From 7163a993840f0906d4ce1e3f193575c99dac21e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2013 14:19:09 -0500
Subject: ima: re-initialize IMA policy LSM info

Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
stale LSM policy.  This patch updates the IMA LSM based rules
to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.

Reported-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
tested-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index af7d182d5a4..70f888de880 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 	kuid_t fowner;
 	struct {
 		void *rule;	/* LSM file metadata specific */
+		void *args_p;	/* audit value */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 };
@@ -119,6 +120,35 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
 
+/* 
+ * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
+ * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
+ * stale LSM policy.
+ *
+ * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. 
+ * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
+ */
+static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
+	int result;
+	int i;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
+		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+			if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
+				continue;
+			result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
+							   Audit_equal,
+							   entry->lsm[i].args_p,
+							   &entry->lsm[i].rule);
+			BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
+}
+
 /**
  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
@@ -149,10 +179,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid, sid;
+		int retried = 0;
 
 		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
 			continue;
-
+retry:
 		switch (i) {
 		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
@@ -176,6 +207,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
+		if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
+			retried = 1;
+			ima_lsm_update_rules();
+			goto retry;
+		} 
 		if (!rc)
 			return false;
 	}
@@ -306,19 +342,27 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 };
 
 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
-			     char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
+			     substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
 {
 	int result;
 
 	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
+	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
 	result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
-					   Audit_equal, args,
+					   Audit_equal,
+					   entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
 					   &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
-	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
+	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
+		kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	return result;
 }
 
@@ -481,37 +525,37 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			break;
 		case Opt_obj_user:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
-			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
 						   LSM_OBJ_USER,
 						   AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
 			break;
 		case Opt_obj_role:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
-			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
 						   LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
 						   AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_obj_type:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
-			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
 						   LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
 						   AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_subj_user:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
-			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
 						   LSM_SUBJ_USER,
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
 			break;
 		case Opt_subj_role:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
-			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
 						   LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_subj_type:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
-			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
 						   LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
 			break;
@@ -589,9 +633,13 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 void ima_delete_rules(void)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
+	int i;
 
 	mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
+		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+			kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+
 		list_del(&entry->list);
 		kfree(entry);
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e90805656d4683f84d360276102ae63adc777a38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2012 17:11:56 +0300
Subject: evm: remove unused cleanup functions

EVM cannot be built as a kernel module. Remove the unncessary __exit
functions.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h       | 1 -
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c  | 9 ---------
 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 6 ------
 3 files changed, 16 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index c885247ebcf..3eb30c6db41 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -45,6 +45,5 @@ extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
 extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
 			 char *hmac_val);
 extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
-extern void evm_cleanup_secfs(void);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index eb5484504f5..a78a5e21ef7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -427,15 +427,6 @@ err:
 	return error;
 }
 
-static void __exit cleanup_evm(void)
-{
-	evm_cleanup_secfs();
-	if (hmac_tfm)
-		crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm);
-	if (hash_tfm)
-		crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
-}
-
 /*
  * evm_display_config - list the EVM protected security extended attributes
  */
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index ac762995057..30f670ad6ac 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -100,9 +100,3 @@ int __init evm_init_secfs(void)
 		error = -EFAULT;
 	return error;
 }
-
-void __exit evm_cleanup_secfs(void)
-{
-	if (evm_init_tpm)
-		securityfs_remove(evm_init_tpm);
-}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From def3e8b9ee23cb69036910e48ec4e3eff40e04cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 22:38:53 +0300
Subject: ima: set appraise status in fix mode only when xattr is fixed

When a file system is mounted read-only, setting the xattr value in
fix mode fails with an error code -EROFS.  The xattr should be fixed
after the file system is remounted read-write.  This patch verifies
that the set xattr succeeds, before setting the appraise status value
to INTEGRITY_PASS.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index bdc8ba1d1d2..b240c58403e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -42,12 +42,13 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE);
 }
 
-static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 			  struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
 	iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
-	__vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
-			      sizeof iint->ima_xattr, 0);
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+				     (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
+				      sizeof(iint->ima_xattr), 0);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -141,8 +142,8 @@ out:
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
 		    (!xattr_value ||
 		     xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
-			ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
-			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+			if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
+				status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
 		}
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
 				    op, cause, rc, 0);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 750943a30714b7e9a5a2b0e08eeef7a808b5a869 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2012 15:57:10 +0300
Subject: ima: remove enforce checking duplication

Based on the IMA appraisal policy, files are appraised.  For those
files appraised, the IMA hooks return the integrity appraisal result,
assuming IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode.  This patch combines
both of these criteria (in policy and enforcing file integrity),
removing the checking duplication.

