Merge branch 'apparmor-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor

30 files changed, 491 insertions, 340 deletions

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 5ad73d085d2f..5f371811bd68 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -1395,10 +1395,13 @@ F:	include/uapi/linux/apm_bios.h
 
 APPARMOR SECURITY MODULE
 M:	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
-L:	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com (subscribers-only, general discussion)
+L:	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com (moderated for non-subscribers)
 S:	Supported
-W:	wiki.apparmor.net
+W:	apparmor.net
+B:	https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor-kernel
+C:	irc://irc.oftc.net/apparmor
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
+T:	https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor-kernel.git
 F:	Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/apparmor.rst
 F:	security/apparmor/
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index 348ed6cfa08a..cb3496e00d8a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR
 	select SECURITY_PATH
 	select SECURITYFS
 	select SECURITY_NETWORK
-	select ZLIB_INFLATE
-	select ZLIB_DEFLATE
 	default n
 	help
 	  This enables the AppArmor security module.
@@ -17,29 +15,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
-	bool "Enable introspection of sha1 hashes for loaded profiles"
-	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
-	select CRYPTO
-	select CRYPTO_SHA1
-	default y
-	help
-	  This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy
-	  is available to userspace via the apparmor filesystem.
-
-config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT
-       bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default"
-       depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
-       default y
-       help
-         This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy
-	 is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for
-	 loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way
-	 to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected,
-	 however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In
-	 these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and
-	 enabled only if needed.
-
 config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG
 	bool "Build AppArmor with debug code"
 	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
@@ -69,6 +44,67 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES
 	  When enabled, various debug messages will be logged to
 	  the kernel message buffer.
 
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY
+	bool "Allow loaded policy to be introspected"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy
+	  is available to userspace via the apparmor filesystem. This
+	  adds to kernel memory usage. It is required for introspection
+	  of loaded policy, and check point and restore support. It
+	  can be disabled for embedded systems where reducing memory and
+	  cpu is paramount.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+	bool "Enable introspection of sha1 hashes for loaded profiles"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy
+	  hashes is available to userspace via the apparmor
+	  filesystem. This option provides a light weight means of
+	  checking loaded policy.  This option adds to policy load
+	  time and can be disabled for small embedded systems.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT
+       bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default"
+       depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+       default y
+       help
+         This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy
+	 is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for
+	 loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way
+	 to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected,
+	 however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In
+	 these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and
+	 enabled only if needed.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+	bool "Allow exporting the raw binary policy"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY
+	select ZLIB_INFLATE
+	select ZLIB_DEFLATE
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option allows reading back binary policy as it was loaded.
+	  It increases the amount of kernel memory needed by policy and
+	  also increases policy load time. This option is required for
+	  checkpoint and restore support, and debugging of loaded policy.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD
+	bool "Perform full verification of loaded policy"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default y
+	help
+	  This options allows controlling whether apparmor does a full
+	  verification of loaded policy. This should not be disabled
+	  except for embedded systems where the image is read only,
+	  includes policy, and has some form of integrity check.
+	  Disabling the check will speed up policy loads.
+
 config SECURITY_APPARMOR_KUNIT_TEST
 	bool "Build KUnit tests for policy_unpack.c" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
 	depends on KUNIT=y && SECURITY_APPARMOR
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 0797edb2fb3d..d066ccc219e2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
 #include "include/resource.h"
 #include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+#include "include/task.h"
 
 /*
  * The apparmor filesystem interface used for policy load and introspection
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ struct rawdata_f_data {
 	struct aa_loaddata *loaddata;
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
 #define RAWDATA_F_DATA_BUF(p) (char *)(p + 1)
 
 static void rawdata_f_data_free(struct rawdata_f_data *private)
@@ -94,9 +96,10 @@ static struct rawdata_f_data *rawdata_f_data_alloc(size_t size)
 
 	return ret;
 }
+#endif
 
 /**
- * aa_mangle_name - mangle a profile name to std profile layout form
+ * mangle_name - mangle a profile name to std profile layout form
  * @name: profile name to mangle  (NOT NULL)
  * @target: buffer to store mangled name, same length as @name (MAYBE NULL)
  *
@@ -401,7 +404,7 @@ static struct aa_loaddata *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(const char __user *userbuf,
 
 	data->size = copy_size;
 	if (copy_from_user(data->data, userbuf, copy_size)) {
-		kvfree(data);
+		aa_put_loaddata(data);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 	}
 
