
+ */
+ if (new->user != old->user)
+ atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
+ if (new->user != old->user)
+ atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
+
+ sched_switch_user(task);
+
+ /* send notifications */
+ if (new->uid != old->uid ||
+ new->euid != old->euid ||
+ new->suid != old->suid ||
+ new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
+ proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);
- atomic_inc(&pcred->user->processes);
+ if (new->gid != old->gid ||
+ new->egid != old->egid ||
+ new->sgid != old->sgid ||
+ new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
+ proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
- /* RCU assignment is unneeded here as no-one can have accessed this
- * pointer yet, barring us */
- p->cred = pcred;
+ put_cred(old);
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
+
+/**
+ * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task
+ * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied
+ *
+ * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the
+ * current task.
+ */
+void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
+{
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
+ put_cred(new);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
+
+/**
+ * override_creds - Temporarily override the current process's credentials
+ * @new: The credentials to be assigned
+ *
+ * Install a set of temporary override credentials on the current process,
+ * returning the old set for later reversion.
+ */
+const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+ const struct cred *old = current->cred;
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, get_cred(new));
+ return old;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
+
+/**
+ * revert_creds - Revert a temporary credentials override
+ * @old: The credentials to be restored
+ *
+ * Revert a temporary set of override credentials to an old set, discarding the
+ * override set.
+ */
+void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
+{
+ const struct cred *override = current->cred;
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
+ put_cred(override);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
+
+/*
+ * initialise the credentials stuff
+ */
+void __init cred_init(void)
+{
+ /* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */
+ cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred),
+ 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index bbc22530f2c..c0711da1548 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -47,12 +47,14 @@
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
+#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <trace/sched.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include "cred-internals.h"
static void exit_mm(struct task_struct * tsk);
@@ -338,12 +340,12 @@ static void reparent_to_kthreadd(void)
/* cpus_allowed? */
/* rt_priority? */
/* signals? */
- security_task_reparent_to_init(current);
memcpy(current->signal->rlim, init_task.signal->rlim,
sizeof(current->signal->rlim));
- atomic_inc(&(INIT_USER->__count));
+
+ atomic_inc(&init_cred.usage);
+ commit_creds(&init_cred);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
- switch_uid(INIT_USER);
}
void __set_special_pids(struct pid *pid)
@@ -1085,7 +1087,6 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
check_stack_usage();
exit_thread();
cgroup_exit(tsk, 1);
- exit_keys(tsk);
if (group_dead && tsk->signal->leader)
disassociate_ctty(1);
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index ded1972672a..82a7948a664 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1084,10 +1084,8 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
goto bad_fork_cleanup_sighand;
if ((retval = copy_mm(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_signal;
- if ((retval = copy_keys(clone_flags, p)))
- goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
if ((retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p)))
- goto bad_fork_cleanup_keys;
+ goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
if ((retval = copy_io(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
retval = copy_thread(0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
@@ -1252,8 +1250,6 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_io:
put_io_context(p->io_context);
bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces:
exit_task_namespaces(p);
-bad_fork_cleanup_keys:
- exit_keys(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_mm:
if (p->mm)
mmput(p->mm);
@@ -1281,6 +1277,7 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup:
bad_fork_cleanup_put_domain:
module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
bad_fork_cleanup_count:
+ atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
put_cred(p->cred);
bad_fork_free:
free_task(p);
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index f044f8f5770..b46dbb90866 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -118,10 +118,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_module);
struct subprocess_info {
struct work_struct work;
struct completion *complete;
+ struct cred *cred;
char *path;
char **argv;
char **envp;
- struct key *ring;
enum umh_wait wait;
int retval;
struct file *stdin;
@@ -134,19 +134,20 @@ struct subprocess_info {
static int ____call_usermodehelper(void *data)
{
struct subprocess_info *sub_info = data;
- struct key *new_session, *old_session;
int retval;
- /* Unblock all signals and set the session keyring. */
- new_session = key_get(sub_info->ring);
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&sub_info->cred->usage) != 1);
+
+ /* Unblock all signals */
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
- old_session = __install_session_keyring(new_session);
flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
recalc_sigpending();
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
- key_put(old_session);
+ /* Install the credentials */
+ commit_creds(sub_info->cred);
+ sub_info->cred = NULL;
/* Install input pipe when needed */
if (sub_info->stdin) {
@@ -185,6 +186,8 @@ void call_usermodehelper_freeinfo(struct subprocess_info *info)
{
if (info->cleanup)
(*info->cleanup)(info->argv, info->envp);
+ if (info->cred)
+ put_cred(info->cred);
kfree(info);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_usermodehelper_freeinfo);
@@ -240,6 +243,8 @@ static void __call_usermodehelper(struct work_struct *work)
pid_t pid;
enum umh_wait wait = sub_info->wait;
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&sub_info->cred->usage) != 1);
+
/* CLONE_VFORK: wait until the usermode helper has execve'd
* successfully We need the data structures to stay around
* until that is done. */
@@ -362,6 +367,9 @@ struct subprocess_info *call_usermodehelper_setup(char *path, char **argv,
sub_info->path = path;
sub_info->argv = argv;
sub_info->envp = envp;
+ sub_info->cred = prepare_usermodehelper_creds();
+ if (!sub_info->cred)
+ return NULL;
out:
return sub_info;
@@ -376,7 +384,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_usermodehelper_setup);
void call_usermodehelper_setkeys(struct subprocess_info *info,
struct key *session_keyring)
{
- info->ring = session_keyring;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = info->cred->tgcred;
+ key_put(tgcred->session_keyring);
+ tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(session_keyring);
+#else
+ BUG();
+#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_usermodehelper_setkeys);
@@ -444,6 +458,8 @@ int call_usermodehelper_exec(struct subprocess_info *sub_info,
DECLARE_COMPLETION_ONSTACK(done);
int retval = 0;
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&sub_info->cred->usage) != 1);
+
helper_lock();
if (sub_info->path[0] == '\0')
goto out;
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index b9d5f4e4f6a..f764b880695 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -171,6 +171,14 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
if (same_thread_group(task, current))
goto out;
+ /* Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference;
+ * SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently under ptrace.
+ */
+ retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ retval = -EPERM;
repeat:
/*
* Nasty, nasty.