Changelog v1:
- Update hook comments

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 52 +++++++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 45de18e9a6f..1cd4eb2c3b9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -208,7 +208,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	kfree(pathbuf);
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-	return (rc && must_appraise) ? -EACCES : 0;
+	if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+		return -EACCES;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -219,19 +221,15 @@ out:
  * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
  * policy decision.
  *
- * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
- * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	if (!file)
-		return 0;
-	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
-		rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
-					 MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
-	return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
+	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
+		return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+					   MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -244,18 +242,15 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
  * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
  * what is being executed.
  *
- * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
- * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = process_measurement(bprm->file,
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file,
 				 (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
 				 bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
 				 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
-	return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -265,18 +260,15 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  *
  * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
  *
- * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
- * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	int rc;
-
 	ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
-	rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+	return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
 				 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
 				 FILE_CHECK);
-	return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
@@ -286,19 +278,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
  *
  * Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
  *
- * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
- * Return code is based upon measurement appraisal.
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
 int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
 {
-	int rc;
-
 	if (!file)
-		rc = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	else
-		rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
-					 MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
-	return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
+		return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+	return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+				   MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
 }
 
 static int __init init_ima(void)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From b51524635b73cfa27cc393859b277cee9c042820 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 01:01:29 +0300
Subject: ima: remove security.ima hexdump

Hexdump is not really helping. Audit messages prints error messages.
Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index b240c58403e..fa675c907e0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -107,11 +107,6 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		if (rc) {
 			cause = "invalid-hash";
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
-			print_hex_dump_bytes("security.ima: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-					     xattr_value, sizeof(*xattr_value));
-			print_hex_dump_bytes("collected: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-					     (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
-					     sizeof iint->ima_xattr);
 			break;
 		}
 		status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 16cac49f727621c6b0467ffe15ed72c2febb1296 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:15:04 -0500
Subject: ima: rename FILE_MMAP to MMAP_CHECK

Rename FILE_MMAP hook to MMAP_CHECK to be consistent with the other
hook names.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        | 2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    | 4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   | 2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 ++++---
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 3b2adb794f1..1385c5c172f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
 struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
 
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		     int flags);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 0cea3db2165..fc722b44c41 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -100,12 +100,12 @@ err_out:
  * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP, MODULE_CHECK)
+ * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  * 		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- * 	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP | MODULE_CHECK
+ * 	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
  * 	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1cd4eb2c3b9..970693d1a32 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
 		return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
-					   MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
+					   MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 70f888de880..95194539d75 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	{.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
@@ -448,8 +448,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
-			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
-				entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
+			else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
+				|| (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
+				entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
 			else
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ee866331749b07373743ce18ceaffb1dd841d855 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 17:00:43 +0300
Subject: integrity: reduce storage size for ima_status and evm_status

This patch reduces size of the iint structure by 8 bytes.
It saves about 15% of iint cache memory.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/integrity.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index e9db763a875..0a298def503 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
 	unsigned short flags;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr;
-	enum integrity_status ima_status;
-	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+	enum integrity_status ima_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
 };
 
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ea1046d4c57ee6e3d5f68f19dd9a45bbab0b71a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 00:40:17 +0300
Subject: ima: move full pathname resolution to separate function

