aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/selinux
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c25
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c347
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h16
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netnode.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c16
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c39
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c65
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c658
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/symtab.c2
13 files changed, 607 insertions, 577 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index f013982df41..58d80f3bd6f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@ $(obj)/avc.o: $(obj)/flask.h
quiet_cmd_flask = GEN $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
-targets += flask.h
+targets += flask.h av_permissions.h
$(obj)/flask.h: $(src)/include/classmap.h FORCE
$(call if_changed,flask)
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 7f1a304712a..9da6420e205 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
if (!node)
goto out;
- INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
@@ -489,9 +488,29 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
struct common_audit_data stack_data;
u32 denied, audited;
denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
- if (denied)
+ if (denied) {
audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
- else if (result)
+ /*
+ * a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in
+ * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
+ * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
+ * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the
+ * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets
+ * assume:
+ *
+ * denied == READ
+ * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
+ * selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
+ *
+ * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
+ * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
+ * ACCESS
+ */
+ if (a &&
+ a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny &&
+ !(a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
+ audited = 0;
+ } else if (result)
audited = denied = requested;
else
audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a03fd74602b..9b40f4c0ac7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -87,9 +87,6 @@
#include "netlabel.h"
#include "audit.h"
-#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
-#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
-
#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
@@ -126,11 +123,6 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
int selinux_enabled = 1;
#endif
-/* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
- before the policy was loaded. */
-static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
-
static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
/**
@@ -193,7 +185,7 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
*/
static inline u32 current_sid(void)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
return tsec->sid;
}
@@ -266,7 +258,6 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
sbsec->sb = sb;
@@ -281,42 +272,10 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
-
- spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
- if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
- list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
- spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
-
sb->s_security = NULL;
kfree(sbsec);
}
-static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
-{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
-
- selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
-{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
- selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
-}
-
/* The security server must be initialized before
any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
extern int ss_initialized;
@@ -612,10 +571,6 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
after the initial policy is loaded and the security
server is ready to handle calls. */
- spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
- if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
- list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
- spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
goto out;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -806,16 +761,10 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
/*
* if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
- * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
- * with it later
+ * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
*/
- if (!ss_initialized) {
- spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
- if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
- list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
- spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+ if (!ss_initialized)
return;
- }
/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
@@ -1606,8 +1555,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
u16 tclass)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid, newsid;
@@ -1828,27 +1776,9 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
{
u32 av = file_to_av(file);
- if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
- mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
- /*
- * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
- */
- if (S_ISREG(mode))
- av |= FILE__OPEN;
- else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
- av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
- else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
- av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
- else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
- av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
- else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
- av |= DIR__OPEN;
- else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
- av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
- else
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
- "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
- }
+ if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
+ av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
return av;
}
@@ -2205,8 +2135,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
u32 sid, osid;
int atsecure = 0;
@@ -2581,8 +2510,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
char **name, void **value,
size_t *len)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid, newsid, clen;
@@ -2698,14 +2626,26 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 perms;
+ bool from_access;
- if (!mask) {
- /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
+ from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
+ mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
+
+ /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
+ if (!mask)
return 0;
- }
- return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
- file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
+
+ if (from_access)
+ ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
+
+ perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
+
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
}
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
@@ -3693,71 +3633,54 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
}
/* socket security operations */
-static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
- u32 perms)
+
+static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct common_audit_data ad;
- u32 sid;
- int err = 0;
+ return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
+}
- isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
- if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
- goto out;
- sid = task_sid(task);
+ if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
+ return 0;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
- ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
- err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+ ad.u.net.sk = sk;
-out:
- return err;
+ return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
}
static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
- u32 sid, newsid;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ u32 newsid;
u16 secclass;
- int err = 0;
if (kern)
- goto out;
-
- sid = tsec->sid;
- newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
+ return 0;
+ newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
- err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
-
-out:
- return err;
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
}
static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- u32 sid, newsid;
int err = 0;
- sid = tsec->sid;
- newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
-
- isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-
if (kern)
isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- else if (newsid)
- isec->sid = newsid;
else
- isec->sid = sid;
+ isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
isec->initialized = 1;
@@ -3778,10 +3701,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
u16 family;
int err;
- err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
+ err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
if (err)
goto out;
@@ -3790,19 +3714,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
* Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
* check the first address now.