@@ -210,6 +218,7 @@ repeat:
bad:
write_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklist_lock, flags);
task_unlock(task);
+ mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
out:
return retval;
}
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 84989124baf..2a64304ed54 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ int next_signal(struct sigpending *pending, sigset_t *mask)
/*
* allocate a new signal queue record
* - this may be called without locks if and only if t == current, otherwise an
- * appopriate lock must be held to protect t's user_struct
+ * appopriate lock must be held to stop the target task from exiting
*/
static struct sigqueue *__sigqueue_alloc(struct task_struct *t, gfp_t flags,
int override_rlimit)
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static struct sigqueue *__sigqueue_alloc(struct task_struct *t, gfp_t flags,
* caller must be holding the RCU readlock (by way of a spinlock) and
* we use RCU protection here
*/
- user = __task_cred(t)->user;
+ user = get_uid(__task_cred(t)->user);
atomic_inc(&user->sigpending);
if (override_rlimit ||
atomic_read(&user->sigpending) <=
@@ -202,12 +202,14 @@ static struct sigqueue *__sigqueue_alloc(struct task_struct *t, gfp_t flags,
q = kmem_cache_alloc(sigqueue_cachep, flags);
if (unlikely(q == NULL)) {
atomic_dec(&user->sigpending);
+ free_uid(user);
} else {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->list);
q->flags = 0;
- q->user = get_uid(user);
+ q->user = user;
}
- return(q);
+
+ return q;
}
static void __sigqueue_free(struct sigqueue *q)
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index ccc9eb736d3..ab735040468 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval)
} while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
break;
case PRIO_USER:
- user = cred->user;
+ user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user;
if (!who)
who = cred->uid;
else if ((who != cred->uid) &&
@@ -479,47 +479,48 @@ void ctrl_alt_del(void)
*/
asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
- int old_rgid = cred->gid;
- int old_egid = cred->egid;
- int new_rgid = old_rgid;
- int new_egid = old_egid;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
int retval;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ old = current_cred();
+
retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
if (retval)
- return retval;
+ goto error;
+ retval = -EPERM;
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
- if ((old_rgid == rgid) ||
- (cred->egid == rgid) ||
+ if (old->gid == rgid ||
+ old->egid == rgid ||
capable(CAP_SETGID))
- new_rgid = rgid;
+ new->gid = rgid;
else
- return -EPERM;
+ goto error;
}
if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
- if ((old_rgid == egid) ||
- (cred->egid == egid) ||
- (cred->sgid == egid) ||
+ if (old->gid == egid ||
+ old->egid == egid ||
+ old->sgid == egid ||
capable(CAP_SETGID))
- new_egid = egid;
+ new->egid = egid;
else
- return -EPERM;
- }
- if (new_egid != old_egid) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- smp_wmb();
+ goto error;
}
+
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
- (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
- cred->sgid = new_egid;
- cred->fsgid = new_egid;
- cred->egid = new_egid;
- cred->gid = new_rgid;
- key_fsgid_changed(current);
- proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID);
- return 0;
+ (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid))
+ new->sgid = new->egid;
+ new->fsgid = new->egid;
+
+ return commit_creds(new);
+
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return retval;
}
/*
@@ -529,40 +530,42 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
*/
asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
- int old_egid = cred->egid;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
int retval;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ old = current_cred();
+
retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
if (retval)
- return retval;
+ goto error;
- if (capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
- if (old_egid != gid) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- smp_wmb();
- }
- cred->gid = cred->egid = cred->sgid = cred->fsgid = gid;
- } else if ((gid == cred->gid) || (gid == cred->sgid)) {
- if (old_egid != gid) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- smp_wmb();
- }
- cred->egid = cred->fsgid = gid;
- }
+ retval = -EPERM;
+ if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid;
+ else if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->sgid)
+ new->egid = new->fsgid = gid;
else
- return -EPERM;
+ goto error;
- key_fsgid_changed(current);
- proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID);
- return 0;
+ return commit_creds(new);
+
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return retval;
}
-static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear)
+/*
+ * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID
+ */
+static int set_user(struct cred *new)
{
struct user_struct *new_user;
- new_user = alloc_uid(current->nsproxy->user_ns, new_ruid);
+ new_user = alloc_uid(current->nsproxy->user_ns, new->uid);
if (!new_user)
return -EAGAIN;
@@ -573,13 +576,8 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear)
return -EAGAIN;
}
- switch_uid(new_user);
-
- if (dumpclear) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- smp_wmb();
- }
- current->cred->uid = new_ruid;
+ free_uid(new->user);
+ new->user = new_user;
return 0;
}
@@ -600,55 +598,56 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear)
*/
asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
- int old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_euid;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
int retval;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ old = current_cred();
+
retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
if (retval)
- return retval;
-
- new_ruid = old_ruid = cred->uid;
- new_euid = old_euid = cred->euid;
- old_suid = cred->suid;
+ goto error;
+ retval = -EPERM;
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
- new_ruid = ruid;
- if ((old_ruid != ruid) &&
- (cred->euid != ruid) &&
+ new->uid = ruid;
+ if (old->uid != ruid &&
+ old->euid != ruid &&
!capable(CAP_SETUID))
- return -EPERM;
+ goto error;
}
if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
- new_euid = euid;
- if ((old_ruid != euid) &&
- (cred->euid != euid) &&
- (cred->suid != euid) &&
+ new->euid = euid;
+ if (old->uid != euid &&
+ old->euid != euid &&
+ old->suid != euid &&
!capable(CAP_SETUID))
- return -EPERM;
+ goto error;
}
- if (new_ruid != old_ruid && set_user(new_ruid, new_euid != old_euid) < 0)
- return -EAGAIN;
+ retval = -EAGAIN;
+ if (new->uid != old->uid && set_user(new) < 0)
+ goto error;
- if (new_euid != old_euid) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- smp_wmb();
- }
- cred->fsuid = cred->euid = new_euid;
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
- (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old_ruid))
- cred->suid = cred->euid;
- cred->fsuid = cred->euid;
-
- key_fsuid_changed(current);
- proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID);
+ (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid))
+ new->suid = new->euid;
+ new->fsuid = new->euid;
- return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RE);
-}
+ retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto error;
+ return commit_creds(new);
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return retval;
+}
/*
* setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
@@ -663,37 +662,41 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
*/
asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
- int old_euid = cred->euid;
- int old_ruid, old_suid, new_suid;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
int retval;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ old = current_cred();
+
retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
if (retval)
- return retval;
+ goto error;
- old_ruid = cred->uid;
- old_suid = cred->suid;
- new_suid = old_suid;
-
+ retval = -EPERM;
if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
- if (uid != old_ruid && set_user(uid, old_euid != uid) < 0)
- return -EAGAIN;
- new_suid = uid;
- } else if ((uid != cred->uid) && (uid != new_suid))
- return -EPERM;
-
- if (old_euid != uid) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- smp_wmb();
+ new->suid = new->uid = uid;
+ if (uid != old->uid && set_user(new) < 0) {
+ retval = -EAGAIN;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else if (uid != old->uid && uid != new->suid) {
+ goto error;
}
- cred->fsuid = cred->euid = uid;
- cred->suid = new_suid;
- key_fsuid_changed(current);
- proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID);
+ new->fsuid = new->euid = uid;
+
+ retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ return commit_creds(new);
- return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_ID);
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return retval;
}
@@ -703,47 +706,53 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
*/
asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
- int old_ruid = cred->uid;
- int old_euid = cred->euid;
- int old_suid = cred->suid;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
int retval;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
if (retval)
- return retval;
+ goto error;
+ old = current_cred();
+ retval = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
- if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != cred->uid) &&
- (ruid != cred->euid) && (ruid != cred->suid))
- return -EPERM;
- if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && (euid != cred->uid) &&
- (euid != cred->euid) && (euid != cred->suid))