Define a new function ima_d_path(), which returns the full pathname.
This function will be used further, for example, by the directory
verification code.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 17 +++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 51 +++++++++++++++------------------------
 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 1385c5c172f..991844db98d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode);
 void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show);
+const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
  * integrity data associated with an inode.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index fc722b44c41..9382a4c568b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -237,3 +237,20 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 
 	iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
 }
+
+const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
+{
+	char *pathname = NULL;
+
+	/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
+	*pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (*pathbuf) {
+		pathname = d_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
+		if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
+			kfree(*pathbuf);
+			*pathbuf = NULL;
+			pathname = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	return pathname;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 970693d1a32..d743c9a0a4b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
 	int must_measure;
 	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
-	unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
+	char *pathbuf = NULL;
+	const char *pathname;
 
 	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
 		return;
@@ -86,22 +87,15 @@ out:
 	if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
 		return;
 
-	/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
-	pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (pathbuf) {
-		pathname = d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
-		if (IS_ERR(pathname))
-			pathname = NULL;
-		else if (strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
-			pathname = NULL;
-	}
+	pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
+	if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
+		pathname = dentry->d_name.name;
+
 	if (send_tomtou)
-		ima_add_violation(inode,
-				  !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname,
+		ima_add_violation(inode, pathname,
 				  "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
 	if (send_writers)
-		ima_add_violation(inode,
-				  !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname,
+		ima_add_violation(inode, pathname,
 				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
 	kfree(pathbuf);
 }
@@ -145,12 +139,13 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
 }
 
-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 			       int mask, int function)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-	unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
+	char *pathbuf = NULL;
+	const char *pathname = NULL;
 	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
 
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
@@ -187,24 +182,18 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (function != BPRM_CHECK) {
-		/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
-		pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (pathbuf) {
-			pathname =
-			    d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
-			if (IS_ERR(pathname))
-				pathname = NULL;
-		}
-	}
+	if (function != BPRM_CHECK)
+		pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
+
+	if (!pathname)
+		pathname = filename;
+
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
-		ima_store_measurement(iint, file,
-				      !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname);
 	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE)
-		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file,
-					      !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file, pathname);
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
-		ima_audit_measurement(iint, !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
 	kfree(pathbuf);
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a175b8bb29ebbad380ab4788f307fbfc47997b19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2012 15:06:28 +0300
Subject: ima: forbid write access to files with digital signatures

This patch forbids write access to files with digital signatures, as they
are considered immutable.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index d743c9a0a4b..cd00ba39e8e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -175,12 +175,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	if (!action) {
 		if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
 			rc = iint->ima_status;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
 	if (rc != 0)
-		goto out;
+		goto out_digsig;
 
 	if (function != BPRM_CHECK)
 		pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
@@ -195,6 +195,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
 		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
 	kfree(pathbuf);
+out_digsig:
+	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG))
+		rc = -EACCES;
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0e5a247cb37a97d843ef76d09d5f80deb7893ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 13:58:49 +0300
Subject: ima: added policy support for 'security.ima' type

The 'security.ima' extended attribute may contain either the file data's
hash or a digital signature.  This patch adds support for requiring a
specific extended attribute type.  It extends the IMA policy with a new
keyword 'appraise_type=imasig'.  (Default is hash.)

Changelog v2:
- Fixed Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy option syntax
Changelog v1:
- Differentiate between 'required' vs. 'actual' extended attribute

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  5 +++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/integrity.h        |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index fa675c907e0..8004332ccb8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 
 	switch (xattr_value->type) {
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+			cause = "IMA signature required";
+			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			break;
+		}
 		rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest,
 			    IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
 		if (rc) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index cd00ba39e8e..3cdd78768c2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED,
 	 *  IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) */
 	iint->flags |= action;
+	action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
 	action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1);
 
 	/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 95194539d75..1a2543a8ee5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -245,6 +245,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
 			continue;
 
+		action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
+
 		action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
 		if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
 			actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
@@ -318,7 +320,8 @@ enum {
 	Opt_audit,
 	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
 	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
-	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner
+	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
+	Opt_appraise_type
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -338,6 +341,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
 	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
 	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
+	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -560,6 +564,18 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 						   LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
 			break;
+		case Opt_appraise_type:
+			if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
+			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
+				entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			break;
 		case Opt_err:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
 			result = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 0a298def503..9334691b2b7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@
 #define IMA_AUDITED		0x0080
 