@@ -1201,7 +1204,7 @@ SEQ_NS_FOPS(name);
 
 
 /* policy/raw_data/ * file ops */
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
 #define SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(NAME)						      \
 static int seq_rawdata_ ##NAME ##_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\
 {									      \
@@ -1294,44 +1297,47 @@ SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(compressed_size);
 
 static int deflate_decompress(char *src, size_t slen, char *dst, size_t dlen)
 {
-	int error;
-	struct z_stream_s strm;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+	if (aa_g_rawdata_compression_level != 0) {
+		int error = 0;
+		struct z_stream_s strm;
 
-	if (aa_g_rawdata_compression_level == 0) {
-		if (dlen < slen)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		memcpy(dst, src, slen);
-		return 0;
-	}
+		memset(&strm, 0, sizeof(strm));
 
-	memset(&strm, 0, sizeof(strm));
+		strm.workspace = kvzalloc(zlib_inflate_workspacesize(), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!strm.workspace)
+			return -ENOMEM;
 
-	strm.workspace = kvzalloc(zlib_inflate_workspacesize(), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!strm.workspace)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	strm.next_in = src;
-	strm.avail_in = slen;
+		strm.next_in = src;
+		strm.avail_in = slen;
 
-	error = zlib_inflateInit(&strm);
-	if (error != Z_OK) {
-		error = -ENOMEM;
-		goto fail_inflate_init;
-	}
+		error = zlib_inflateInit(&strm);
+		if (error != Z_OK) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto fail_inflate_init;
+		}
 
-	strm.next_out = dst;
-	strm.avail_out = dlen;
+		strm.next_out = dst;
+		strm.avail_out = dlen;
 
-	error = zlib_inflate(&strm, Z_FINISH);
-	if (error != Z_STREAM_END)
-		error = -EINVAL;
-	else
-		error = 0;
+		error = zlib_inflate(&strm, Z_FINISH);
+		if (error != Z_STREAM_END)
+			error = -EINVAL;
+		else
+			error = 0;
 
-	zlib_inflateEnd(&strm);
+		zlib_inflateEnd(&strm);
 fail_inflate_init:
-	kvfree(strm.workspace);
-	return error;
+		kvfree(strm.workspace);
+
+		return error;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (dlen < slen)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(dst, src, slen);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static ssize_t rawdata_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t size,
@@ -1492,10 +1498,12 @@ fail:
 
 	return PTR_ERR(dent);
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
+
 
 /** fns to setup dynamic per profile/namespace files **/
 
-/**
+/*
  *
  * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
  */
@@ -1522,7 +1530,7 @@ void __aafs_profile_rmdir(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	}
 }
 
-/**
+/*
  *
  * Requires: @old->ns->lock held
  */
@@ -1557,6 +1565,7 @@ static struct dentry *create_profile_file(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
 	return dent;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
 static int profile_depth(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
 	int depth = 0;
@@ -1658,7 +1667,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_abi_iops = {
 static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_data_iops = {
 	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_data,
 };
-
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
 
 /*
  * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
@@ -1729,15 +1738,17 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent)
 		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_HASH] = dent;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
 	if (profile->rawdata) {
-		dent = aafs_create("raw_sha1", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
-				   profile->label.proxy, NULL, NULL,
-				   &rawdata_link_sha1_iops);
-		if (IS_ERR(dent))
-			goto fail;
-		aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy);
-		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = dent;
-
+		if (aa_g_hash_policy) {
+			dent = aafs_create("raw_sha1", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
+					   profile->label.proxy, NULL, NULL,
+					   &rawdata_link_sha1_iops);
+			if (IS_ERR(dent))
+				goto fail;
+			aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy);
+			profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = dent;
+		}
 		dent = aafs_create("raw_abi", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
 				   profile->label.proxy, NULL, NULL,
 				   &rawdata_link_abi_iops);
@@ -1754,6 +1765,7 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent)
 		aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy);
 		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA] = dent;
 	}
+#endif /*CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
 
 	list_for_each_entry(child, &profile->base.profiles, base.list) {
 		error = __aafs_profile_mkdir(child, prof_child_dir(profile));
@@ -1880,7 +1892,7 @@ static void __aa_fs_list_remove_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns)
 		__aa_fs_remove_rawdata(ent);
 }
 
