From 42d8644bd77dd2d747e004e367cb0c895a606f39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 18:12:17 +0300 Subject: xen: Prevent buffer overflow in privcmd ioctl The "call" variable comes from the user in privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(). It's an offset into the hypercall_page[] which has (PAGE_SIZE / 32) elements. We need to put an upper bound on it to prevent an out of bounds access. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1246ae0bb992 ("xen: add variable hypercall caller") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross --- arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h index de6f0d59a24f..2863c2026655 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h @@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ xen_single_call(unsigned int call, __HYPERCALL_DECLS; __HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); + if (call >= PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(hypercall_page[0])) + return -EINVAL; + asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call]) -- cgit v1.2.3