 /* iint cache flags */
+#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS	0xff00
 #define IMA_DIGSIG		0x0100
+#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x0200
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT)
 #define IMA_DONE_MASK		(IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f578c08ec959cb0cdadf02bdc9689a4df3e9b9d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2012 09:29:09 -0500
Subject: ima: increase iint flag size

In preparation for hook specific appraise status results, increase
the iint flags size.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
---
 security/integrity/integrity.h | 24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 9334691b2b7..329ad263e13 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -16,19 +16,19 @@
 #include <crypto/sha.h>
 
 /* iint action cache flags */
-#define IMA_MEASURE		0x0001
-#define IMA_MEASURED		0x0002
-#define IMA_APPRAISE		0x0004
-#define IMA_APPRAISED		0x0008
-/*#define IMA_COLLECT		0x0010  do not use this flag */
-#define IMA_COLLECTED		0x0020
-#define IMA_AUDIT		0x0040
-#define IMA_AUDITED		0x0080
+#define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
+#define IMA_MEASURED		0x00000002
+#define IMA_APPRAISE		0x00000004
+#define IMA_APPRAISED		0x00000008
+/*#define IMA_COLLECT		0x00000010  do not use this flag */
+#define IMA_COLLECTED		0x00000020
+#define IMA_AUDIT		0x00000040
+#define IMA_AUDITED		0x00000080
 
 /* iint cache flags */
-#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS	0xff00
-#define IMA_DIGSIG		0x0100
-#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x0200
+#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS	0xff000000
+#define IMA_DIGSIG		0x01000000
+#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x02000000
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT)
 #define IMA_DONE_MASK		(IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED \
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
 	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode in question */
 	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
-	unsigned short flags;
+	unsigned long flags;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr;
 	enum integrity_status ima_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d79d72e02485c00b886179538dc8deaffa3be507 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 17:08:11 -0500
Subject: ima: per hook cache integrity appraisal status

With the new IMA policy 'appraise_type=' option, different hooks
can require different methods for appraising a file's integrity.

For example, the existing 'ima_appraise_tcb' policy defines a
generic rule, requiring all root files to be appraised, without
specfying the appraisal method.  A more specific rule could require
all kernel modules, for example, to be signed.

appraise fowner=0 func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
appraise fowner=0

As a result, the integrity appraisal results for the same inode, but
for different hooks, could differ.  This patch caches the integrity
appraisal results on a per hook basis.

Changelog v2:
- Rename ima_cache_status() to ima_set_cache_status()
- Rename and move get_appraise_status() to ima_get_cache_status()
Changelog v0:
- include IMA_APPRAISE/APPRAISED_SUBMASK in IMA_DO/DONE_MASK (Dmitry)
- Support independent MODULE_CHECK appraise status.
- fixed IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE/APPRAISED flags

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
---
 security/integrity/iint.c             | 10 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          | 13 ++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 19 ++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 22 +++++++++++
 security/integrity/integrity.h        | 26 +++++++++++--
 6 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index d82a5a13d85..74522dbd10a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -72,7 +72,10 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
-	iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_module_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
 }
@@ -149,7 +152,10 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 	memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
-	iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_module_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 991844db98d..ab68bed8ac3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -142,13 +142,16 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void);
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX	0x02
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
-int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
+enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+					   int func);
 
 #else
-static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(int func,
+					   struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					   struct file *file,
 					   const unsigned char *filename)
 {
@@ -165,6 +168,12 @@ static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 				    struct file *file)
 {
 }
+
+static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache
+							 *iint, int func)
+{
+	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
 #endif
 
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 8004332ccb8..2d4becab891 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -51,6 +51,62 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 				      sizeof(iint->ima_xattr), 0);
 }
 