-/**
+/*
  *
  * Requires: @ns->lock held
  */
@@ -2323,6 +2335,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v6",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v7",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v8",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v9",	1),
 	{ }
 };
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index f7e97c7e80f3..704b0c895605 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
 	}
 	if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
 	    (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
-	     AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET))
+	     AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED))
 		return aad(sa)->error;
 
 	if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index a29e69d2c300..91689d34d281 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static inline unsigned int match_component(struct aa_profile *profile,
  * @profile: profile to find perms for
  * @label: label to check access permissions for
  * @stack: whether this is a stacking request
- * @start: state to start match in
+ * @state: state to start match in
  * @subns: whether to do permission checks on components in a subns
  * @request: permissions to request
  * @perms: perms struct to set
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ restart:
 				 * xattrs, or a longer match
 				 */
 				candidate = profile;
-				candidate_len = profile->xmatch_len;
+				candidate_len = max(count, profile->xmatch_len);
 				candidate_xattrs = ret;
 				conflict = false;
 			}
@@ -1279,7 +1279,6 @@ static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name,
 /**
  * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
  * @fqname: name of profile may include namespace (NOT NULL)
- * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec
  * @flags: flags affecting change behavior
  *
  * Change to new profile @name.  Unlike with hats, there is no way
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 1fbabdb565a8..9c3fc36a0702 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
 extern bool aa_g_audit_header;
 extern bool aa_g_debug;
 extern bool aa_g_hash_policy;
+extern bool aa_g_export_binary;
 extern int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level;
 extern bool aa_g_lock_policy;
 extern bool aa_g_logsyscall;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
index 6e14f6cecdb9..1e94904f68d9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
@@ -114,7 +114,21 @@ int __aafs_ns_mkdir(struct aa_ns *ns, struct dentry *parent, const char *name,
 		     struct dentry *dent);
 
 struct aa_loaddata;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
 void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata);
 int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_loaddata *rawdata);
+#else
+static inline void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata)
+{
+	/* empty stub */
+}
+
+static inline int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns,
+					 struct aa_loaddata *rawdata)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
 
 #endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index 7517605a183d..029cb20e322d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
  */
 #define dfa_user_allow(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f) | \
 				    ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000))
+#define dfa_user_xbits(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f)
 #define dfa_user_audit(dfa, state) ((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f)
 #define dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f)
 #define dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state) \
@@ -150,6 +151,8 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
 #define dfa_other_allow(dfa, state) ((((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & \
 				      0x7f) |				\
 				     ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000))
+#define dfa_other_xbits(dfa, state) \
+	((((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f)
 #define dfa_other_audit(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & 0x7f)
 #define dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state) \
 	((((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
index 9cafd80f7731..a1ac6ffb95e9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -13,24 +13,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
-struct aa_profile;
-
-#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE		MAY_WRITE
-#define AA_PTRACE_READ		MAY_READ
-#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED	AA_MAY_APPEND
-#define AA_MAY_BE_READ		AA_MAY_CREATE
-#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT	2
-
-#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \
-			     AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED)
-#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
-
-#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \
-	"segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
-	"xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
-
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
-		  u32 request);
 int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig);
 
 #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
index 9101c2c76d9e..860484c6f99a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ enum label_flags {
 	FLAG_STALE = 0x800,		/* replaced/removed */
 	FLAG_RENAMED = 0x1000,		/* label has renaming in it */
 	FLAG_REVOKED = 0x2000,		/* label has revocation in it */
+	FLAG_DEBUG1 = 0x4000,
+	FLAG_DEBUG2 = 0x8000,
 
 	/* These flags must correspond with PATH_flags */
 	/* TODO: add new path flags */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
index e2e8df0c6f1c..f42359f58eb5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
  */
 