- return -EPERM;
- if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && (suid != cred->uid) &&
- (suid != cred->euid) && (suid != cred->suid))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && ruid != old->uid &&
+ ruid != old->euid && ruid != old->suid)
+ goto error;
+ if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid &&
+ euid != old->euid && euid != old->suid)
+ goto error;
+ if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && suid != old->uid &&
+ suid != old->euid && suid != old->suid)
+ goto error;
}
+
+ retval = -EAGAIN;
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
- if (ruid != cred->uid &&
- set_user(ruid, euid != cred->euid) < 0)
- return -EAGAIN;
+ new->uid = ruid;
+ if (ruid != old->uid && set_user(new) < 0)
+ goto error;
}
- if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
- if (euid != cred->euid) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- smp_wmb();
- }
- cred->euid = euid;
- }
- cred->fsuid = cred->euid;
+ if (euid != (uid_t) -1)
+ new->euid = euid;
if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
- cred->suid = suid;
+ new->suid = suid;
+ new->fsuid = new->euid;
- key_fsuid_changed(current);
- proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID);
+ retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto error;
- return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
+ return commit_creds(new);
+
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return retval;
}
asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t __user *ruid, uid_t __user *euid, uid_t __user *suid)
@@ -763,40 +772,45 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t __user *ruid, uid_t __user *euid, uid_t __us
*/
asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
int retval;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ old = current_cred();
+
retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES);
if (retval)
- return retval;
+ goto error;
+ retval = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
- if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && (rgid != cred->gid) &&
- (rgid != cred->egid) && (rgid != cred->sgid))
- return -EPERM;
- if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && (egid != cred->gid) &&
- (egid != cred->egid) && (egid != cred->sgid))
- return -EPERM;
- if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && (sgid != cred->gid) &&
- (sgid != cred->egid) && (sgid != cred->sgid))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid &&
+ rgid != old->egid && rgid != old->sgid)
+ goto error;
+ if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid &&
+ egid != old->egid && egid != old->sgid)
+ goto error;
+ if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && sgid != old->gid &&
+ sgid != old->egid && sgid != old->sgid)
+ goto error;
}
- if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
- if (egid != cred->egid) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- smp_wmb();
- }
- cred->egid = egid;
- }
- cred->fsgid = cred->egid;
+
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
- cred->gid = rgid;
+ new->gid = rgid;
+ if (egid != (gid_t) -1)
+ new->egid = egid;
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
- cred->sgid = sgid;
+ new->sgid = sgid;
+ new->fsgid = new->egid;
- key_fsgid_changed(current);
- proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID);
- return 0;
+ return commit_creds(new);
+
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return retval;
}
asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t __user *rgid, gid_t __user *egid, gid_t __user *sgid)
@@ -820,28 +834,35 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t __user *rgid, gid_t __user *egid, gid_t __us
*/
asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
- int old_fsuid;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
+ uid_t old_fsuid;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return current_fsuid();
+ old = current_cred();
+ old_fsuid = old->fsuid;
- old_fsuid = cred->fsuid;
- if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
- return old_fsuid;
+ if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS) < 0)
+ goto error;
- if (uid == cred->uid || uid == cred->euid ||
- uid == cred->suid || uid == cred->fsuid ||
+ if (uid == old->uid || uid == old->euid ||
+ uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid ||
capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
if (uid != old_fsuid) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- smp_wmb();
+ new->fsuid = uid;
+ if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
+ goto change_okay;
}
- cred->fsuid = uid;
}
- key_fsuid_changed(current);
- proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID);
-
- security_task_post_setuid(old_fsuid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS);
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return old_fsuid;
+change_okay:
+ commit_creds(new);
return old_fsuid;
}
@@ -850,24 +871,34 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
*/
asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
- int old_fsgid;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
+ gid_t old_fsgid;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return current_fsgid();
+ old = current_cred();
+ old_fsgid = old->fsgid;
- old_fsgid = cred->fsgid;
if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
- return old_fsgid;
+ goto error;
- if (gid == cred->gid || gid == cred->egid ||
- gid == cred->sgid || gid == cred->fsgid ||
+ if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->egid ||
+ gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid ||
capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
if (gid != old_fsgid) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- smp_wmb();
+ new->fsgid = gid;
+ goto change_okay;
}
- cred->fsgid = gid;
- key_fsgid_changed(current);
- proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID);
}
+
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return old_fsgid;
+
+change_okay:
+ commit_creds(new);
return old_fsgid;
}
@@ -1136,7 +1167,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_free);
/* export the group_info to a user-space array */
static int groups_to_user(gid_t __user *grouplist,
- struct group_info *group_info)
+ const struct group_info *group_info)
{
int i;
unsigned int count = group_info->ngroups;
@@ -1227,31 +1258,25 @@ int groups_search(const struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp)
}
/**
- * set_groups - Change a group subscription in a security record
- * @sec: The security record to alter
- * @group_info: The group list to impose
+ * set_groups - Change a group subscription in a set of credentials
+ * @new: The newly prepared set of credentials to alter
+ * @group_info: The group list to install
*
- * Validate a group subscription and, if valid, impose it upon a task security
- * record.
+ * Validate a group subscription and, if valid, insert it into a set
+ * of credentials.
*/
-int set_groups(struct cred *cred, struct group_info *group_info)
+int set_groups(struct cred *new, struct group_info *group_info)
{
int retval;
- struct group_info *old_info;
retval = security_task_setgroups(group_info);
if (retval)
return retval;
+ put_group_info(new->group_info);
groups_sort(group_info);
get_group_info(group_info);
-
- spin_lock(&cred->lock);
- old_info = cred->group_info;
- cred->group_info = group_info;
- spin_unlock(&cred->lock);
-
- put_group_info(old_info);
+ new->group_info = group_info;
return 0;
}
@@ -1266,7 +1291,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_groups);
*/
int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info)
{
- return set_groups(current->cred, group_info);
+ struct cred *new;
+ int ret;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = set_groups(new, group_info);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return commit_creds(new);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_current_groups);
@@ -1666,9 +1704,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
long error;
- if (security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, &error))
+ error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+ if (error != -ENOSYS)
return error;
+ error = 0;
switch (option) {
case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index 104d22ac84d..d476307dd4b 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include "cred-internals.h"
struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
.kref = {
@@ -104,16 +105,10 @@ static int sched_create_user(struct user_struct *up)
return rc;
}
-static void sched_switch_user(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- sched_move_task(p);
-}
-
#else /* CONFIG_USER_SCHED */
static void sched_destroy_user(struct user_struct *up) { }
static int sched_create_user(struct user_struct *up) { return 0; }
-static void sched_switch_user(struct task_struct *p) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_USER_SCHED */
@@ -448,36 +443,6 @@ out_unlock:
return NULL;
}
-void switch_uid(struct user_struct *new_user)
-{
- struct user_struct *old_user;
-
- /* What if a process setreuid()'s and this brings the
- * new uid over his NPROC rlimit? We can check this now
- * cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
- * we should be checking for it. -DaveM
- */
- old_user = current->cred->user;
- atomic_inc(&new_user->processes);
- atomic_dec(&old_user->processes);
- switch_uid_keyring(new_user);
- current->cred->user = new_user;
- sched_switch_user(current);
-
- /*
- * We need to synchronize with __sigqueue_alloc()
- * doing a get_uid(p->user).. If that saw the old
- * user value, we need to wait until it has exited
- * its critical region before we can free the old
- * structure.