+/* Return specific func appraised cached result */
+enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+					   int func)
+{
+	switch(func) {
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+		return iint->ima_mmap_status;
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+		return iint->ima_bprm_status;
+	case MODULE_CHECK:
+		return iint->ima_module_status;
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	default:
+		return iint->ima_file_status;
+	}
+}
+
+static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				 int func, enum integrity_status status)
+{
+	switch(func) {
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+		iint->ima_mmap_status = status;
+		break;
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+		iint->ima_bprm_status = status;
+		break;
+	case MODULE_CHECK:
+		iint->ima_module_status = status;
+		break;
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	default:
+		iint->ima_file_status = status;
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
+{
+	switch(func) {
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
+	case MODULE_CHECK:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	default:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
  *
@@ -59,7 +115,7 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
  *
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
-int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
@@ -75,9 +131,6 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
-	if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
-		return iint->ima_status;
-
 	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value,
 				0, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (rc <= 0) {
@@ -99,7 +152,6 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			cause = "invalid-HMAC";
 		goto out;
 	}
-
 	switch (xattr_value->type) {
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
 		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
@@ -148,9 +200,9 @@ out:
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
 				    op, cause, rc, 0);
 	} else {
-		iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISED;
+		ima_cache_flags(iint, func);
 	}
-	iint->ima_status = status;
+	ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status);
 	kfree(xattr_value);
 	return status;
 }
@@ -196,10 +248,11 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 	must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
 	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
 	if (iint) {
+		iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
+				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
+				 IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
 		if (must_appraise)
 			iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE;
-		else
-			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED);
 	}
 	if (!must_appraise)
 		rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 3cdd78768c2..66b7f408eff 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -151,8 +151,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
 
-	/* Determine if in appraise/audit/measurement policy,
-	 * returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT bitmask.  */
+	/* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
+	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
+	 * Included is the appraise submask.
+	 */
 	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function);
 	if (!action)
 		return 0;
@@ -166,16 +168,17 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
-	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED,
-	 *  IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) */
+	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
+	 *  IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
+	 */
 	iint->flags |= action;
 	action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
 	action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1);
 
 	/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
 	if (!action) {
-		if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
-			rc = iint->ima_status;
+		if (must_appraise)
+			rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, function);
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
@@ -191,8 +194,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname);
-	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE)
-		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file, pathname);
+	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(function, iint, file, pathname);
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
 		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
 	kfree(pathbuf);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 1a2543a8ee5..4d7c0ae656d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -218,6 +218,25 @@ retry:
 	return true;
 }
 
+/*
+ * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
+ * we need to differentiate between calling hooks.
+ */
+static int get_subaction(int func)
+{
+	switch(func) {
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+		return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+		return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
+	case MODULE_CHECK:
+		return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE;
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	default:
+		return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
+	}
+}
+
 /**
  * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
@@ -248,6 +267,9 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
 
 		action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
+		if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE)
+			action |= get_subaction(func);
+
 		if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
 			actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
 		else
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 329ad263e13..0ae08fc8858 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -30,9 +30,24 @@
 #define IMA_DIGSIG		0x01000000
 #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x02000000
 
-#define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT)
-#define IMA_DONE_MASK		(IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED \
-				 | IMA_COLLECTED)
+#define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
+				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+#define IMA_DONE_MASK		(IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
+				 IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
+
+/* iint subaction appraise cache flags */
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE	0x00000100
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED	0x00000200
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE	0x00000400
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED	0x00000800
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE	0x00001000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED	0x00002000
+#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE	0x00004000
+#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED	0x00008000
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE)
+#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED)
 
 enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@@ -52,7 +67,10 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr;
-	enum integrity_status ima_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
 };
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5a73fcfa8875a94c2956e7ff8fba54d31a3e2854 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2012 15:14:38 -0500
Subject: ima: differentiate appraise status only for hook specific rules

Different hooks can require different methods for appraising a
file's integrity.  As a result, an integrity appraisal status is
cached on a per hook basis.

Only a hook specific rule, requires the inode to be re-appraised.
This patch eliminates unnecessary appraisals.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   | 9 ++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 ++++++---
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 66b7f408eff..3e751a9743a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
-	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
+	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
 
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
@@ -161,6 +161,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 
 	must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
 
+	/*  Is the appraise rule hook specific?  */
+	_func = (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE) ? FILE_CHECK : function;
+
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
 	iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
@@ -178,7 +181,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
 	if (!action) {
 		if (must_appraise)
-			rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, function);
+			rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, _func);
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
@@ -195,7 +198,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname);
 	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(function, iint, file, pathname);
+		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname);
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
 		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
 	kfree(pathbuf);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 4d7c0ae656d..4adcd0f8c1d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -220,10 +220,13 @@ retry:
 