 #define DEBUG_ON (aa_g_debug)
+/*
+ * split individual debug cases out in preparation for finer grained
+ * debug controls in the future.
+ */
+#define AA_DEBUG_LABEL DEBUG_ON
 #define dbg_printk(__fmt, __args...) pr_debug(__fmt, ##__args)
 #define AA_DEBUG(fmt, args...)						\
 	do {								\
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/path.h b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
index 44a7945fbe3c..343189903dba 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/path.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ enum path_flags {
 	PATH_CHROOT_REL = 0x8,		/* do path lookup relative to chroot */
 	PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT = 0x10,	/* connect paths that are at ns root */
 
-	PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED = 0x08000, /* delegate deleted files */
-	PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000,	 /* mediate deleted paths */
+	PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* delegate deleted files */
+	PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x20000,	 /* mediate deleted paths */
 };
 
 int aa_path_name(const struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index cb5ef21991b7..639b5b248e63 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[];
 
 #define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->label.flags & FLAG_HAT)
 
+#define CHECK_DEBUG1(_profile) ((_profile)->label.flags & FLAG_DEBUG1)
+
+#define CHECK_DEBUG2(_profile) ((_profile)->label.flags & FLAG_DEBUG2)
+
 #define profile_is_stale(_profile) (label_is_stale(&(_profile)->label))
 
 #define on_list_rcu(X) (!list_empty(X) && (X)->prev != LIST_POISON2)
@@ -135,7 +139,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
 
 	const char *attach;
 	struct aa_dfa *xmatch;
-	int xmatch_len;
+	unsigned int xmatch_len;
 	enum audit_mode audit;
 	long mode;
 	u32 path_flags;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
index 3df6f804922d..33d665516fc1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ struct aa_ns {
 	struct dentry *dents[AAFS_NS_SIZEOF];
 };
 
+extern struct aa_label *kernel_t;
 extern struct aa_ns *root_ns;
 
 extern const char *aa_hidden_ns_name;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
index e0e1ca7ebc38..eb5f7d7f132b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ void aa_load_ent_free(struct aa_load_ent *ent);
 struct aa_load_ent *aa_load_ent_alloc(void);
 
 #define PACKED_FLAG_HAT		1
+#define PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG1	2
+#define PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG2	4
 
 #define PACKED_MODE_ENFORCE	0
 #define PACKED_MODE_COMPLAIN	1
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index 48ff1ddecad5..a912a5d5d04f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ struct aa_label;
 /* secid value that matches any other secid */
 #define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
 
+/* sysctl to enable displaying mode when converting secid to secctx */
+extern int apparmor_display_secid_mode;
+
 struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid);
 int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
@@ -31,6 +34,4 @@ int aa_alloc_secid(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 void aa_free_secid(u32 secid);
 void aa_secid_update(u32 secid, struct aa_label *label);
 
-void aa_secids_init(void);
-
 #endif /* __AA_SECID_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
index f13d12373b25..13437d62c70f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -77,4 +77,22 @@ static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
 	ctx->token = 0;
 }
 
+#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE		MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_PTRACE_READ		MAY_READ
+#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED	AA_MAY_APPEND
+#define AA_MAY_BE_READ		AA_MAY_CREATE
+#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT	2
+
+#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \
+			     AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED)
+#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
+
+#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \
+	"segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
+	"xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
+
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+		  u32 request);
+
+
 #endif /* __AA_TASK_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index fe36d112aad9..3dbbc59d440d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
-#include <linux/ptrace.h>
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
@@ -18,115 +17,6 @@
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 #include "include/sig_names.h"
 
-/**
- * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
- * @mask: permission mask to convert
- *
- * Returns: pointer to static string
- */
-static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
-{
-	switch (mask) {
-	case MAY_READ:
-		return "read";
-	case MAY_WRITE:
-		return "trace";
-	case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
-		return "readby";
-	case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
-		return "tracedby";
-	}
-	return "";
-}
-
-/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
-static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-{
-	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
-
-	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
-				 audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
-
-		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
-					 audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
-		}
-	}
-	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
-	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
-			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
-}
-
-/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
-/* TODO: conditionals */
-static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
-			     struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
-			     struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-	struct aa_perms perms = { };
-
-	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
-	aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
-			       &perms);
-	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
-	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
-}
-
-static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
-			       struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
-			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-	if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
-	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
-		return 0;
-
-	return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
-}
-
-static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
-			       struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
-			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-	if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
-		return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
-
-	/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
-	if (&tracer->label == tracee)
-		return 0;
-
-	aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
-	aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
-	aad(sa)->request = 0;
-	aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
-				    CAP_OPT_NONE);
-
-	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
- * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
- * @tracee: task label to be traced
- * @request: permission request
- *
- * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
- */
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
-		  u32 request)
-{
-	struct aa_profile *profile;
-	u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
-
-	return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
-			profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
-			profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
-}
-
 
