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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c823
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/domain.h36
2 files changed, 859 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..08bbe6397a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,823 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_domain_entries - free entries in a domain table
+ * @domain: the domain table to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (domain) {
+ if (!domain->table)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++)
+ kzfree(domain->table[i]);
+ kzfree(domain->table);
+ domain->table = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
+ * @task: task we want to change profile of (NOT NULL)
+ * @to_profile: profile to change to (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Check if the task is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
+ * to trace the new domain
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
+ */
+static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
+ struct aa_profile *to_profile)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tracer;
+ struct cred *cred = NULL;
+ struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(task);
+ if (tracer) {
+ /* released below */
+ cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
+ tracerp = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ /* not ptraced */
+ if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
+ goto out;
+
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+
+out:
+ if (cred)
+ put_cred(cred);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile
+ * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: the namespace being switched to (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: the name of the profile to change to (NOT NULL)
+ * @request: requested perms
+ * @start: state to start matching in
+ *
+ * Returns: permission set
+ */
+static struct file_perms change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct aa_namespace *ns,
+ const char *name, u32 request,
+ unsigned int start)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms;
+ struct path_cond cond = { };
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ if (unconfined(profile)) {
+ perms.allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+ perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0;
+ return perms;
+ } else if (!profile->file.dfa) {
+ return nullperms;
+ } else if ((ns == profile->ns)) {
+ /* try matching against rules with out namespace prepended */
+ aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, start, name, &cond, &perms);
+ if (COMBINED_PERM_MASK(perms) & request)
+ return perms;
+ }
+
+ /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, start, ns->base.name);
+ state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
+ aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms);
+
+ return perms;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match
+ * @name - to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching
+ * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses
+ * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest
+ * xmatch_len are preferred.
+ *
+ * Requires: @head not be shared or have appropriate locks held
+ *
+ * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
+ struct list_head *head)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(profile, head, base.list) {
+ if (profile->flags & PFLAG_NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) {
+ unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch,
+ DFA_START, name);
+ u32 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
+ /* any accepting state means a valid match. */
+ if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
+ candidate = profile;
+ len = profile->xmatch_len;
+ }
+ } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name))
+ /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */
+ return profile;
+ }
+
+ return candidate;
+}
+
+/**
+ * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes
+ * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL)
+ * @list: list to search (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *find_attach(struct aa_namespace *ns,
+ struct list_head *list, const char *name)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+ read_lock(&ns->lock);
+ profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list));
+ read_unlock(&ns->lock);
+
+ return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * separate_fqname - separate the namespace and profile names
+ * @fqname: the fqname name to split (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns_name: the namespace name if it exists (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This is the xtable equivalent routine of aa_split_fqname. It finds the
+ * split in an xtable fqname which contains an embedded \0 instead of a :
+ * if a namespace is specified. This is done so the xtable is constant and
+ * isn't re-split on every lookup.
+ *
+ * Either the profile or namespace name may be optional but if the namespace
+ * is specified the profile name termination must be present. This results
+ * in the following possible encodings:
+ * profile_name\0
+ * :ns_name\0profile_name\0
+ * :ns_name\0\0
+ *
+ * NOTE: the xtable fqname is pre-validated at load time in unpack_trans_table
+ *
+ * Returns: profile name if it is specified else NULL
+ */
+static const char *separate_fqname(const char *fqname, const char **ns_name)
+{
+ const char *name;
+
+ if (fqname[0] == ':') {
+ /* In this case there is guaranteed to be two \0 terminators
+ * in the string. They are verified at load time by
+ * by unpack_trans_table
+ */
+ *ns_name = fqname + 1; /* skip : */
+ name = *ns_name + strlen(*ns_name) + 1;
+ if (!*name)
+ name = NULL;
+ } else {
+ *ns_name = NULL;
+ name = fqname;
+ }
+
+ return name;
+}
+
+static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table
+ * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @xindex: index into x transition table
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+ u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+ int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
+ const char *name;
+
+ /* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */
+ for (name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !new_profile && name;
+ name = next_name(xtype, name)) {
+ struct aa_namespace *new_ns;
+ const char *xname = NULL;
+
+ new_ns = NULL;
+ if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) {
+ /* release by caller */
+ new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, name);
+ continue;
+ } else if (*name == ':') {
+ /* switching namespace */
+ const char *ns_name;
+ xname = name = separate_fqname(name, &ns_name);
+ if (!xname)
+ /* no name so use profile name */
+ xname = profile->base.hname;
+ if (*ns_name == '@') {
+ /* TODO: variable support */
+ ;
+ }
+ /* released below */
+ new_ns = aa_find_namespace(ns, ns_name);
+ if (!new_ns)
+ continue;
+ } else if (*name == '@') {
+ /* TODO: variable support */
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ /* basic namespace lookup */
+ xname = name;
+ }
+
+ /* released by caller */
+ new_profile = aa_lookup_profile(new_ns ? new_ns : ns, xname);
+ aa_put_namespace(new_ns);
+ }
+
+ /* released by caller */
+ return new_profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * x_to_profile - get target profile for a given xindex
+ * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL)
+ * @xindex: index into x transition table
+ *
+ * find profile for a transition index
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found available