 /*
  * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
- * we need to differentiate between calling hooks.
+ * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
  */
-static int get_subaction(int func)
+static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
 {
+	if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
+		return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
+
 	switch(func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
 		return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
@@ -268,7 +271,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 
 		action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
 		if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE)
-			action |= get_subaction(func);
+			action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
 
 		if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
 			actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 74de66842473bdafa798010e58f1999ec70a8983 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2012 10:37:20 +0300
Subject: evm: add file system uuid to EVM hmac

EVM uses the same key for all file systems to calculate the HMAC,
making it possible to paste inodes from one file system on to another
one, without EVM being able to detect it.  To prevent such an attack,
it is necessary to make the EVM HMAC file system specific.

This patch uses the file system UUID, a file system unique identifier,
to bind the EVM HMAC to the file system. The value inode->i_sb->s_uuid
is used for the HMAC hash calculation, instead of using it for deriving
the file system specific key.  Initializing the key for every inode HMAC
calculation is a bit more expensive operation than adding the uuid to
the HMAC hash.

Changing the HMAC calculation method or adding additional info to the
calculation, requires existing EVM labeled file systems to be relabeled.
This patch adds a Kconfig HMAC version option for backwards compatability.

Changelog v1:
- squash "hmac version setting"
Changelog v0:
- add missing Kconfig depends (Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig      | 13 +++++++++++++
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h        |  1 +
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c |  3 +++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   |  1 +
 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index afbb59dd262..fea9749c375 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -11,3 +11,16 @@ config EVM
 	  integrity attacks.
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config EVM_HMAC_VERSION
+	int "EVM HMAC version"
+	depends on EVM
+	default 2
+	help
+	  This options adds EVM HMAC version support.
+	  1 - original version
+	  2 - add per filesystem unique identifier (UUID) (default)
+
+	  WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding 
+	  additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
+	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.  
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 3eb30c6db41..30bd1ec0232 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 extern int evm_initialized;
 extern char *evm_hmac;
 extern char *evm_hash;
+extern int evm_hmac_version;
 
 extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
 extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index dfb26918699..ff8e2abf8f2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
 	hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
 	hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
 	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
+	if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
+		crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
+				    sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
 	crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index a78a5e21ef7..cdbde176218 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ int evm_initialized;
 
 char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
 char *evm_hash = "sha1";
+int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION;
 
 char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 85865c1fa189fcba49089e6254a0226f2269bebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2012 23:23:13 +0300
Subject: ima: add policy support for file system uuid

The IMA policy permits specifying rules to enable or disable
measurement/appraisal/audit based on the file system magic number.
If, for example, the policy contains an ext4 measurement rule,
the rule is enabled for all ext4 partitions.

Sometimes it might be necessary to enable measurement/appraisal/audit
only for one partition and disable it for another partition of the
same type.  With the existing IMA policy syntax, this can not be done.

This patch provides support for IMA policy rules to specify the file
system by its UUID (eg. fsuuid=397449cd-687d-4145-8698-7fed4a3e0363).

For partitions not being appraised, it might be a good idea to mount
file systems with the 'noexec' option to prevent executing non-verified
binaries.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 4adcd0f8c1d..23f49e37a95 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/genhd.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@
 #define IMA_FSMAGIC	0x0004
 #define IMA_UID		0x0008
 #define IMA_FOWNER	0x0010
+#define IMA_FSUUID	0x0020
 
 #define UNKNOWN		0
 #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	int mask;
 	unsigned long fsmagic;
+	u8 fsuuid[16];
 	kuid_t uid;
 	kuid_t fowner;
 	struct {
@@ -172,6 +175,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
 	    && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
 		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
+		memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid)))
+		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
 		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
@@ -346,7 +352,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
 	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
 	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
-	Opt_appraise_type
+	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -364,6 +370,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_func, "func=%s"},
 	{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
 	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
+	{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
 	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
 	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
 	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
@@ -519,6 +526,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			if (!result)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
 			break;
+		case Opt_fsuuid:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
+
+			if (memchr_inv(entry->fsuuid, 0x00,
+			    sizeof(entry->fsuuid))) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			part_pack_uuid(args[0].from, entry->fsuuid);
+			entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
+			result = 0;
+			break;
 		case Opt_uid:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 76bb28f6126f20ee987b9d2570fa653d95d30ae9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 10:42:30 +0300
Subject: ima: use new crypto_shash API instead of old crypto_hash