 static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
 {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
index 0b0265da1926..0f36ee907438 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -197,18 +197,18 @@ static bool vec_is_stale(struct aa_profile **vec, int n)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static bool vec_unconfined(struct aa_profile **vec, int n)
+static long union_vec_flags(struct aa_profile **vec, int n, long mask)
 {
+	long u = 0;
 	int i;
 
 	AA_BUG(!vec);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-		if (!profile_unconfined(vec[i]))
-			return false;
+		u |= vec[i]->label.flags & mask;
 	}
 
-	return true;
+	return u;
 }
 
 static int sort_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ int aa_label_next_confined(struct aa_label *label, int i)
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_label_next_not_in_set - return the next profile of @sub not in @set
+ * __aa_label_next_not_in_set - return the next profile of @sub not in @set
  * @I: label iterator
  * @set: label to test against
  * @sub: label to if is subset of @set
@@ -1097,8 +1097,8 @@ static struct aa_label *label_merge_insert(struct aa_label *new,
 		else if (k == b->size)
 			return aa_get_label(b);
 	}
-	if (vec_unconfined(new->vec, new->size))
-		new->flags |= FLAG_UNCONFINED;
+	new->flags |= union_vec_flags(new->vec, new->size, FLAG_UNCONFINED |
+					      FLAG_DEBUG1 | FLAG_DEBUG2);
 	ls = labels_set(new);
 	write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
 	label = __label_insert(labels_set(new), new, false);
@@ -1631,9 +1631,9 @@ int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns,
 	AA_BUG(!str && size != 0);
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 
-	if (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT) {
+	if (AA_DEBUG_LABEL && (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT)) {
 		ns = root_ns;
-		len = snprintf(str, size, "=");
+		len = snprintf(str, size, "_");
 		update_for_len(total, len, size, str);
 	} else if (!ns) {
 		ns = labels_ns(label);
@@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ void aa_label_xaudit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_ns *ns,
 	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags) ||
 	    display_mode(ns, label, flags)) {
 		len  = aa_label_asxprint(&name, ns, label, flags, gfp);
-		if (len == -1) {
+		if (len < 0) {
 			AA_DEBUG("label print error");
 			return;
 		}
@@ -1772,7 +1772,7 @@ void aa_label_seq_xprint(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_ns *ns,
 		int len;
 
 		len = aa_label_asxprint(&str, ns, label, flags, gfp);
-		if (len == -1) {
+		if (len < 0) {
 			AA_DEBUG("label print error");
 			return;
 		}
@@ -1795,7 +1795,7 @@ void aa_label_xprintk(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags,
 		int len;
 
 		len = aa_label_asxprint(&str, ns, label, flags, gfp);
-		if (len == -1) {
+		if (len < 0) {
 			AA_DEBUG("label print error");
 			return;
 		}
@@ -1895,7 +1895,8 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 	AA_BUG(!str);
 
 	str = skipn_spaces(str, n);
-	if (str == NULL || (*str == '=' && base != &root_ns->unconfined->label))
+	if (str == NULL || (AA_DEBUG_LABEL && *str == '_' &&
+			    base != &root_ns->unconfined->label))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	len = label_count_strn_entries(str, end - str);
@@ -2136,7 +2137,7 @@ static void __labelset_update(struct aa_ns *ns)
 }
 
 /**
- * __aa_labelset_udate_subtree - update all labels with a stale component
+ * __aa_labelset_update_subtree - update all labels with a stale component
  * @ns: ns to start update at (NOT NULL)
  *
  * Requires: @ns lock be held
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index fa49b81eb54c..1c72a61108d3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ __counted char *aa_str_alloc(int size, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	struct counted_str *str;
 
-	str = kmalloc(sizeof(struct counted_str) + size, gfp);
+	str = kmalloc(struct_size(str, name, size), gfp);
 	if (!str)
 		return NULL;
 