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ const char *name, u32 xindex)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+ u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ switch (xtype) {
+ case AA_X_NONE:
+ /* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */
+ return NULL;
+ case AA_X_NAME:
+ if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
+ /* released by caller */
+ new_profile = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles,
+ name);
+ else
+ /* released by caller */
+ new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles,
+ name);
+ break;
+ case AA_X_TABLE:
+ /* released by caller */
+ new_profile = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* released by caller */
+ return new_profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ */
+int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct aa_profile *profile, *new_profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+ unsigned int state;
+ struct file_perms perms = {};
+ struct path_cond cond = {
+ bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+ bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+ };
+ const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+ return 0;
+
+ cxt = bprm->cred->security;
+ BUG_ON(!cxt);
+
+ profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile));
+ /*
+ * get the namespace from the replacement profile as replacement
+ * can change the namespace
+ */
+ ns = profile->ns;
+ state = profile->file.start;
+
+ /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
+ error = aa_get_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer,
+ &name);
+ if (error) {
+ if (profile->flags &
+ (PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | PFLAG_UNCONFINED))
+ error = 0;
+ info = "Exec failed name resolution";
+ name = bprm->filename;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ /* Test for onexec first as onexec directives override other
+ * x transitions.
+ */
+ if (unconfined(profile)) {
+ /* unconfined task */
+ if (cxt->onexec)
+ /* change_profile on exec already been granted */
+ new_profile = aa_get_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ else
+ new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name);
+ if (!new_profile)
+ goto cleanup;
+ goto apply;
+ }
+
+ /* find exec permissions for name */
+ state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms);
+ if (cxt->onexec) {
+ struct file_perms cp;
+ info = "change_profile onexec";
+ if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
+ goto audit;
+
+ /* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec.
+ * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing
+ * exec\0change_profile
+ */
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
+ cp = change_profile_perms(profile, cxt->onexec->ns, name,
+ AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state);
+
+ if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
+ goto audit;
+ new_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec));
+ goto apply;
+ }
+
+ if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
+ /* exec permission determine how to transition */
+ new_profile = x_to_profile(profile, name, perms.xindex);
+ if (!new_profile) {
+ if (perms.xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) {
+ /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do
+ * use the newest version, which was picked
+ * up above when getting profile
+ */
+ info = "ix fallback";
+ new_profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
+ goto x_clear;
+ } else if (perms.xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) {
+ new_profile = aa_get_profile(ns->unconfined);
+ info = "ux fallback";
+ } else {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ info = "profile not found";
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
+ /* no exec permission - are we in learning mode */
+ new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0);
+ if (!new_profile) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ info = "could not create null profile";
+ } else {
+ error = -EACCES;
+ target = new_profile->base.hname;
+ }
+ perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
+ } else
+ /* fail exec */
+ error = -EACCES;
+
+ if (!new_profile)
+ goto audit;
+
+ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+ /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
+ ;
+ }
+
+ if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, new_profile);
+ if (error) {
+ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Determine if secure exec is needed.
+ * Can be at this point for the following reasons:
+ * 1. unconfined switching to confined
+ * 2. confined switching to different confinement
+ * 3. confined switching to unconfined
+ *
+ * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
+ * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
+ *
+ * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission
+ * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec
+ */
+ if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
+ AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n",
+ name, new_profile->base.hname);
+ bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
+ }
+apply:
+ target = new_profile->base.hname;
+ /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
+ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+x_clear:
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ /* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */
+ cxt->profile = new_profile;
+
+ /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ cxt->previous = NULL;
+ cxt->onexec = NULL;
+ cxt->token = 0;
+
+audit:
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
+ name, target, cond.uid, info, error);
+
+cleanup:
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+ kfree(buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed
+ * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0
+ */
+int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
+
+ /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
+ * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
+ */
+ if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED))
+ ret = 1;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security;
+
+ /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
+ if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) ||
+ (unconfined(new_cxt->profile)))
+ return;
+
+ current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+ /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new profile */
+ __aa_transition_rlimits(profile, new_cxt->profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_commited_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Functions for self directed profile change
+ */
+
+/**
+ * new_compound_name - create an hname with @n2 appended to @n1
+ * @n1: base of hname (NOT NULL)
+ * @n2: name to append (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: new name or NULL on error
+ */
+static char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2)
+{
+ char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (name)
+ sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2);
+ return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile
+ * @hats: vector of hat names to try changing into (MAYBE NULL if @count == 0)
+ * @count: number of hat names in @hats
+ * @token: magic value to validate the hat change
+ * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
+ *
+ * Change to the first profile specified in @hats that exists, and store
+ * the @hat_magic in the current task context. If the count == 0 and the
+ * @token matches that stored in the current task context, return to the
+ * top level profile.