Old crypto hash API internally uses shash API.
Using shash API directly is more efficient.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c   |  3 ++
 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index ab68bed8ac3..5a94f9c9260 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest);
 int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest);
 void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
+int ima_init_crypto(void);
 
 /*
  * used to protect h_table and sha_table
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index b21ee5b5495..920f49cfbf1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -19,24 +19,22 @@
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
-static int init_desc(struct hash_desc *desc)
+static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
+
+int ima_init_crypto(void)
 {
-	int rc;
+	long rc;
 
-	desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(ima_hash, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-	if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
-		pr_info("IMA: failed to load %s transform: %ld\n",
-			ima_hash, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
-		rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
+	ima_shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(ima_hash, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(ima_shash_tfm)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(ima_shash_tfm);
+		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", ima_hash, rc);
 		return rc;
 	}
-	desc->flags = 0;
-	rc = crypto_hash_init(desc);
-	if (rc)
-		crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm);
-	return rc;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -44,13 +42,18 @@ static int init_desc(struct hash_desc *desc)
  */
 int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
 {
-	struct hash_desc desc;
-	struct scatterlist sg[1];
 	loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
 	char *rbuf;
 	int rc, read = 0;
+	struct {
+		struct shash_desc shash;
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)];
+	} desc;
 
-	rc = init_desc(&desc);
+	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	desc.shash.flags = 0;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -75,19 +78,17 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
 		if (rbuf_len == 0)
 			break;
 		offset += rbuf_len;
-		sg_init_one(sg, rbuf, rbuf_len);
 
-		rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, rbuf_len);
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, rbuf, rbuf_len);
 		if (rc)
 			break;
 	}
 	kfree(rbuf);
 	if (!rc)
-		rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest);
 	if (read)
 		file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
 out:
-	crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -96,20 +97,15 @@ out:
  */
 int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest)
 {
-	struct hash_desc desc;
-	struct scatterlist sg[1];
-	int rc;
+	struct {
+		struct shash_desc shash;
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)];
+	} desc;
 
-	rc = init_desc(&desc);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
+	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
-	sg_init_one(sg, template, template_len);
-	rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, template_len);
-	if (!rc)
-		rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
-	crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
-	return rc;
+	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, template, template_len, digest);
 }
 
 static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
@@ -126,12 +122,17 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
  */
 int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
 {
-	struct hash_desc desc;
-	struct scatterlist sg;
 	u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	int rc, i;
+	struct {
+		struct shash_desc shash;
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)];
+	} desc;
+
+	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
-	rc = init_desc(&desc);
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -139,11 +140,9 @@ int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
 	for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) {
 		ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i);
 		/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
-		sg_init_one(&sg, pcr_i, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
-		rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, pcr_i, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	}
 	if (!rc)
-		crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
-	crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+		crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest);
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index b5dfd534f13..162ea723db3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
 		pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
 
+	rc = ima_init_crypto();
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 	ima_add_boot_aggregate();	/* boot aggregate must be first entry */
 	ima_init_policy();
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 50af554466804bf51a52fa3d1d0a76f96bd33929 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 14 May 2012 14:13:56 +0300
Subject: ima: rename hash calculation functions

Rename hash calculation functions to reflect meaning
and change argument order in conventional way.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        | 4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    | 6 +++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 8 ++++----
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 5a94f9c9260..6e69697fd53 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ void ima_fs_cleanup(void);
 int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode);
-int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest);
-int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest);
+int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest);
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest);
 int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest);
 void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 9382a4c568b..d9030b29d84 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 	entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template);
 
 	if (!violation) {
-		result = ima_calc_template_hash(entry->template_len,
-						&entry->template,
+		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template,
+						entry->template_len,
 						entry->digest);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version;
 
 		iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
-		result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
 		if (!result) {
 			iint->version = i_version;
 			iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 920f49cfbf1..b691e0f3830 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void)
 /*
  * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest
  */
-int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
+int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
 {
 	loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
 	char *rbuf;
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ out:
 }
 