@@ -322,22 +322,39 @@ static u32 map_other(u32 x)
 		((x & 0x60) << 19);	/* SETOPT/GETOPT */
 }
 
+static u32 map_xbits(u32 x)
+{
+	return ((x & 0x1) << 7) |
+		((x & 0x7e) << 9);
+}
+
 void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 		      struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
+	/* This mapping is convulated due to history.
+	 * v1-v4: only file perms
+	 * v5: added policydb which dropped in perm user conditional to
+	 *     gain new perm bits, but had to map around the xbits because
+	 *     the userspace compiler was still munging them.
+	 * v9: adds using the xbits in policydb because the compiler now
+	 *     supports treating policydb permission bits different.
+	 *     Unfortunately there is not way to force auditing on the
+	 *     perms represented by the xbits
+	 */
 	*perms = (struct aa_perms) {
-		.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state),
+		.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state) |
+			 map_xbits(dfa_user_xbits(dfa, state)),
 		.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state),
-		.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state),
+		.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state) |
+			 map_xbits(dfa_other_xbits(dfa, state)),
 	};
 
-	/* for v5 perm mapping in the policydb, the other set is used
+	/* for v5-v9 perm mapping in the policydb, the other set is used
 	 * to extend the general perm set
 	 */
 	perms->allow |= map_other(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state));
 	perms->audit |= map_other(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state));
 	perms->quiet |= map_other(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
-//	perms->xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 900bc540656a..e29cade7b662 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 }
 
 /**
- * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
+ * apparmor_sk_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
  */
 static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
 				       struct sock *newsk)
@@ -886,10 +886,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	struct aa_label *label;
 
 	if (kern) {
-		struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
-
-		label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
-		aa_put_ns(ns);
+		label = aa_get_label(kernel_t);
 	} else
 		label = aa_get_current_label();
 
@@ -937,7 +934,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
 }
 
 /**
- * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
+ * apparmor_socket_listen - check perms before allowing listen
  */
 static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 {
@@ -1041,7 +1038,7 @@ static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
 }
 
 /**
- * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
+ * apparmor_socket_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
  */
 static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 				      int optname)
@@ -1051,7 +1048,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 }
 
 /**
- * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
+ * apparmor_socket_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
  */
 static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 				      int optname)
@@ -1070,7 +1067,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
 /**
- * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
+ * apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
  *
  * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
  *
@@ -1357,6 +1354,12 @@ bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
 module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
 #endif
 
+/* whether policy exactly as loaded is retained for debug and checkpointing */
+bool aa_g_export_binary = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
+module_param_named(export_binary, aa_g_export_binary, aabool, 0600);
+#endif
+
 /* policy loaddata compression level */
 int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
 module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
@@ -1399,7 +1402,7 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
  * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
  * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
  */
-bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true;
+bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD);
 module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
 
 static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
@@ -1761,6 +1764,14 @@ static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
 		.mode           = 0600,
 		.proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
 	},
+	{
+		.procname       = "apparmor_display_secid_mode",
+		.data           = &apparmor_display_secid_mode,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0600,
+		.proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
+	},
+
 	{ }
 };
 
@@ -1819,11 +1830,8 @@ static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = {
 
 static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
+	return nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
 				    ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
-	return ret;
 }
 
 static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
@@ -1857,8 +1865,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	aa_secids_init();
-
 	error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
 	if (error) {
 		AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
index aa6fcfde3051..f61247241803 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/mount.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -217,7 +217,6 @@ static struct aa_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
 		.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state),
 		.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state),
 		.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state),
-		.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state),
 	};
 
 	return perms;
@@ -229,7 +228,8 @@ static const char * const mnt_info_table[] = {
 	"failed srcname match",
 	"failed type match",
 	"failed flags match",
-	"failed data match"
+	"failed data match",
+	"failed perms check"
 };
 
 /*
@@ -284,8 +284,8 @@ static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 			return 0;
 	}
 
-	/* failed at end of flags match */
-	return 4;
+	/* failed at perms check, don't confuse with flags match */
+	return 6;
 }
 
