diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
34 files changed, 233 insertions, 154 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 95accd442d5..e0f08b52e4a 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ config INTEL_TXT config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX + default 32768 if ARM default 65536 help This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index f204869399e..2dafe50a2e2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -6,19 +6,47 @@ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ resource.o sid.o file.o -clean-files: capability_names.h af_names.h +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h + +# Build a lower case string table of capability names +# Transforms lines from +# #define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 1 +# to +# [1] = "dac_override", quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN $@ -cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n -e "/CAP_FS_MASK/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+CAP_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ +cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ + sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \ + -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ + echo "};" >> $@ + +# Build a lower case string table of rlimit names. +# Transforms lines from +# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */ +# to +# [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack", +# +# and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps +# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h Thi is +# required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal +# ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT. +# Transforms lines from +# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */ +# to +# RLIMIT_STACK, quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN $@ -cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n --e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+RLIMIT_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ ; echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ; sed -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+\\(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/\\1,/p" $< >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ +cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ + sed $< >> $@ -r -n \ + -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\ + echo "};" >> $@ ;\ + echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ;\ + sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\ + echo "};" >> $@ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h $(call cmd,make-caps) -$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h - $(call cmd,make-af) $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h $(call cmd,make-rlim) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index b7106f192b7..ae3a698415e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include "include/apparmor.h" @@ -136,11 +137,11 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, } static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred, - int cap, int audit) + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit) { struct aa_profile *profile; /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ - int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit); + int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit); if (!error) { profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); if (!unconfined(profile)) @@ -693,11 +694,9 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); -#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); -#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c index 5cb4dc1f699..06d764ccbbe 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/match.c +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref) * * Unpack a dfa that has been serialized. To find information on the dfa * format look in Documentation/apparmor.txt - * Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundry + * Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundary * * Returns: an unpacked dfa ready for matching or ERR_PTR on failure */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index eb3700e9fd3..e33aaf7e574 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ fail: * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL) * @profile: profile to add the accept table to (NOT NULL) * - * Returns: 1 if table succesfully unpacked + * Returns: 1 if table successfully unpacked */ static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) { diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 56bb1605fd7..bbb51156261 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ static int cap_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir) static int cap_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, - struct flowi *fl) + const struct flowi *fl) { return 1; } diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 64c2ed9c901..a93b3b73307 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in @@ -52,13 +53,12 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap(); return 0; } int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) { - if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap)) + if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap)) return -EPERM; return 0; } @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability * @tsk: The task to query * @cred: The credentials to use + * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability * @cap: The capability to check for * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not * @@ -79,10 +80,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. */ -int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap, - int audit) +int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit) { - return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; + for (;;) { + /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */ + if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user) + return 0; + + /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ + if (targ_ns == cred->user->user_ns) + return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; + + /* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */ + if (targ_ns == &init_user_ns) + return -EPERM; + + /* + *If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have + * it over all children user namespaces as well. + */ + targ_ns = targ_ns->creator->user_ns; + } + + /* We never get here */ } /** @@ -93,7 +114,7 @@ int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap, * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied. */ -int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) +int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) return -EPERM; @@ -106,18 +127,30 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) * @child: The process to be accessed * @mode: The mode of attachment. * + * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target + * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. + * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace + * access is allowed. + * Else denied. + * * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission * granted, -ve if denied. */ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { int ret = 0; + const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; rcu_read_lock(); - if (!cap_issubset(__task_cred(child)->cap_permitted, - current_cred()->cap_permitted) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) - ret = -EPERM; + cred = current_cred(); + child_cred = __task_cred(child); + if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns && + cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) + goto out; + if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + goto out; + ret = -EPERM; +out: rcu_read_unlock(); return ret; } @@ -126,18 +159,30 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer * + * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's + * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. + * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace + * access is allowed. + * Else denied. + * * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. */ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { int ret = 0; + const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; rcu_read_lock(); - if (!cap_issubset(current_cred()->cap_permitted, - __task_cred(parent)->cap_permitted) && - !has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) - ret = -EPERM; + cred = __task_cred(parent); + child_cred = current_cred(); + if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns && + cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) + goto out; + if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + goto out; + ret = -EPERM; +out: rcu_read_unlock(); return ret; } @@ -177,7 +222,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ - if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP, + if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), + current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) return 0; return 1; @@ -483,15 +529,10 @@ skip: new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid; new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; - /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set in the initial - * task. Thus we skip the usual capability rules - */ - if (!is_global_init(current)) { - if (effective) - new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; - else - cap_clear(new->cap_effective); - } + if (effective) + new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; + else + cap_clear(new->cap_effective); bprm->cap_effective = effective; /* @@ -829,7 +870,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, & (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ - || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP, + || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), + current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ /* * [1] no changing of bits that are locked @@ -894,7 +936,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int cap_sys_admin = 0; - if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, + if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); @@ -921,7 +963,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, int ret = 0; if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { - ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO, + ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ if (ret == 0) diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 07a025f8190..f375152a250 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -109,11 +109,13 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, const struct cred *cred, struct key_type *type, const void *description, - key_match_func_t match); + key_match_func_t match, + bool no_state_check); extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, const void *description, key_match_func_t match, + bool no_state_check, const struct cred *cred); extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, const void *description, diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 427fddcaeb1..eca51918c95 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -206,8 +206,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type, goto error5; } + /* wait for the key to finish being constructed */ + ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1); + if (ret < 0) + goto error6; + ret = key->serial; +error6: key_put(key); error5: key_type_put(ktype); diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index cdd2f3f88c8..a06ffab3856 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -176,13 +176,15 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) else seq_puts(m, "[anon]"); - rcu_read_lock(); - klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions); - if (klist) - seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys); - else - seq_puts(m, ": empty"); - rcu_read_unlock(); + if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) { + rcu_read_lock(); + klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions); + if (klist) + seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys); + else + seq_puts(m, ": empty"); + rcu_read_unlock(); + } } /* @@ -271,6 +273,7 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, * @type: The type of key to search for. * @description: Parameter for @match. * @match: Function to rule on whether or not a key is the one required. + * @no_state_check: Don't check if a matching key is bad * * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given. * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the @@ -303,7 +306,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, const struct cred *cred, struct key_type *type, const void *description, - key_match_func_t match) + key_match_func_t match, + bool no_state_check) { struct { struct keyring_list *keylist; @@ -345,6 +349,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, kflags = keyring->flags; if (keyring->type == type && match(keyring, description)) { key = keyring; + if (no_state_check) + goto found; /* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been * revoked */ @@ -384,11 +390,13 @@ descend: continue; /* skip revoked keys and expired keys */ - if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)) - continue; + if (!no_state_check) { + if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)) + continue; - if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) - continue; + if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) + continue; + } /* keys that don't match */ if (!match(key, description)) @@ -399,6 +407,9 @@ descend: cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) continue; + if (no_state_check) + goto found; + /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { err = key->type_data.reject_error; @@ -478,7 +489,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred, - type, description, type->match); + type, description, type->match, false); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search); diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 525cf8a29cd..49bbc97943a 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) { skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key, lookup_user_key_possessed, - cred); + true, cred); if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) { key_ref_put(skey_ref); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 930634e4514..6c0480db888 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, const void *description, key_match_func_t match, + bool no_state_check, const struct cred *cred) { key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err; @@ -350,7 +351,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, if (cred->thread_keyring) { key_ref = keyring_search_aux( make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1), - cred, type, description, match); + cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; @@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) { key_ref = keyring_search_aux( make_key_ref(cred->tgcred->process_keyring, 1), - cred, type, description, match); + cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; @@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, make_key_ref(rcu_dereference( cred->tgcred->session_keyring), 1), - cred, type, description, match); + cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); rcu_read_unlock(); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) @@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, else if (cred->user->session_keyring) { key_ref = keyring_search_aux( make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1), - cred, type, description, match); + cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; @@ -459,7 +460,8 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, might_sleep(); - key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match, cred); + key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match, + false, cred); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; err = key_ref; diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index df3c0417ee4..b18a7174590 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -530,8 +530,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, dest_keyring, flags); /* search all the process keyrings for a key */ - key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, - cred); + key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 68164031a74..f6337c9082e 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); - seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len); + if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len); } /* diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index c6ca8662a46..5b366d7af3c 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -69,18 +69,6 @@ error: EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate); /* - * dispose of the old data from an updated user defined key - */ -static void user_update_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu) -{ - struct user_key_payload *upayload; - - upayload = container_of(rcu, struct user_key_payload, rcu); - - kfree(upayload); -} - -/* * update a user defined key * - the key's semaphore is write-locked */ @@ -114,7 +102,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) key->expiry = 0; } - call_rcu(&zap->rcu, user_update_rcu_disposal); + kfree_rcu(zap, rcu); error: return ret; @@ -145,7 +133,7 @@ void user_revoke(struct key *key) if (upayload) { rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, NULL); - call_rcu(&upayload->rcu, user_update_rcu_disposal); + kfree_rcu(upayload, rcu); } } @@ -169,8 +157,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy); void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { seq_puts(m, key->description); - - seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen); + if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 7e34f98bf43..4ba6d4cc061 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -154,29 +154,33 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, int cap) +int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred, + int cap) { - return security_ops->capable(current, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap, + SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); } -int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) +int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap) { const struct cred *cred; int ret; cred = get_task_cred(tsk); - ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); put_cred(cred); return ret; } -int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) +int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { const struct cred *cred; int ret; cred = get_task_cred(tsk); - ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); + ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); put_cred(cred); return ret; } @@ -196,7 +200,7 @@ int security_syslog(int type) return security_ops->syslog(type); } -int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) +int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz) { return security_ops->settime(ts, tz); } @@ -1103,7 +1107,7 @@ void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl) { - security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->secid); + security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->flowi_secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); @@ -1236,7 +1240,8 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) } int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl) + struct xfrm_policy *xp, + const struct flowi *fl) { return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl); } @@ -1248,7 +1253,7 @@ int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl) { - int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->secid, 0); + int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid, 0); BUG_ON(rc); } diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index ce742f1778e..fcb89cb0f22 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -38,11 +38,7 @@ #define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS -#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) \ -do { \ - per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, get_cpu()).field++; \ - put_cpu(); \ -} while (0) +#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) this_cpu_inc(avc_cache_stats.field) #else #define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) do {} while (0) #endif @@ -347,11 +343,10 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass); if (node) - avc_cache_stats_incr(hits); - else - avc_cache_stats_incr(misses); + return node; - return node; + avc_cache_stats_incr(misses); + return NULL; } static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert) @@ -769,7 +764,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, rcu_read_lock(); node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass); - if (!node) { + if (unlikely(!node)) { rcu_read_unlock(); if (in_avd) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 9f426b8a12b..a0d38459d65 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/syslog.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" @@ -1866,11 +1867,11 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, */ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, - int cap, int audit) + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit) { int rc; - rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit); + rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1951,7 +1952,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; - rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, + rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), + &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); if (rc == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; @@ -2746,7 +2748,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode)) + if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) return -EPERM; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); @@ -2857,7 +2859,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ - error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN, + error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), + &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); if (!error) error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, @@ -2991,7 +2994,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, case KDSKBENT: case KDSKBSENT: error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); break; /* default case assumes that the command will go @@ -4369,7 +4372,7 @@ static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void) static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl) { - fl->secid = req->secid; + fl->flowi_secid = req->secid; } static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) @@ -4718,6 +4721,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability) { int err; struct common_audit_data ad; + u32 sid; err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability); if (err) @@ -4726,8 +4730,9 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability) COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); ad.u.cap = capability; - return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, - SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad); + security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, + CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad); } static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index e77b2ac2908..47fda963495 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ struct sk_buff; */ struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned int lookups; - unsigned int hits; unsigned int misses; unsigned int allocations; unsigned int reclaims; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 13128f9a3e5..b43813c9e04 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x); int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x); int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl); + struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl); /* * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket) diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c index d6095d63d83..58cc481c93d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netif.c +++ b/security/selinux/netif.c @@ -104,22 +104,6 @@ static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif) } /** - * sel_netif_free - Frees an interface entry - * @p: the entry's RCU field - * - * Description: - * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu() - * function so that memory allocated to a hash table interface entry can be - * released safely. - * - */ -static void sel_netif_free(struct rcu_head *p) -{ - struct sel_netif *netif = container_of(p, struct sel_netif, rcu_head); - kfree(netif); -} - -/** * sel_netif_destroy - Remove an interface record from the table * @netif: the existing interface record * @@ -131,7 +115,7 @@ static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif) { list_del_rcu(&netif->list); sel_netif_total--; - call_rcu(&netif->rcu_head, sel_netif_free); + kfree_rcu(netif, rcu_head); } /** diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index 1c2fc46544b..c3bf3ed07b0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec) * * Description: * Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset. - * The caller is responsibile for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking. + * The caller is responsible for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking. * */ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index fde4e9d64bf..77d44138864 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, length = -ENOMEM; if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out;; + goto out; /* No partial writes. */ length = -EINVAL; @@ -889,12 +889,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER); if (length) - goto out;; + goto out; length = -ENOMEM; con = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!con) - goto out;; + goto out; length = -ENOMEM; user = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) length = -ENOMEM; scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!scon) - goto out;; + goto out; length = -ENOMEM; tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1393,10 +1393,14 @@ static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) seq_printf(seq, "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims " "frees\n"); - else - seq_printf(seq, "%u %u %u %u %u %u\n", st->lookups, - st->hits, st->misses, st->allocations, + else { + unsigned int lookups = st->lookups; + unsigned int misses = st->misses; + unsigned int hits = lookups - misses; + seq_printf(seq, "%u %u %u %u %u %u\n", lookups, + hits, misses, st->allocations, st->reclaims, st->frees); + } return 0; } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index e11b4b038f4..c3e4b52699f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2814,7 +2814,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */ + /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */ if (strchr(rulestr, '-')) return -EINVAL; break; @@ -3083,7 +3083,7 @@ static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, * Description: * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux - * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the + * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 728c57e3d65..68178b76a2b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) */ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, - struct flowi *fl) + const struct flowi *fl) { u32 state_sid; int rc; @@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy * state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid; - if (fl->secid != state_sid) + if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid) return 0; - rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + rc = avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL)? 0:1; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 86453db4333..9637e107f7e 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ char *smk_import(const char *string, int len) * smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid * @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label * - * Returns a pointer to the appropraite Smack label if there is one, + * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label if there is one, * otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label. */ char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 410825a4439..9831a39c11f 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1804,7 +1804,7 @@ static void smack_set_catset(char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap) * Casey says that CIPSO is good enough for now. * It can be used to effect. * It can also be abused to effect when necessary. - * Appologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular. + * Apologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular. */ static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp) { @@ -2540,7 +2540,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) switch (sbp->s_magic) { case SMACK_MAGIC: /* - * Casey says that it's a little embarassing + * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing * that the smack file system doesn't do * extended attributes. */ @@ -3094,7 +3094,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, /* * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will - * propogate the wire-label to the sock when it is created. + * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created. */ hdr = ip_hdr(skb); addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr; diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 90d1bbaaa6f..f93460156dc 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (*ppos != 0) return -EINVAL; /* - * Minor hack for backward compatability + * Minor hack for backward compatibility */ if (count < (SMK_OLOADLEN) || count > SMK_LOADLEN) return -EINVAL; @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } /* - * More on the minor hack for backward compatability + * More on the minor hack for backward compatibility */ if (count == (SMK_OLOADLEN)) data[SMK_OLOADLEN] = '-'; @@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } } else { /* we delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label - * wasnt the special CIPSO option */ + * wasn't the special CIPSO option */ if (skp->smk_label != smack_cipso_option) rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL, &skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask, diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c index 7556315c197..a0d09e56874 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c @@ -108,10 +108,9 @@ static bool tomoyo_flush(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) head->read_user_buf += len; w += len; } - if (*w) { - head->r.w[0] = w; + head->r.w[0] = w; + if (*w) return false; - } /* Add '\0' for query. */ if (head->poll) { if (!head->read_user_buf_avail || @@ -459,8 +458,16 @@ static int tomoyo_write_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) if (profile == &tomoyo_default_profile) return -EINVAL; if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) { - const struct tomoyo_path_info *old_comment = profile->comment; - profile->comment = tomoyo_get_name(cp); + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + const struct tomoyo_path_info *new_comment + = tomoyo_get_name(cp); + const struct tomoyo_path_info *old_comment; + if (!new_comment) + return -ENOMEM; + spin_lock(&lock); + old_comment = profile->comment; + profile->comment = new_comment; + spin_unlock(&lock); tomoyo_put_name(old_comment); return 0; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c index cb09f1fce91..d64e8ecb6fb 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/file.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c @@ -1011,7 +1011,6 @@ int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path) break; case TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR: case TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT: - case TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT: tomoyo_add_slash(&buf); break; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c index bbada7ca1b9..3312e5624f2 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_policy_loader_exists(void) * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since * policies are not loaded yet. - * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime. + * Thus, let do_execve() call this function every time. */ struct path path; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/memory.c b/security/tomoyo/memory.c index 297612669c7..42a7b1ba8cb 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/memory.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/memory.c @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size) memset(data, 0, size); return ptr; } + kfree(ptr); return NULL; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c index 82bf8c2390b..162a864dba2 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name, goto out; } requested_dev_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path); + path_put(&path); if (!requested_dev_name) { error = -ENOENT; goto out; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c index 9bfc1ee8222..6d5393204d9 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/util.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c @@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ bool tomoyo_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname) if (!cp) break; if (*domainname != '/' || - !tomoyo_correct_word2(domainname, cp - domainname - 1)) + !tomoyo_correct_word2(domainname, cp - domainname)) goto out; domainname = cp + 1; } |