From 03a816b46d7eba78da11e4025f0af195b32fa464 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Dickson <SteveD@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2009 15:06:05 -0400
Subject: nfsd: restrict filehandles accepted in V4ROOT case

On V4ROOT exports, only accept filehandles that are the *root* of some
export.  This allows mountd to allow or deny access to individual
directories and symlinks on the pseudofilesystem.

Note that the checks in readdir and lookup are not enough, since a
malicious host with access to the network could guess filehandles that
they weren't able to obtain through lookup or readdir.

Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
---
 fs/nfsd/nfsd.h  |  5 +++++
 fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/nfsd/vfs.c   |  6 ------
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'fs/nfsd')

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h b/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h
index 74f67c2aca3..ac121ad1654 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h
@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ int nfsd_create_serv(void);
 
 extern int nfsd_max_blksize;
 
+static inline int nfsd_v4client(struct svc_rqst *rq)
+{
+	return rq->rq_prog == NFS_PROGRAM && rq->rq_vers == 4;
+}
+
 /* 
  * NFSv4 State
  */
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
index 951938d6c49..44812c32e51 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
@@ -103,6 +103,36 @@ static __be32 nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
 	return nfserrno(nfsd_setuser(rqstp, exp));
 }
 
+static inline __be32 check_pseudo_root(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+	struct dentry *dentry, struct svc_export *exp)
+{
+	if (!(exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_V4ROOT))
+		return nfs_ok;
+	/*
+	 * v2/v3 clients have no need for the V4ROOT export--they use
+	 * the mount protocl instead; also, further V4ROOT checks may be
+	 * in v4-specific code, in which case v2/v3 clients could bypass
+	 * them.
+	 */
+	if (!nfsd_v4client(rqstp))
+		return nfserr_stale;
+	/*
+	 * We're exposing only the directories and symlinks that have to be
+	 * traversed on the way to real exports:
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
+		     !S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)))
+		return nfserr_stale;
+	/*
+	 * A pseudoroot export gives permission to access only one
+	 * single directory; the kernel has to make another upcall
+	 * before granting access to anything else under it:
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(dentry != exp->ex_path.dentry))
+		return nfserr_stale;
+	return nfs_ok;
+}
+
 /*
  * Use the given filehandle to look up the corresponding export and
  * dentry.  On success, the results are used to set fh_export and
@@ -299,6 +329,10 @@ fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, int access)
 	 *	  (for example, if different id-squashing options are in
 	 *	  effect on the new filesystem).
 	 */
+	error = check_pseudo_root(rqstp, dentry, exp);
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
+
 	error = nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(rqstp, exp);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index a0015a958ae..f6ca32b07e1 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -72,12 +72,6 @@ struct raparm_hbucket {
 #define RAPARM_HASH_MASK	(RAPARM_HASH_SIZE-1)
 static struct raparm_hbucket	raparm_hash[RAPARM_HASH_SIZE];
 
-static inline int
-nfsd_v4client(struct svc_rqst *rq)
-{
-    return rq->rq_prog == NFS_PROGRAM && rq->rq_vers == 4;
-}
-
 /* 
  * Called from nfsd_lookup and encode_dirent. Check if we have crossed 
  * a mount point.
-- 
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