 
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
  * @profile: the confining profile
  * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
  * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
- * @devnme: string for the devname/src_name (MAY BE NULL OR ERRPTR)
+ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAY BE NULL OR ERRPTR)
  * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
  * @flags: mount flags to match
  * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ audit:
 /**
  * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
  * @profile: the confining profile
- * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
+ * @path: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
  * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
  * @devpath: path devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
  * @devbuffer: buffer to be used to lookup devname/src_name
@@ -718,6 +718,7 @@ int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
 			aa_put_label(target);
 			goto out;
 		}
+		aa_put_label(target);
 	} else
 		/* already audited error */
 		error = PTR_ERR(target);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index e0c1b50d6edd..7efe4d17273d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -145,12 +145,13 @@ int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
 static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
 			    struct sock *sk)
 {
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
 	int error = 0;
 
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 	AA_BUG(!sk);
 
-	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+	if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) {
 		struct aa_profile *profile;
 		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index b0cbc4906cb3..499c0209b6a4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__lookup_profile(struct aa_policy *base,
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_lookup_profile - find a profile by its full or partial name
+ * aa_lookupn_profile - find a profile by its full or partial name
  * @ns: the namespace to start from (NOT NULL)
  * @hname: name to do lookup on.  Does not contain namespace prefix (NOT NULL)
  * @n: size of @hname
@@ -952,16 +952,18 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
 
 	mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level);
 	/* check for duplicate rawdata blobs: space and file dedup */
-	list_for_each_entry(rawdata_ent, &ns->rawdata_list, list) {
-		if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) {
-			struct aa_loaddata *tmp;
-
-			tmp = __aa_get_loaddata(rawdata_ent);
-			/* check we didn't fail the race */
-			if (tmp) {
-				aa_put_loaddata(udata);
-				udata = tmp;
-				break;
+	if (!list_empty(&ns->rawdata_list)) {
+		list_for_each_entry(rawdata_ent, &ns->rawdata_list, list) {
+			if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) {
+				struct aa_loaddata *tmp;
+
+				tmp = __aa_get_loaddata(rawdata_ent);
+				/* check we didn't fail the race */
+				if (tmp) {
+					aa_put_loaddata(udata);
+					udata = tmp;
+					break;
+				}
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -969,7 +971,8 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
 	list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) {
 		struct aa_policy *policy;
 
-		ent->new->rawdata = aa_get_loaddata(udata);
+		if (aa_g_export_binary)
+			ent->new->rawdata = aa_get_loaddata(udata);
 		error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->base.hname,
 					 !(mask & AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY),
 					 &ent->old, &info);
@@ -1009,7 +1012,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
 	}
 
 	/* create new fs entries for introspection if needed */
-	if (!udata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR]) {
+	if (!udata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR] && aa_g_export_binary) {
 		error = __aa_fs_create_rawdata(ns, udata);
 		if (error) {
 			info = "failed to create raw_data dir and files";
@@ -1037,12 +1040,14 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
 
 	/* Done with checks that may fail - do actual replacement */
 	__aa_bump_ns_revision(ns);
-	__aa_loaddata_update(udata, ns->revision);
+	if (aa_g_export_binary)
+		__aa_loaddata_update(udata, ns->revision);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) {
 		list_del_init(&ent->list);
 		op = (!ent->old && !ent->rename) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
 
-		if (ent->old && ent->old->rawdata == ent->new->rawdata) {
+		if (ent->old && ent->old->rawdata == ent->new->rawdata &&
+		    ent->new->rawdata) {
 			/* dedup actual profile replacement */
 			audit_policy(label, op, ns_name, ent->new->base.hname,
 				     "same as current profile, skipping",
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
index 70921d95fb40..43beaad083fe 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
 #include "include/label.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 
+/* kernel label */
+struct aa_label *kernel_t;
+
 /* root profile namespace */
 struct aa_ns *root_ns;
 const char *aa_hidden_ns_name = "---";
@@ -51,10 +54,10 @@ bool aa_ns_visible(struct aa_ns *curr, struct aa_ns *view, bool subns)
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_na_name - Find the ns name to display for @view from @curr
- * @curr - current namespace (NOT NULL)
- * @view - namespace attempting to view (NOT NULL)
- * @subns - are subns visible
+ * aa_ns_name - Find the ns name to display for @view from @curr
+ * @curr: current namespace (NOT NULL)
+ * @view: namespace attempting to view (NOT NULL)
+ * @subns: are subns visible
  *
  * Returns: name of @view visible from @curr
  */
@@ -77,6 +80,23 @@ const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_ns *curr, struct aa_ns *view, bool subns)
 	return aa_hidden_ns_name;
 }
 