 /*
- * Calculate the hash of a given template
+ * Calculate the hash of a given buffer
  */
-int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest)
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest)
 {
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest)
 	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
-	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, template, template_len, digest);
+	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, data, len, digest);
 }
 
 static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e0751257a64ea10cca96ccb06522bfb10e36cb5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 00:12:08 +0200
Subject: ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys

Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on
signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the
signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM
signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional
signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric
key infrastructure.

Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header
could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save
space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM
header format.  The main difference is that the key identifier is a
sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the
current implementation.  The only purpose of the key identifier is to
identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring.  ima-evm-utils
was updated to support the new signature format.

While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many
different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated
during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm.
The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5
is supported.  Due to this current limitation, signatures should be
generated using a sha1 hash algorithm.

Changes in this patch:
- Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of
  in source #ifdefs.
- keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign
  IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel
  asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also
  loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be
  done using keyctl only.
- keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space.  Key search is done
  using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match().
- Kconfig option title was changed

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/Kconfig             |  12 ++++
 security/integrity/Makefile            |   1 +
 security/integrity/digsig.c            |  11 +++-
 security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/integrity.h         |  12 ++++
 5 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 5bd1cc1b4a5..4bb3a775a99 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -17,5 +17,17 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 	  This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
 	  usually only added from initramfs.
 
+config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
+	default n
+        select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+        select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+        select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
+        select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	help
+	  This option enables digital signature verification using
+	  asymmetric keys.
+
 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index d43799cc14f..ebb6409b3fc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 
 integrity-y := iint.o
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 2dc167d7cde..0b759e17a13 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -44,5 +44,14 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 		}
 	}
 
-	return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen, digest, digestlen);
+	switch (sig[0]) {
+	case 1:
+		return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
+				     digest, digestlen);
+	case 2:
+		return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
+					 digest, digestlen);
+	}
+
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b4754667659
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+
+#include "integrity.h"
+
+/*
+ * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
+ */
+struct signature_v2_hdr {
+	uint8_t version;	/* signature format version */
+	uint8_t	hash_algo;	/* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */
+	uint32_t keyid;		/* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific*/
+	uint16_t sig_size;	/* signature size */
+	uint8_t sig[0];		/* signature payload */
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * Request an asymmetric key.
+ */
+static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	char name[12];
+
+	sprintf(name, "id:%x", keyid);
+
+	pr_debug("key search: \"%s\"\n", name);
+
+	if (keyring) {
+		/* search in specific keyring */
+		key_ref_t kref;
+		kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+				      &key_type_asymmetric, name);
+		if (IS_ERR(kref))
+			key = ERR_CAST(kref);
+		else
+			key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref);
+	} else {
+		key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_warn("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
+			name, PTR_ERR(key));
+		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+			/* Hide some search errors */
+		case -EACCES:
+		case -ENOTDIR:
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		default:
+			return key;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
+
+	return key;
+}
+
+int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
+		      int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature pks;
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	siglen -= sizeof(*hdr);
+
+	if (siglen != __be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	if (hdr->hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, __be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid));
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+	memset(&pks, 0, sizeof(pks));
+
+	pks.pkey_hash_algo = hdr->hash_algo;
+	pks.digest = (u8 *)data;
+	pks.digest_size = datalen;
+	pks.nr_mpi = 1;
+	pks.rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(hdr->sig, siglen);
+
+	if (pks.rsa.s)
+		ret = verify_signature(key, &pks);
+
+	mpi_free(pks.rsa.s);
+	key_put(key);
+	pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 0ae08fc8858..84c37c4db91 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
 
 /* iint action cache flags */
 #define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
@@ -101,5 +102,16 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
+		      int siglen, const char *data, int datalen);
+#else
+static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
+				    int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int iint_initialized;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3