- */
- smp_mb();
- spin_unlock_wait(&current->sighand->siglock);
-
- free_uid(old_user);
- suid_keys(current);
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
void release_uids(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index f82730adea0..0d9c51d6733 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static struct user_namespace *clone_user_ns(struct user_namespace *old_ns)
{
struct user_namespace *ns;
struct user_struct *new_user;
+ struct cred *new;
int n;
ns = kmalloc(sizeof(struct user_namespace), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -45,7 +46,16 @@ static struct user_namespace *clone_user_ns(struct user_namespace *old_ns)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
- switch_uid(new_user);
+ /* Install the new user */
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new) {
+ free_uid(new_user);
+ free_uid(ns->root_user);
+ kfree(ns);
+ }
+ free_uid(new->user);
+ new->user = new_user;
+ commit_creds(new);
return ns;
}
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 7cb65d85aeb..80fe8a3ec12 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o \
idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o prio_tree.o \
sha1.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
- proportions.o prio_heap.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o
+ proportions.o prio_heap.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o is_single_threaded.o
lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o
lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
index 9a8ff684da7..ad8c7a782da 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ int rxrpc_get_server_data_key(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
time_t expiry,
u32 kvno)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *key;
int ret;
@@ -297,7 +298,7 @@ int rxrpc_get_server_data_key(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
_enter("");
- key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, "x", 0, 0, current, 0,
+ key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, "x", 0, 0, cred, 0,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
_leave(" = -ENOMEM [alloc %ld]", PTR_ERR(key));
@@ -340,10 +341,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_get_server_data_key);
*/
struct key *rxrpc_get_null_key(const char *keyname)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *key;
int ret;
- key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, keyname, 0, 0, current,
+ key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, keyname, 0, 0, cred,
KEY_POS_SEARCH, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(key))
return key;
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index fac2f61b69a..efeb6d9e0e6 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -340,12 +340,16 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
return 0;
}
-static int cap_cred_alloc_security(struct cred *cred)
+static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+}
+
+static int cap_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
{
return 0;
}
-static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+static void cap_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
}
@@ -750,7 +754,7 @@ static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *ctx,
+static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
return 0;
@@ -760,7 +764,7 @@ static void cap_key_free(struct key *key)
{
}
-static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, struct task_struct *context,
+static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm)
{
return 0;
@@ -814,8 +818,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset_check);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset_set);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, acct);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
@@ -890,10 +893,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_security);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_post_setuid);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid);
@@ -910,7 +914,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_wait);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_kill);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_prctl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 0384bf95db6..b5419273f92 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
int ret = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
- if (!cap_issubset(child->cred->cap_permitted,
- current->cred->cap_permitted) &&
+ if (!cap_issubset(__task_cred(child)->cap_permitted,
+ current_cred()->cap_permitted) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
ret = -EPERM;
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
int ret = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
- if (!cap_issubset(current->cred->cap_permitted,
- parent->cred->cap_permitted) &&
+ if (!cap_issubset(current_cred()->cap_permitted,
+ __task_cred(parent)->cap_permitted) &&
!has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
ret = -EPERM;
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
* to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
* does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
*/
- return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0);
+ return cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0;
}
static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }
@@ -132,52 +132,39 @@ static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
-
- if (cap_inh_is_capped()
- && !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
- cap_combine(cred->cap_inheritable,
- cred->cap_permitted))) {
+ if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
+ !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+ cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
+ old->cap_permitted)))
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
- }
+
if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
- cap_combine(cred->cap_inheritable,
- cred->cap_bset))) {
+ cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
+ old->cap_bset)))
/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
return -EPERM;
- }
/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
- if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
- cap_combine (cred->cap_permitted,
- cred->cap_permitted))) {
+ if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted))
return -EPERM;
- }
/* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
- if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
+ if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted))
return -EPERM;
- }
+ new->cap_effective = *effective;
+ new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
+ new->cap_permitted = *permitted;
return 0;
}
-void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
-
- cred->cap_effective = *effective;
- cred->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
- cred->cap_permitted = *permitted;
-}
-
static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
cap_clear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted);
@@ -382,41 +369,46 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return ret;
}
-void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
+int cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+ const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+ struct cred *new;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- if (bprm->e_uid != cred->uid || bprm->e_gid != cred->gid ||
+ if (bprm->e_uid != old->uid || bprm->e_gid != old->gid ||
!cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
- cred->cap_permitted)) {
+ old->cap_permitted)) {
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
- bprm->e_uid = cred->uid;
- bprm->e_gid = cred->gid;
+ bprm->e_uid = old->uid;
+ bprm->e_gid = old->gid;
}
if (cap_limit_ptraced_target()) {
bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_intersect(
bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
- cred->cap_permitted);
+ new->cap_permitted);
}
}
}
- cred->suid = cred->euid = cred->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
- cred->sgid = cred->egid = cred->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
+ new->suid = new->euid = new->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
+ new->sgid = new->egid = new->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
/* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
* in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
* capability rules */
if (!is_global_init(current)) {
- cred->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
+ new->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
if (bprm->cap_effective)
- cred->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
+ new->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
else
- cap_clear(cred->cap_effective);
+ cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
}
/*
@@ -431,15 +423,15 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
- if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_effective)) {
- if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_effective) ||
- (bprm->e_uid != 0) || (cred->uid != 0) ||
+ if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
+ if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
+ bprm->e_uid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
- audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &cred->cap_permitted,
- &cred->cap_effective);
+ audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
}
- cred->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ return commit_creds(new);
}
int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -514,65 +506,49 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
* files..
* Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
*/
-static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
- int old_suid)
+static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
-
- if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
- (cred->uid != 0 && cred->euid != 0 && cred->suid != 0) &&
+ if ((old->uid == 0 || old->euid == 0 || old->suid == 0) &&
+ (new->uid != 0 && new->euid != 0 && new->suid != 0) &&
!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
- cap_clear(cred->cap_permitted);
- cap_clear(cred->cap_effective);
- }
- if (old_euid == 0 && cred->euid != 0) {
- cap_clear(cred->cap_effective);
- }
- if (old_euid != 0 && cred->euid == 0) {
- cred->cap_effective = cred->cap_permitted;
+ cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);
+ cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
}
+ if (old->euid == 0 && new->euid != 0)
+ cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
+ if (old->euid != 0 && new->euid == 0)
+ new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
}
-int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
- int flags)
+int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
-
switch (flags) {
case LSM_SETID_RE:
case LSM_SETID_ID:
case LSM_SETID_RES:
/* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
- if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
- cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
- }
+ if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
+ cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);
break;
case LSM_SETID_FS:
- {
- uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid;
-
- /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */
+ /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */
- /*
- * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
- * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
- */
-
- if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
- if (old_fsuid == 0 && cred->fsuid != 0) {
- cred->cap_effective =
- cap_drop_fs_set(
- cred->cap_effective);
- }
- if (old_fsuid != 0 && cred->fsuid == 0) {
- cred->cap_effective =
- cap_raise_fs_set(
- cred->cap_effective,
- cred->cap_permitted);
- }
+ /*
+ * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
+ * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
+ */
+ if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
+ if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0) {
+ new->cap_effective =
+ cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);
+ }
+ if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0) {
+ new->cap_effective =
+ cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,
+ new->cap_permitted);
}
- break;
}
+ break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -628,13 +604,14 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
* this task could get inconsistent info. There can be no
* racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
*/
-static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
+static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;
- cap_lower(current->cred->cap_bset, cap);
+
+ cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);
return 0;
}
@@ -655,22 +632,29 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
#endif
int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
- struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct cred *new;
long error = 0;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
switch (option) {
case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
+ error = -EINVAL;
if (!cap_valid(arg2))
- error = -EINVAL;
- else
- error = !!cap_raised(cred->cap_bset, arg2);
- break;
+ goto error;
+ error = !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset, arg2);
+ goto no_change;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
- error = cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
- break;
+ error = cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2);
+ if (error < 0)
+ goto error;
+ goto changed;
/*
* The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
@@ -692,12 +676,12 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
* capability-based-privilege environment.