+ *
+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
+ */
+int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile, *hat = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ int i;
+ struct file_perms perms = {};
+ const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ /* released below */
+ cred = get_current_cred();
+ cxt = cred->security;
+ profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+ previous_profile = cxt->previous;
+
+ if (unconfined(profile)) {
+ info = "unconfined";
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ if (count) {
+ /* attempting to change into a new hat or switch to a sibling */
+ struct aa_profile *root;
+ root = PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile) ? profile->parent : profile;
+
+ /* find first matching hat */
+ for (i = 0; i < count && !hat; i++)
+ /* released below */
+ hat = aa_find_child(root, hats[i]);
+ if (!hat) {
+ if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(root) || permtest) {
+ if (list_empty(&root->base.profiles))
+ error = -ECHILD;
+ else
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In complain mode and failed to match any hats.
+ * Audit the failure is based off of the first hat
+ * supplied. This is done due how userspace
+ * interacts with change_hat.
+ *
+ * TODO: Add logging of all failed hats
+ */
+
+ /* freed below */
+ name = new_compound_name(root->base.hname, hats[0]);
+ target = name;
+ /* released below */
+ hat = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 1);
+ if (!hat) {
+ info = "failed null profile create";
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ } else {
+ target = hat->base.hname;
+ if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) {
+ info = "target not hat";
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, hat);
+ if (error) {
+ info = "ptraced";
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ if (!permtest) {
+ error = aa_set_current_hat(hat, token);
+ if (error == -EACCES)
+ /* kill task in case of brute force attacks */
+ perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
+ else if (name && !error)
+ /* reset error for learning of new hats */
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ }
+ } else if (previous_profile) {
+ /* Return to saved profile. Kill task if restore fails
+ * to avoid brute force attacks
+ */
+ target = previous_profile->base.hname;
+ error = aa_restore_previous_profile(token);
+ perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
+ } else
+ /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
+ goto out;
+
+audit:
+ if (!permtest)
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL,
+ OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL,
+ target, 0, info, error);
+
+out:
+ aa_put_profile(hat);
+ kfree(name);
+ put_cred(cred);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
+ * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @hname: name of profile to change to (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec
+ * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
+ *
+ * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way
+ * to change back. If @name isn't specified the current profile name is
+ * used.
+ * If @onexec then the transition is delayed until
+ * the next exec.
+ *
+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
+ */
+int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
+ bool permtest)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
+ struct file_perms perms = {};
+ const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int op, error = 0;
+ u32 request;
+
+ if (!hname && !ns_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (onexec) {
+ request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+ op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC;
+ } else {
+ request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+ op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+ }
+
+ cred = get_current_cred();
+ cxt = cred->security;
+ profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+
+ if (ns_name) {
+ /* released below */
+ ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name);
+ if (!ns) {
+ /* we don't create new namespace in complain mode */
+ name = ns_name;
+ info = "namespace not found";
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ } else
+ /* released below */
+ ns = aa_get_namespace(profile->ns);
+
+ /* if the name was not specified, use the name of the current profile */
+ if (!hname) {
+ if (unconfined(profile))
+ hname = ns->unconfined->base.hname;
+ else
+ hname = profile->base.hname;
+ }
+
+ perms = change_profile_perms(profile, ns, hname, request,
+ profile->file.start);
+ if (!(perms.allow & request)) {
+ error = -EACCES;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ /* released below */
+ target = aa_lookup_profile(ns, hname);
+ if (!target) {
+ info = "profile not found";
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ if (permtest || !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ goto audit;
+ /* released below */
+ target = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0);
+ if (!target) {
+ info = "failed null profile create";
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, target);
+ if (error) {
+ info = "ptrace prevents transition";
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ if (permtest)
+ goto audit;
+
+ if (onexec)
+ error = aa_set_current_onexec(target);
+ else
+ error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
+
+audit:
+ if (!permtest)
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request,
+ name, hname, 0, info, error);
+
+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
+ aa_put_profile(target);
+ put_cred(cred);
+
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..de04464f0a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor security domain transition function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifndef __AA_DOMAIN_H
+#define __AA_DOMAIN_H
+
+struct aa_domain {
+ int size;
+ char **table;
+};
+
+int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
+void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain);
+int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest);
+int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *name, bool onexec,
+ bool permtest);
+
+#endif /* __AA_DOMAIN_H */