*/
- family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ family = sk->sk_family;
if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
char *addrp;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
unsigned short snum;
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
u32 sid, node_perm;
- isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-
if (family == PF_INET) {
addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
@@ -3826,15 +3747,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = family;
- err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
- isec->sclass,
+ err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+ sksec->sclass,
SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
- switch (isec->sclass) {
+ switch (sksec->sclass) {
case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
break;
@@ -3865,8 +3786,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
else
ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
- err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
- isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
+ err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+ sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
if (err)
goto out;
}
@@ -3877,19 +3798,18 @@ out:
static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
int err;
- err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+ err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
if (err)
return err;
/*
* If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
*/
- isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
- if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
- isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
+ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+ sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
@@ -3912,13 +3832,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
if (err)
goto out;
- perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
+ perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
- err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
+ err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
if (err)
goto out;
}
@@ -3931,7 +3851,7 @@ out:
static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
- return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
+ return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
}
static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
@@ -3940,7 +3860,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
- err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
+ err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3957,30 +3877,30 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size)
{
- return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
+ return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
}
static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size, int flags)
{
- return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
+ return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
}
static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
{
- return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+ return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
}
static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
{
- return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+ return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
}
static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
{
int err;
- err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
+ err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3990,68 +3910,58 @@ static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname
static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
int optname)
{
- return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
+ return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
}
static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
- return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
+ return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
}
static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
int err;
- isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
- other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
-
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
- err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
- isec->sclass,
+ err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
+ sksec_other->sclass,
UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
if (err)
return err;
- /* connecting socket */
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- sksec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
-
/* server child socket */
- sksec = newsk->sk_security;
- sksec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
- err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, sksec->peer_sid, &sksec->sid);
+ sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
+ err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
+ &sksec_new->sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
- return err;
+ /* connecting socket */
+ sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
+
+ return 0;
}
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
- int err;
-
- isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
- other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
- err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
- isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- return 0;
+ return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
+ &ad);
}
static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
@@ -4190,26 +4100,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
- isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-
- if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
- isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
+ sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
- }
- if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
- err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
-
if (err)
- goto out;
+ return err;
if (scontext_len > len) {
err = -ERANGE;
@@ -4222,9 +4124,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
out_len:
if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
err = -EFAULT;
-
kfree(scontext);
-out:
return err;
}
@@ -4256,12 +4156,27 @@ out:
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+ sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
+ if (!sksec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
+ sk->sk_security = sksec;
+
+ return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- sk_free_security(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
+ kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
@@ -4421,8 +4336,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
int err = 0;
u32 perm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -4430,13 +4344,13 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
- err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+ err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL) {
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
"SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
" type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
- nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
+ nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
err = 0;
}
@@ -4447,7 +4361,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
goto out;
}
- err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
+ err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
out:
return err;
}
@@ -5680,35 +5594,18 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
return 0;
}
+static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
+{
+ superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
+}
+
void selinux_complete_init(void)
{
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
/* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
- spin_lock(&sb_lock);
- spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
-next_sb:
- if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
- list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
- struct superblock_security_struct,
- list);
- struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
- sb->s_count++;
- spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
- spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
- down_read(&sb->s_umount);
- if (sb->s_root)
- superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
- drop_super(sb);
- spin_lock(&sb_lock);
- spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
- list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
- goto next_sb;
- }
- spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
- spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+ iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
}
/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 8b32e959bb2..b4c9eb4bd6f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
"getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append"
#define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \
- "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton"
+ "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
+ "open", "execmod"
#define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \
"listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom", \
@@ -43,22 +44,21 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"quotaget", NULL } },
{ "file",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
- "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execmod", "open", NULL } },
+ "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } },
{ "dir",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name",
- "reparent", "search", "rmdir", "open", NULL } },
+ "reparent", "search", "rmdir", NULL } },
{ "fd", { "use", NULL } },
{ "lnk_file",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "chr_file",
- { COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
- "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execmod", "open", NULL } },
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "blk_file",
- { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } },
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "sock_file",
- { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } },
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "fifo_file",
- { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } },
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "tcp_socket",
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index c4e062336ef..26c7eee1c30 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ struct file_security_struct {
struct superblock_security_struct {
struct super_block *sb; /* back pointer to sb object */
- struct list_head list; /* list of superblock_security_struct */
u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */
u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */
u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index dc92792271f..65ebfe954f8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -183,8 +183,6 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
BUG();
}
- INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rcu);
-
/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
* this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
list_add_rcu(&node->list, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 0293843f7ed..79a1bb63566 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ out:
static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
.read = sel_read_enforce,
.write = sel_write_enforce,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
.read = sel_read_handle_unknown,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
@@ -251,6 +253,7 @@ out:
static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
.write = sel_write_disable,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
@@ -265,6 +268,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
.read = sel_read_policyvers,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
/* declaration for sel_write_load */
@@ -289,6 +293,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
.read = sel_read_mls,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
@@ -356,6 +361,7 @@ out:
static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
.write = sel_write_load,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
@@ -437,6 +443,7 @@ out:
static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
.read = sel_read_checkreqprot,
.write = sel_write_checkreqprot,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
/*
@@ -482,6 +489,7 @@ static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
.write = selinux_transaction_write,
.read = simple_transaction_read,
.release = simple_transaction_release,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
/*
@@ -883,6 +891,7 @@ out:
static const struct file_operations sel_bool_ops = {
.read = sel_read_bool,
.write = sel_write_bool,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
@@ -935,6 +944,7 @@ out:
static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
.write = sel_commit_bools_write,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
@@ -1127,10 +1137,12 @@ out:
static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
.read = sel_read_avc_cache_threshold,
.write = sel_write_avc_cache_threshold,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static const struct file_operations sel_avc_hash_stats_ops = {
.read = sel_read_avc_hash_stats,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
@@ -1255,6 +1267,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
static const struct file_operations sel_initcon_ops = {
.read = sel_read_initcon,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
@@ -1330,6 +1343,7 @@ out:
static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
.read = sel_read_class,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
@@ -1354,6 +1368,7 @@ out:
static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
.read = sel_read_perm,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
@@ -1372,6 +1387,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = {
.read = sel_read_policycap,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 1215b8e47db..929480c6c43 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -342,20 +342,20 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
- return -1;
+ return rc;
}
items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
- return -1;
+ return rc;
}
items = 0;
@@ -363,19 +363,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
key.source_type = (u16)val;
if (key.source_type != val) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.target_type = (u16)val;
if (key.target_type != val) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.target_class = (u16)val;
if (key.target_class != val) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
@@ -383,12 +383,12 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
if ((val & AVTAB_AV) &&
(val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
@@ -403,15 +403,15 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
if (items != items2) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", items2, items);
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
- return -1;
+ return rc;
}
items = 0;
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
!policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
set = 0;
@@ -434,19 +434,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
}
if (!set || set > 1) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
- return -1;
+ return rc;
}
datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
}
@@ -487,8 +487,7 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n");
else if (rc == -EEXIST)
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
- else
- rc = -EINVAL;
+
goto bad;
}
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 4a4e35cac22..c91e150c308 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -117,10 +117,14 @@ int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
{
+ int rc;
+
p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
p->cond_list = NULL;
- if (avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab))
- return -1;
+
+ rc = avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return 0;
}
@@ -219,34 +223,37 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!booldatum)
- return -1;
+ return -ENOMEM;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto err;
booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
goto err;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
goto err;
rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto err;
key[len] = '\0';
- if (hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum))
+ rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum);
+ if (rc)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
- return -1;
+ return rc;
}
struct cond_insertf_data {
@@ -263,7 +270,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
struct cond_av_list *other = data->other, *list, *cur;
struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
u8 found;
-
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
/*
* For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
@@ -313,12 +320,15 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
if (!node_ptr) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
list = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_av_list), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!list)