*/
case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
- if ((((cred->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
- & (cred->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
- || ((cred->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
- & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
- || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)) { /*[4]*/
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if ((((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
+ & (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
+ || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
+ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
+ || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
* [2] no unlocking of locks
@@ -705,50 +689,51 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
* [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
* the "sendmail capabilities bug")
*/
- error = -EPERM; /* cannot change a locked bit */
- } else {
- cred->securebits = arg2;
- }
- break;
+ )
+ /* cannot change a locked bit */
+ goto error;
+ new->securebits = arg2;
+ goto changed;
+
case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
- error = cred->securebits;
- break;
+ error = new->securebits;
+ goto no_change;
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
error = 1;
- break;
+ goto no_change;
+
case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
+ error = -EINVAL;
if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
- error = -EINVAL;
- else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
- error = -EPERM;
- else if (arg2)
- cred->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ goto error;
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
+ goto error;
+ if (arg2)
+ new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
else
- cred->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
- break;
+ new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ goto changed;
default:
/* No functionality available - continue with default */
- return 0;
+ error = -ENOSYS;
+ goto error;
}
/* Functionality provided */
- *rc_p = error;
- return 1;
-}
-
-void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
-{
- struct cred *cred = p->cred;
-
- cap_set_init_eff(cred->cap_effective);
- cap_clear(cred->cap_inheritable);
- cap_set_full(cred->cap_permitted);
- p->cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
+changed:
+ return commit_creds(new);
+
+no_change:
+ error = 0;
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return error;
}
int cap_syslog (int type)
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index d1586c62978..81932abefe7 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#ifndef _INTERNAL_H
#define _INTERNAL_H
+#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
static inline __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
printk(KERN_DEBUG "<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "xxx" FMT"yyy\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG " "FMT"\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
#else
#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
@@ -97,7 +98,7 @@ extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
typedef int (*key_match_func_t)(const struct key *, const void *);
extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- struct task_struct *tsk,
+ const struct cred *cred,
struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match);
@@ -105,13 +106,13 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
- struct task_struct *tsk);
+ const struct cred *cred);
extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
extern int install_user_keyrings(void);
-extern int install_thread_keyring(void);
-extern int install_process_keyring(void);
+extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *);
+extern int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *);
extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
@@ -130,12 +131,12 @@ extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
* check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way
*/
extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *context,
+ const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm);
static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, key_perm_t perm)
{
- return key_task_permission(key_ref, current, perm);
+ return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), perm);
}
/* required permissions */
@@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, key_perm_t perm)
struct request_key_auth {
struct key *target_key;
struct key *dest_keyring;
- struct task_struct *context;
+ const struct cred *cred;
void *callout_info;
size_t callout_len;
pid_t pid;
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index a6ca39ed3b0..f76c8a546fd 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ serial_exists:
* instantiate the key or discard it before returning
*/
struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
- uid_t uid, gid_t gid, struct task_struct *ctx,
+ uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags)
{
struct key_user *user = NULL;
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
#endif
/* let the security module know about the key */
- ret = security_key_alloc(key, ctx, flags);
+ ret = security_key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto security_error;
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
const void *data,
size_t datalen,
struct key *keyring,
- struct key *instkey)
+ struct key *authkey)
{
int ret, awaken;
@@ -421,8 +421,8 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
/* disable the authorisation key */
- if (instkey)
- key_revoke(instkey);
+ if (authkey)
+ key_revoke(authkey);
}
}
@@ -444,14 +444,14 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
const void *data,
size_t datalen,
struct key *keyring,
- struct key *instkey)
+ struct key *authkey)
{
int ret;
if (keyring)
down_write(&keyring->sem);
- ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, instkey);
+ ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey);
if (keyring)
up_write(&keyring->sem);
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_instantiate_and_link);
int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
unsigned timeout,
struct key *keyring,
- struct key *instkey)
+ struct key *authkey)
{
struct timespec now;
int ret, awaken;
@@ -504,8 +504,8 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
/* disable the authorisation key */
- if (instkey)
- key_revoke(instkey);
+ if (authkey)
+ key_revoke(authkey);
}
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
@@ -743,6 +743,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key_type *ktype;
struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -802,8 +803,8 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
}
/* allocate a new key */
- key = key_alloc(ktype, description, current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(),
- current, perm, flags);
+ key = key_alloc(ktype, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
+ perm, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error_3;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 8833b447ade..7c72baa02f2 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -866,6 +866,23 @@ static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
return -ENOKEY;
}
+/*
+ * change the request_key authorisation key on the current process
+ */
+static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct cred *new;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ key_put(new->request_key_auth);
+ new->request_key_auth = key_get(key);
+
+ return commit_creds(new);
+}
+
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* instantiate the key with the specified payload, and, if one is given, link
@@ -876,12 +893,15 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
size_t plen,
key_serial_t ringid)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct request_key_auth *rka;
struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
void *payload;
long ret;
bool vm = false;
+ kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid);
+
ret = -EINVAL;
if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
goto error;
@@ -889,7 +909,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
ret = -EPERM;
- instkey = current->cred->request_key_auth;
+ instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
if (!instkey)
goto error;
@@ -931,10 +951,8 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
* instantiation of the key */
- if (ret == 0) {
- key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
- current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
- }
+ if (ret == 0)
+ keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error2:
if (!vm)
@@ -953,14 +971,17 @@ error:
*/
long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct request_key_auth *rka;
struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
long ret;
+ kenter("%d,%u,%d", id, timeout, ringid);
+
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
ret = -EPERM;
- instkey = current->cred->request_key_auth;
+ instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
if (!instkey)
goto error;
@@ -982,10 +1003,8 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
* instantiation of the key */
- if (ret == 0) {
- key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
- current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
- }
+ if (ret == 0)
+ keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error:
return ret;
@@ -999,36 +1018,56 @@ error:
*/
long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
{
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
- int ret;
+ struct cred *new;
+ int ret, old_setting;
+
+ old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring);
+
+ if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE)
+ return old_setting;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
switch (reqkey_defl) {
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
- ret = install_thread_keyring();
+ ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ goto error;
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
- ret = install_process_keyring();
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret != -EEXIST)
+ goto error;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
- set:
- cred->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
+ case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
+ goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
- return cred->jit_keyring;
-
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
default:
- return -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto error;
}
+set:
+ new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return old_setting;
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return -EINVAL;
+
} /* end keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() */
/*****************************************************************************/
@@ -1087,9 +1126,7 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
/* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
if (id == 0) {
- key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
- current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
- ret = 0;
+ ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
goto error;
}
@@ -1104,10 +1141,12 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
goto error;
}
- key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
- current->cred->request_key_auth = authkey;
- ret = authkey->serial;
+ ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ key_put(authkey);
+ ret = authkey->serial;
error:
return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index fdf75f90199..ed851574d07 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -245,14 +245,14 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
* allocate a keyring and link into the destination keyring
*/
struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
- struct task_struct *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+ const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags,
struct key *dest)
{
struct key *keyring;
int ret;
keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description,
- uid, gid, ctx,
+ uid, gid, cred,
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL,
flags);
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
* - we propagate the possession attribute from the keyring ref to the key ref
*/
key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- struct task_struct *context,
+ const struct cred *cred,
struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match)
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
key_check(keyring);
/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
- err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, context, KEY_SEARCH);
+ err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, cred, KEY_SEARCH);
if (err < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
goto error;
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ descend:
/* key must have search permissions */
if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
- context, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+ cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ ascend:
continue;
if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
- context, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+ cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* stack the current position */
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
if (!type->match)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
- return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current,
+ return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred,
type, description, type->match);
} /* end keyring_search() */
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 13c36164f28..5d9fc7b93f2 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -14,24 +14,27 @@
#include "internal.h"
/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way,
- * but permit the security modules to override
+/**
+ * key_task_permission - Check a key can be used
+ * @key_ref: The key to check
+ * @cred: The credentials to use
+ * @perm: The permissions to check for
+ *
+ * Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way,
+ * but permit the security modules to override.
+ *
+ * The caller must hold either a ref on cred or must hold the RCU readlock or a
+ * spinlock.