+ if (!list) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
+ }
list->node = node_ptr;
if (!data->head)
@@ -331,7 +341,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
err:
cond_av_list_destroy(data->head);
data->head = NULL;
- return -1;
+ return rc;
}
static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list **ret_list, struct cond_av_list *other)
@@ -345,8 +355,8 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list *
len = 0;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- return -1;
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (len == 0)
@@ -361,7 +371,6 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list *
&data);
if (rc)
return rc;
-
}
*ret_list = data.head;
@@ -390,24 +399,25 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
struct cond_expr *expr = NULL, *last = NULL;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- return -1;
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
len = 0;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- return -1;
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
/* expr */
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto err;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
expr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_expr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!expr)
goto err;
@@ -416,6 +426,7 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
if (!expr_isvalid(p, expr)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
kfree(expr);
goto err;
}
@@ -427,14 +438,16 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
last = expr;
}
- if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL) != 0)
+ rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL);
+ if (rc)
goto err;
- if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list) != 0)
+ rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list);
+ if (rc)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
cond_node_destroy(node);
- return -1;
+ return rc;
}
int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
@@ -445,8 +458,8 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
int rc;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
- if (rc < 0)
- return -1;
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
@@ -455,11 +468,13 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
node = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_node), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!node)
goto err;
- if (cond_read_node(p, node, fp) != 0)
+ rc = cond_read_node(p, node, fp);
+ if (rc)
goto err;
if (i == 0)
@@ -472,7 +487,7 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
err:
cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
p->cond_list = NULL;
- return -1;
+ return rc;
}
/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index c57802a164d..3a29704be8c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
#include "security.h"
#include "policydb.h"
@@ -655,6 +656,9 @@ static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
{
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+
context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
@@ -736,11 +740,17 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL);
hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
- if (p->type_attr_map) {
- for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)
- ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map[i]);
+ if (p->type_attr_map_array) {
+ for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+ struct ebitmap *e;
+
+ e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
+ if (!e)
+ continue;
+ ebitmap_destroy(e);
+ }
+ flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array);
}
- kfree(p->type_attr_map);
ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
@@ -1701,6 +1711,333 @@ u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
return 1U << (perdatum->value-1);
}
+static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct range_trans *rt = NULL;
+ struct mls_range *r = NULL;
+ int i, rc;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 nel;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rt)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ } else
+ rt->target_class = p->process_class;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class))
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!r)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(p->range_tr, rt, r);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rt = NULL;
+ r = NULL;
+ }
+ rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr);
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(rt);
+ kfree(r);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ int i, j, rc;
+ u32 nel, nel2, len, len2;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ struct ocontext *l, *c;
+ struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
+ struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs;
+ struct genfs *newgenfs = NULL;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ newgenfs = kzalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newgenfs)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newgenfs->fstype)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(newgenfs->fstype, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ newgenfs->fstype[len] = 0;
+
+ for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
+ genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs fstype %s\n",
+ newgenfs->fstype);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ newgenfs->next = genfs;
+ if (genfs_p)
+ genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
+ else
+ p->genfs = newgenfs;
+ genfs = newgenfs;
+ newgenfs = NULL;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ newc = kzalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newc->u.name)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(newc->u.name, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ newc->u.name[len] = 0;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (l = NULL, c = genfs->head; c;
+ l = c, c = c->next) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
+ (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
+ newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n",
+ genfs->fstype, c->u.name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ len = strlen(newc->u.name);
+ len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
+ if (len > len2)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ newc->next = c;
+ if (l)
+ l->next = newc;
+ else
+ genfs->head = newc;
+ newc = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ if (newgenfs)
+ kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
+ kfree(newgenfs);
+ ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ int i, j, rc;
+ u32 nel, len;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ struct ocontext *l, *c;
+ u32 nodebuf[8];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ l = NULL;
+ for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c)
+ goto out;
+ if (l)
+ l->next = c;
+ else
+ p->ocontexts[i] = c;
+ l = c;
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case OCON_ISID:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FS:
+ case OCON_NETIF:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c->u.name)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ c->u.name[len] = 0;
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_PORT:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE:
+ rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
+ c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FSUSE:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c->u.name)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.name[len] = 0;
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE6: {
+ int k;
+
+ rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+ c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
+ for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+ c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4];
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
* representation file into a policy database structure.
@@ -1709,16 +2046,12 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
struct role_trans *tr, *ltr;
- struct ocontext *l, *c, *newc;
- struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs, *newgenfs;
int i, j, rc;
__le32 buf[4];
- u32 nodebuf[8];
- u32 len, len2, nprim, nel, nel2;
+ u32 len, nprim, nel;
+
char *policydb_str;
struct policydb_compat_info *info;
- struct range_trans *rt;
- struct mls_range *r;
rc = policydb_init(p);
if (rc)
@@ -1919,294 +2252,45 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (!p->process_trans_perms)
goto bad;