*/
-int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *context,
+int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm)
{
- const struct cred *cred;
struct key *key;
key_perm_t kperm;
int ret;
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- rcu_read_lock();
- cred = __task_cred(context);
-
/* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
if (key->uid == cred->fsuid) {
kperm = key->perm >> 16;
@@ -57,7 +60,6 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
kperm = key->perm;
use_these_perms:
- rcu_read_lock();
/* use the top 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller possesses
* - possessor permissions are additive with other permissions
@@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ use_these_perms:
return -EACCES;
/* let LSM be the final arbiter */
- return security_key_permission(key_ref, context, perm);
+ return security_key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
} /* end key_task_permission() */
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index f619170da76..7f508def50e 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -136,8 +136,12 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
int rc;
/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming
- * non-possession) */
- rc = key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, 0), current, KEY_VIEW);
+ * non-possession)
+ * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
+ * access to __current_cred() safe
+ */
+ rc = key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, 0), current_cred(),
+ KEY_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
return 0;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 70ee93406f3..df329f684a6 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -42,11 +42,15 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = {
*/
int install_user_keyrings(void)
{
- struct user_struct *user = current->cred->user;
+ struct user_struct *user;
+ const struct cred *cred;
struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
char buf[20];
int ret;
+ cred = current_cred();
+ user = cred->user;
+
kenter("%p{%u}", user, user->uid);
if (user->uid_keyring) {
@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1,
- current, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+ cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
@@ -83,8 +87,7 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
session_keyring =
keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1,
- current, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
- NULL);
+ cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
goto error_release;
@@ -116,142 +119,128 @@ error:
return ret;
}
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
- * deal with the UID changing
+ * install a fresh thread keyring directly to new credentials
*/
-void switch_uid_keyring(struct user_struct *new_user)
+int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
-#if 0 /* do nothing for now */
- struct key *old;
-
- /* switch to the new user's session keyring if we were running under
- * root's default session keyring */
- if (new_user->uid != 0 &&
- current->session_keyring == &root_session_keyring
- ) {
- atomic_inc(&new_user->session_keyring->usage);
-
- task_lock(current);
- old = current->session_keyring;
- current->session_keyring = new_user->session_keyring;
- task_unlock(current);
+ struct key *keyring;
- key_put(old);
- }
-#endif
+ keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
+ KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
-} /* end switch_uid_keyring() */
+ new->thread_keyring = keyring;
+ return 0;
+}
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one
*/
-int install_thread_keyring(void)
+static int install_thread_keyring(void)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- struct key *keyring, *old;
- char buf[20];
+ struct cred *new;
int ret;
- sprintf(buf, "_tid.%u", tsk->pid);
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk,
- KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
- goto error;
+ BUG_ON(new->thread_keyring);
+
+ ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return ret;
}
- task_lock(tsk);
- old = tsk->cred->thread_keyring;
- tsk->cred->thread_keyring = keyring;
- task_unlock(tsk);
+ return commit_creds(new);
+}
- ret = 0;
+/*
+ * install a process keyring directly to a credentials struct
+ * - returns -EEXIST if there was already a process keyring, 0 if one installed,
+ * and other -ve on any other error
+ */
+int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
+{
+ struct key *keyring;
+ int ret;
- key_put(old);
-error:
+ if (new->tgcred->process_keyring)
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid,
+ new, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&new->tgcred->lock);
+ if (!new->tgcred->process_keyring) {
+ new->tgcred->process_keyring = keyring;
+ keyring = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ ret = -EEXIST;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irq(&new->tgcred->lock);
+ key_put(keyring);
return ret;
+}
-} /* end install_thread_keyring() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* make sure a process keyring is installed
+ * - we
*/
-int install_process_keyring(void)
+static int install_process_keyring(void)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- struct key *keyring;
- char buf[20];
+ struct cred *new;
int ret;
- might_sleep();
-
- if (!tsk->cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
- sprintf(buf, "_pid.%u", tsk->tgid);
-
- keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk,
- KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
- goto error;
- }
-
- /* attach keyring */
- spin_lock_irq(&tsk->cred->tgcred->lock);
- if (!tsk->cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
- tsk->cred->tgcred->process_keyring = keyring;
- keyring = NULL;
- }
- spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->cred->tgcred->lock);
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- key_put(keyring);
+ ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return ret != -EEXIST ?: 0;
}
- ret = 0;
-error:
- return ret;
-
-} /* end install_process_keyring() */
+ return commit_creds(new);
+}
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
- * install a session keyring, discarding the old one
- * - if a keyring is not supplied, an empty one is invented
+ * install a session keyring directly to a credentials struct
*/
-static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
+static int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred,
+ struct key *keyring)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
unsigned long flags;
struct key *old;
- char buf[20];
might_sleep();
/* create an empty session keyring */
if (!keyring) {
- sprintf(buf, "_ses.%u", tsk->tgid);
-
flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
- if (tsk->cred->tgcred->session_keyring)
+ if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring)
flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
- keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid,
- tsk, flags, NULL);
+ keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid,
+ cred, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
- }
- else {
+ } else {
atomic_inc(&keyring->usage);
}
/* install the keyring */
- spin_lock_irq(&tsk->cred->tgcred->lock);
- old = tsk->cred->tgcred->session_keyring;
- rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->cred->tgcred->session_keyring, keyring);
- spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->cred->tgcred->lock);
+ spin_lock_irq(&cred->tgcred->lock);
+ old = cred->tgcred->session_keyring;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(cred->tgcred->session_keyring, keyring);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&cred->tgcred->lock);
/* we're using RCU on the pointer, but there's no point synchronising
* on it if it didn't previously point to anything */
@@ -261,38 +250,29 @@ static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
}
return 0;
+}
-} /* end install_session_keyring() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
- * copy the keys for fork
+ * install a session keyring, discarding the old one
+ * - if a keyring is not supplied, an empty one is invented
*/
-int copy_keys(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
{
- key_check(tsk->cred->thread_keyring);
- key_check(tsk->cred->request_key_auth);
-
- /* no thread keyring yet */
- tsk->cred->thread_keyring = NULL;
-
- /* copy the request_key() authorisation for this thread */
- key_get(tsk->cred->request_key_auth);
-
- return 0;
+ struct cred *new;
+ int ret;
-} /* end copy_keys() */
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
-/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * dispose of per-thread keys upon thread exit
- */
-void exit_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- key_put(tsk->cred->thread_keyring);
- key_put(tsk->cred->request_key_auth);
+ ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return ret;
+ }
-} /* end exit_keys() */
+ return commit_creds(new);
+}
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
@@ -300,38 +280,41 @@ void exit_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
*/
int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- struct key *old;
+ struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL;
+ struct cred *new;
- /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
- task_lock(tsk);
- old = tsk->cred->thread_keyring;
- tsk->cred->thread_keyring = NULL;
- task_unlock(tsk);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tgcred)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+#endif
- key_put(old);
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (new < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- /* discard the process keyring from a newly exec'd task */
- spin_lock_irq(&tsk->cred->tgcred->lock);
- old = tsk->cred->tgcred->process_keyring;
- tsk->cred->tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
- spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->cred->tgcred->lock);
+ /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
+ key_put(new->thread_keyring);
+ new->thread_keyring = NULL;
- key_put(old);
+ /* create a new per-thread-group creds for all this set of threads to
+ * share */
+ memcpy(tgcred, new->tgcred, sizeof(struct thread_group_cred));
- return 0;
+ atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
+ spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
-} /* end exec_keys() */
+ /* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */
+ key_get(tgcred->session_keyring);
+ tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
-/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * deal with SUID programs
- * - we might want to make this invent a new session keyring
- */
-int suid_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
+ release_tgcred(new);
+ new->tgcred = tgcred;
+
+ commit_creds(new);
return 0;
-} /* end suid_keys() */
+} /* end exec_keys() */
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
@@ -376,16 +359,13 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
- struct task_struct *context)
+ const struct cred *cred)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
- struct cred *cred;
key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
might_sleep();
- cred = get_task_cred(context);
-
/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were
* searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
* otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if
@@ -401,7 +381,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
if (cred->thread_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1),
- context, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -422,7 +402,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->tgcred->process_keyring, 1),
- context, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -446,7 +426,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(
cred->tgcred->session_keyring),
1),
- context, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
@@ -468,7 +448,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
else if (cred->user->session_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
- context, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -490,7 +470,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
* - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
*/
if (cred->request_key_auth &&
- context == current &&
+ cred == current_cred() &&
type != &key_type_request_key_auth
) {
/* defend against the auth key being revoked */
@@ -500,7 +480,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
- match, rka->context);
+ match, rka->cred);
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
@@ -527,7 +507,6 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
key_ref = ret ? ret : err;
found:
- put_cred(cred);
return key_ref;
} /* end search_process_keyrings() */
@@ -552,8 +531,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
key_perm_t perm)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
- struct task_struct *t = current;
- struct cred *cred;
+ const struct cred *cred;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
int ret;
@@ -608,6 +586,7 @@ try_again:
goto error;
ret = install_session_keyring(
cred->user->session_keyring);
+
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
@@ -693,7 +672,7 @@ try_again:
/* check to see if we possess the key */
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
lookup_user_key_possessed,
- current);
+ cred);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_put(key);
@@ -725,7 +704,7 @@ try_again:
goto invalid_key;
/* check the permissions */
- ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, t, perm);
+ ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
@@ -755,21 +734,33 @@ reget_creds:
*/
long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
struct key *keyring;
- long ret;
+ long ret, serial;
+
+ /* only permit this if there's a single thread in the thread group -
+ * this avoids us having to adjust the creds on all threads and risking
+ * ENOMEM */
+ if (!is_single_threaded(current))
+ return -EMLINK;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ old = current_cred();
/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
if (!name) {
- ret = install_session_keyring(NULL);
+ ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- rcu_read_lock();
- ret = rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring)->serial;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto error;
+ serial = new->tgcred->session_keyring->serial;
+ ret = commit_creds(new);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = serial;
+ goto okay;
}
/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
@@ -779,29 +770,33 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
/* not found - try and create a new one */
- keyring = keyring_alloc(name, cred->uid, cred->gid, tsk,
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
}
- }
- else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
+ } else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
}
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
- ret = install_session_keyring(keyring);
+ ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error2;
+ commit_creds(new);
+ mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
+
ret = keyring->serial;
key_put(keyring);
+okay:
+ return ret;
error2:
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
error:
+ abort_creds(new);
return ret;
-
-} /* end join_session_keyring() */
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 3d12558362d..0e04f72ef2d 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -83,8 +83,10 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
/* allocate a new session keyring */
sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial);
- keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(), current,
+ cred = get_current_cred();
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
+ put_cred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error_alloc;
@@ -104,8 +106,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
/* we specify the process's default keyrings */
sprintf(keyring_str[0], "%d",
- cred->thread_keyring ?
- cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
+ cred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
prkey = 0;
if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring)
@@ -155,8 +156,8 @@ error_link:
key_put(keyring);
error_alloc:
- kleave(" = %d", ret);
complete_request_key(cons, ret);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -295,6 +296,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
struct key_user *user,
struct key **_key)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -302,9 +304,8 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
- key = key_alloc(type, description,
- current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(), current, KEY_POS_ALL,
- flags);
+ key = key_alloc(type, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
+ KEY_POS_ALL, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key))
goto alloc_failed;
@@ -317,8 +318,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
* waited for locks */
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
- key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
- current);
+ key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto key_already_present;
@@ -363,6 +363,8 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
struct key *key;
int ret;
+ kenter("");
+
user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
if (!user)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
@@ -376,17 +378,21 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
if (ret == 0) {
ret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
dest_keyring);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kdebug("cons failed");
goto construction_failed;
+ }
}
key_put(dest_keyring);
+ kleave(" = key %d", key_serial(key));
return key;
construction_failed:
key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
key_put(key);
key_put(dest_keyring);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
@@ -405,6 +411,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -414,7 +421,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
- current);
+ cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 2125579d5d7..86747151ee5 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -105,9 +105,9 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
- if (rka->context) {
- put_task_struct(rka->context);
- rka->context = NULL;
+ if (rka->cred) {
+ put_cred(rka->cred);
+ rka->cred = NULL;
}
} /* end request_key_auth_revoke() */
@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
- if (rka->context) {
- put_task_struct(rka->context);
- rka->context = NULL;
+ if (rka->cred) {
+ put_cred(rka->cred);
+ rka->cred = NULL;
}
key_put(rka->target_key);
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;
+ const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
struct key *authkey = NULL;
char desc[20];
int ret;
@@ -164,28 +165,25 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
* another process */
- if (current->cred->request_key_auth) {
+ if (cred->request_key_auth) {
/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
- down_read(&current->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+ down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
* servicing is already instantiated */
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
- &current->cred->request_key_auth->flags))
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags))
goto auth_key_revoked;
- irka = current->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
- rka->context = irka->context;
+ irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+ rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);
rka->pid = irka->pid;
- get_task_struct(rka->context);
- up_read(&current->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
}
else {
/* it isn't - use this process as the context */
- rka->context = current;
+ rka->cred = get_cred(cred);
rka->pid = current->pid;
- get_task_struct(rka->context);
}
rka->target_key = key_get(target);
@@ -197,7 +195,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
- current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(), current,
+ cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
@@ -205,16 +203,16 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
goto error_alloc;
}
- /* construct and attach to the keyring */
+ /* construct the auth key */
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_inst;
- kleave(" = {%d}", authkey->serial);
+ kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, atomic_read(&authkey->usage));
return authkey;
auth_key_revoked:
- up_read(&current->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
kfree(rka->callout_info);
kfree(rka);
kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED");
@@ -257,6 +255,7 @@ static int key_get_instantiation_authkey_match(const struct key *key,
*/
struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *authkey;
key_ref_t authkey_ref;
@@ -264,7 +263,7 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
&key_type_request_key_auth,
(void *) (unsigned long) target_id,
key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
- current);
+ cred);
if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f40a0a04c3c..a55d739c686 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -145,18 +145,13 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return security_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
-}
-
-void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
- security_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return security_ops->capset(new, old,
+ effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
@@ -228,9 +223,9 @@ void security_bprm_free(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
security_ops->bprm_free_security(bprm);
}
-void security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
+int security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
- security_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+ return security_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
}
void security_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -616,14 +611,19 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
}
-int security_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred)
+void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- return security_ops->cred_alloc_security(cred);
+ security_ops->cred_free(cred);
}
-void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
{
- security_ops->cred_free(cred);
+ return security_ops->cred_prepare(new, old, gfp);
+}
+
+void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+ return security_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
}
int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -631,10 +631,10 @@ int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
}
-int security_task_post_setuid(uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
- uid_t old_suid, int flags)
+int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int flags)
{
- return security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, flags);
+ return security_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
}
int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -716,14 +716,9 @@ int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
}
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
-{
- return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
-}
-
-void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
- security_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
+ return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
}
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
@@ -1123,9 +1118,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags)
+int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+ unsigned long flags)
{
- return security_ops->key_alloc(key, tsk, flags);
+ return security_ops->key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
}
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
@@ -1134,9 +1130,9 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key)
}
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm)
+ const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
{
- return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, context, perm);
+ return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
}
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f20cbd681ba..c71bba78872 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -156,20 +156,20 @@ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
}
-/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
-
-static int cred_alloc_security(struct cred *cred)
+/*
+ * initialise the security for the init task
+ */
+static void cred_init_security(void)
{
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
- tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
cred->security = tsec;
-
- return 0;
}
/*
@@ -1379,6 +1379,19 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
}
/*
+ * Check permission between a pair of credentials
+ * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
+ */
+static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
+ const struct cred *target,
+ u32 perms)
+{
+ u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
* Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
* fork check, ptrace check, etc.
* tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
@@ -1820,24 +1833,19 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static int selinux_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
int error;
- error = secondary_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+ effective, inheritable, permitted);
if (error)
return error;
- return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETCAP);
-}
-
-static void selinux_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
- secondary_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
@@ -2244,16 +2252,23 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
}
-static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
+static int selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+ struct cred *new;
u32 sid;
int rc;
- secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+ rc = secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
- tsec = current_security();
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tsec = new->security;
bsec = bprm->security;
sid = bsec->sid;
@@ -2268,7 +2283,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
if (rc) {
bsec->unsafe = 1;
- return;
+ goto out;
}
}
@@ -2292,12 +2307,16 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
if (rc) {
bsec->unsafe = 1;
- return;
+ goto out;
}
}
}
tsec->sid = sid;
}
+
+out:
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -3021,6 +3040,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ int rc = 0;
#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
@@ -3029,9 +3049,9 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
* private file mapping that will also be writable.
* This has an additional check.
*/
- int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
+ rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
if (rc)
- return rc;
+ goto error;
}
#endif
@@ -3048,7 +3068,9 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
}
- return 0;
+
+error:
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
@@ -3090,8 +3112,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
rc = 0;
if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
- rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
- PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
+ rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
@@ -3104,8 +3125,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
* modified content. This typically should only
* occur for text relocations.