- for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- l = NULL;
- for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
- c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!c) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
- if (l)
- l->next = c;
- else
- p->ocontexts[i] = c;
- l = c;
- rc = -EINVAL;
- switch (i) {
- case OCON_ISID:
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
- if (rc)
- goto bad;
- break;
- case OCON_FS:
- case OCON_NETIF:
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!c->u.name) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
- rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- c->u.name[len] = 0;
- rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
- if (rc)
- goto bad;
- rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
- if (rc)
- goto bad;
- break;
- case OCON_PORT:
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
- if (rc)
- goto bad;
- break;
- case OCON_NODE:
- rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
- c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
- rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
- if (rc)
- goto bad;
- break;
- case OCON_FSUSE:
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE)
- goto bad;
- len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!c->u.name) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
- rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- c->u.name[len] = 0;
- rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
- if (rc)
- goto bad;
- break;
- case OCON_NODE6: {
- int k;
-
- rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
- c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
- for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
- c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4];
- if (context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp))
- goto bad;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
+ rc = ocontext_read(p, info, fp);
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
- nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- genfs_p = NULL;
- rc = -EINVAL;
- for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- newgenfs = kzalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!newgenfs) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
- newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!newgenfs->fstype) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- kfree(newgenfs);
- goto bad;
- }
- rc = next_entry(newgenfs->fstype, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0) {
- kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
- kfree(newgenfs);
- goto bad;
- }
- newgenfs->fstype[len] = 0;
- for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
- genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
- if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs "
- "fstype %s\n", newgenfs->fstype);
- kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
- kfree(newgenfs);
- goto bad;
- }
- if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
- break;
- }
- newgenfs->next = genfs;
- if (genfs_p)
- genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
- else
- p->genfs = newgenfs;
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-
- newc = kzalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!newc) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
-
- newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!newc->u.name) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad_newc;
- }
- rc = next_entry(newc->u.name, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad_newc;
- newc->u.name[len] = 0;
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad_newc;
- newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- if (context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp))
- goto bad_newc;
- for (l = NULL, c = newgenfs->head; c;
- l = c, c = c->next) {
- if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
- (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
- newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs "
- "entry (%s,%s)\n",
- newgenfs->fstype, c->u.name);
- goto bad_newc;
- }
- len = strlen(newc->u.name);
- len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
- if (len > len2)
- break;
- }
+ rc = genfs_read(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
- newc->next = c;
- if (l)
- l->next = newc;
- else
- newgenfs->head = newc;
- }
- }
+ rc = range_read(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
- if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
- int new_rangetr = p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS;
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
- goto bad;
- nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
- rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!rt) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
- if (rc < 0) {
- kfree(rt);
- goto bad;
- }
- rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- if (new_rangetr) {
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0) {
- kfree(rt);
- goto bad;
- }
- rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- } else
- rt->target_class = p->process_class;
- if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
- !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
- !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class)) {
- kfree(rt);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto bad;
- }
- r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!r) {
- kfree(rt);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
- rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp);
- if (rc) {
- kfree(rt);
- kfree(r);
- goto bad;
- }
- if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n");
- kfree(rt);
- kfree(r);
- goto bad;
- }
- rc = hashtab_insert(p->range_tr, rt, r);
- if (rc) {
- kfree(rt);
- kfree(r);
- goto bad;
- }
- }
- rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr);
- }
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ p->type_attr_map_array = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct ebitmap),
+ p->p_types.nprim,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!p->type_attr_map_array)
+ goto bad;
- p->type_attr_map = kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim * sizeof(struct ebitmap), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!p->type_attr_map)
+ /* preallocate so we don't have to worry about the put ever failing */
+ rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_attr_map_array, 0, p->p_types.nprim - 1,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
- ebitmap_init(&p->type_attr_map[i]);
+ struct ebitmap *e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
+
+ BUG_ON(!e);
+ ebitmap_init(e);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
- if (ebitmap_read(&p->type_attr_map[i], fp))
+ rc = ebitmap_read(e, fp);
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
}
/* add the type itself as the degenerate case */
- if (ebitmap_set_bit(&p->type_attr_map[i], i, 1))
- goto bad;
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(e, i, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
}
rc = policydb_bounds_sanity_check(p);
@@ -2216,8 +2300,6 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
-bad_newc:
- ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
bad:
if (!rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 26d9adf8542..310e94442cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_
#define _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
+
#include "symtab.h"
#include "avtab.h"
#include "sidtab.h"
@@ -246,7 +248,7 @@ struct policydb {
struct hashtab *range_tr;
/* type -> attribute reverse mapping */
- struct ebitmap *type_attr_map;
+ struct flex_array *type_attr_map_array;
struct ebitmap policycaps;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 1de60ce90d9..9ea2feca3cd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include "flask.h"
@@ -626,8 +627,10 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
*/
avkey.target_class = tclass;
avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
- sattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1];
- tattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1];
+ sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
+ BUG_ON(!sattr);
+ tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
+ BUG_ON(!tattr);
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
avkey.source_type = i + 1;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
index bcf9f620426..160326ee99e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size)
{
s->table = hashtab_create(symhash, symcmp, size);
if (!s->table)
- return -1;
+ return -ENOMEM;
s->nprim = 0;
return 0;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-07-10 00:16:11 +0000