*/
- rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file,
- FILE__EXECMOD);
+ rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
}
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3211,6 +3231,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
struct inode *inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
fsec = file->f_security;
isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -3247,38 +3268,41 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
}
-static int selinux_cred_alloc_security(struct cred *cred)
+/*
+ * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
- int rc;
-
- tsec1 = current_security();
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ cred->security = NULL;
+ kfree(tsec);
+}
- rc = cred_alloc_security(cred);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- tsec2 = cred->security;
+/*
+ * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
- tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
+ old_tsec = old->security;
- /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
- tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
- tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
- tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
- tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
+ tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+ if (!tsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ new->security = tsec;
return 0;
}
/*
- * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
+ * commit new credentials
*/
-static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
- cred->security = NULL;
- kfree(tsec);
+ secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
}
static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -3292,9 +3316,10 @@ static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
+static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int flags)
{
- return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
+ return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
}
static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -3368,7 +3393,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim
/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
- upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
+ upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
@@ -3422,13 +3447,12 @@ static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
unsigned long arg2,
unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4,
- unsigned long arg5,
- long *rc_p)
+ unsigned long arg5)
{
/* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
the state of the current process. */
- return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
+ return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
}
static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
@@ -3436,18 +3460,6 @@ static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
}
-static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
- secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
-
- tsec = p->cred->security;
- tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
- tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- return;
-}
-
static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
struct inode *inode)
{
@@ -5325,7 +5337,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct task_struct *tracer;
- u32 sid = 0;
+ struct cred *new;
+ u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
int error;
char *str = value;
@@ -5372,86 +5385,75 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
return error;
}
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
/* Permission checking based on the specified context is
performed during the actual operation (execve,
open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
- operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
+ operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
- tsec = p->cred->security;
- if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+ tsec = new->security;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
tsec->exec_sid = sid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
tsec->create_sid = sid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
error = may_create_key(sid, p);
if (error)
- return error;
+ goto abort_change;
tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
- } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
- struct av_decision avd;
-
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
if (sid == 0)
- return -EINVAL;
- /*
- * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
- * - Single threaded processes.
- * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
- * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
- */
- if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
- struct task_struct *g, *t;
- struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
- read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
- do_each_thread(g, t) {
- if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
- read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
- error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
- if (!error)
- goto boundary_ok;
-
- return error;
- }
- } while_each_thread(g, t);
- read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ goto abort_change;
+
+ /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
+ error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
+ if (error)
+ goto abort_change;
}
-boundary_ok:
/* Check permissions for the transition. */
error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
if (error)
- return error;
+ goto abort_change;
/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
+ ptsid = 0;
task_lock(p);
- rcu_read_lock();
tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
- if (tracer != NULL) {
- u32 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
- SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
- if (!error)
- tsec->sid = sid;
- task_unlock(p);
- avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
+ if (tracer)
+ ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
+ task_unlock(p);
+
+ if (tracer) {
+ error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
if (error)
- return error;
- } else {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- tsec->sid = sid;
- task_unlock(p);
+ goto abort_change;
}
- } else
- return -EINVAL;
+ tsec->sid = sid;
+ } else {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto abort_change;
+ }
+
+ commit_creds(new);
return size;
+
+abort_change:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return error;
}
static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
@@ -5471,23 +5473,21 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
+static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ksec)
return -ENOMEM;
- rcu_read_lock();
- __tsec = __task_cred(tsk)->security;
- if (__tsec->keycreate_sid)
- ksec->sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
+ tsec = cred->security;
+ if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
+ ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
else
- ksec->sid = __tsec->sid;
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
k->security = ksec;
return 0;
@@ -5502,8 +5502,8 @@ static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
}
static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *ctx,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ const struct cred *cred,
+ key_perm_t perm)
{
struct key *key;
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
@@ -5515,7 +5515,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
if (perm == 0)
return 0;
- sid = task_sid(ctx);
+ sid = cred_sid(cred);
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
ksec = key->security;
@@ -5545,8 +5545,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
.ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = selinux_capget,
- .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
- .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
+ .capset = selinux_capset,
.sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
.capable = selinux_capable,
.quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
@@ -5621,10 +5620,11 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
.task_create = selinux_task_create,
- .cred_alloc_security = selinux_cred_alloc_security,
.cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
+ .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
+ .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
.task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
- .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
+ .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
.task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
.task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
.task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
@@ -5641,7 +5641,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
.task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
.task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
- .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
@@ -5737,8 +5736,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
static __init int selinux_init(void)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
selinux_enabled = 0;
return 0;
@@ -5752,10 +5749,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
- if (cred_alloc_security(current->cred))
- panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
- tsec = current->cred->security;
- tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ cred_init_security();
sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 11167fd567b..e952b397153 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -104,8 +104,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = smk_access(current->cred->security, ctp->cred->security,
- MAY_READWRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(ctp), MAY_READWRITE);
if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return rc;
@@ -127,8 +126,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = smk_access(ptp->cred->security, current->cred->security,
- MAY_READWRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(task_security(ptp), current_security(), MAY_READWRITE);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return rc;
@@ -977,22 +975,6 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
*/
/**
- * smack_cred_alloc_security - "allocate" a task cred blob
- * @cred: the task creds in need of a blob
- *
- * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
- * points to an immutable list. No alloc required.
- * No data copy required.
- *
- * Always returns 0
- */
-static int smack_cred_alloc_security(struct cred *cred)
-{
- cred->security = current_security();
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
* smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
* @cred: the credentials in question
*
@@ -1006,6 +988,30 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
}
/**
+ * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ new->security = old->security;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * commit new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ */
+static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
+
+/**
* smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
* @p: the task object
* @pgid: unused
@@ -2036,6 +2042,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
+ struct cred *new;
char *newsmack;
/*
@@ -2058,7 +2065,11 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
if (newsmack == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
- p->cred->security = newsmack;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ new->security = newsmack;
+ commit_creds(new);
return size;
}
@@ -2354,17 +2365,17 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
/**
* smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
* @key: object
- * @tsk: the task associated with the key
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
* @flags: unused
*
* No allocation required
*
* Returns 0
*/
-static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk,
+static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- key->security = tsk->cred->security;
+ key->security = cred->security;
return 0;
}
@@ -2382,14 +2393,14 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
/*
* smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
* @key_ref: gets to the object
- * @context: task involved
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
* @perm: unused
*
* Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
* an error code otherwise
*/
static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
- struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm)
+ const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
{
struct key *keyp;
@@ -2405,11 +2416,10 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
/*
* This should not occur
*/
- if (context->cred->security == NULL)
+ if (cred->security == NULL)
return -EACCES;
- return smk_access(context->cred->security, keyp->security,
- MAY_READWRITE);
+ return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
@@ -2580,8 +2590,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.ptrace_may_access = smack_ptrace_may_access,
.ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = cap_capget,
- .capset_check = cap_capset_check,
- .capset_set = cap_capset_set,
+ .capset = cap_capset,
.capable = cap_capable,
.syslog = smack_syslog,
.settime = cap_settime,
@@ -2630,9 +2639,10 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
.file_receive = smack_file_receive,
- .cred_alloc_security = smack_cred_alloc_security,
.cred_free = smack_cred_free,
- .task_post_setuid = cap_task_post_setuid,
+ .cred_prepare = smack_cred_prepare,
+ .cred_commit = smack_cred_commit,
+ .task_fix_setuid = cap_task_fix_setuid,
.task_setpgid = smack_task_setpgid,
.task_getpgid = smack_task_getpgid,
.task_getsid = smack_task_getsid,
@@ -2645,7 +2655,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.task_movememory = smack_task_movememory,
.task_kill = smack_task_kill,
.task_wait = smack_task_wait,
- .task_reparent_to_init = cap_task_reparent_to_init,
.task_to_inode = smack_task_to_inode,
.task_prctl = cap_task_prctl,
@@ -2721,6 +2730,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
*/
static __init int smack_init(void)
{
+ struct cred *cred;
+
if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
return 0;
@@ -2729,7 +2740,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Set the security state for the initial task.
*/
- current->cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+ cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
+ cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
/*
* Initialize locks