+static struct aa_profile *alloc_unconfined(const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!profile)
+		return NULL;
+
+	profile->label.flags |= FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
+		FLAG_IMMUTIBLE | FLAG_NS_COUNT | FLAG_UNCONFINED;
+	profile->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED;
+	profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+	profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+
+	return profile;
+}
+
 /**
  * alloc_ns - allocate, initialize and return a new namespace
  * @prefix: parent namespace name (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -101,16 +121,9 @@ static struct aa_ns *alloc_ns(const char *prefix, const char *name)
 	init_waitqueue_head(&ns->wait);
 
 	/* released by aa_free_ns() */
-	ns->unconfined = aa_alloc_profile("unconfined", NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ns->unconfined = alloc_unconfined("unconfined");
 	if (!ns->unconfined)
 		goto fail_unconfined;
-
-	ns->unconfined->label.flags |= FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
-		FLAG_IMMUTIBLE | FLAG_NS_COUNT | FLAG_UNCONFINED;
-	ns->unconfined->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED;
-	ns->unconfined->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
-	ns->unconfined->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
-
 	/* ns and ns->unconfined share ns->unconfined refcount */
 	ns->unconfined->ns = ns;
 
@@ -187,7 +200,7 @@ struct aa_ns *aa_find_ns(struct aa_ns *root, const char *name)
 
 /**
  * __aa_lookupn_ns - lookup the namespace matching @hname
- * @base: base list to start looking up profile name from  (NOT NULL)
+ * @view: namespace to search in  (NOT NULL)
  * @hname: hierarchical ns name  (NOT NULL)
  * @n: length of @hname
  *
@@ -272,7 +285,7 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name,
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_create_ns - create an ns, fail if it already exists
+ * __aa_find_or_create_ns - create an ns, fail if it already exists
  * @parent: the parent of the namespace being created
  * @name: the name of the namespace
  * @dir: if not null the dir to put the ns entries in
@@ -388,11 +401,22 @@ static void __ns_list_release(struct list_head *head)
  */
 int __init aa_alloc_root_ns(void)
 {
+	struct aa_profile *kernel_p;
+
 	/* released by aa_free_root_ns - used as list ref*/
 	root_ns = alloc_ns(NULL, "root");
 	if (!root_ns)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	kernel_p = alloc_unconfined("kernel_t");
+	if (!kernel_p) {
+		destroy_ns(root_ns);
+		aa_free_ns(root_ns);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	kernel_t = &kernel_p->label;
+	root_ns->unconfined->ns = aa_get_ns(root_ns);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -405,6 +429,7 @@ void __init aa_free_root_ns(void)
 
 	 root_ns = NULL;
 
+	 aa_label_free(kernel_t);
 	 destroy_ns(ns);
 	 aa_put_ns(ns);
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 0acca6f2a93f..55d31bac4f35 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -125,15 +125,16 @@ void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision)
 {
 	AA_BUG(!data);
 	AA_BUG(!data->ns);
-	AA_BUG(!data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION]);
 	AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&data->ns->lock));
 	AA_BUG(data->revision > revision);
 
 	data->revision = revision;
-	d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR])->i_mtime =
-		current_time(d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR]));
-	d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])->i_mtime =
-		current_time(d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION]));
+	if ((data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])) {
+		d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR])->i_mtime =
+			current_time(d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR]));
+		d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])->i_mtime =
+			current_time(d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION]));
+	}
 }
 
 bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r)
@@ -213,7 +214,7 @@ static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len)
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_u16_chunck - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk
+ * unpack_u16_chunk - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk
  * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
  * @chunk: start address for chunk of data (NOT NULL)
  *
@@ -456,7 +457,9 @@ static struct aa_dfa *unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e)
 			((e->pos - e->start) & 7);
 		size_t pad = ALIGN(sz, 8) - sz;
 		int flags = TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
-			TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES;
+			TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32);
+		if (aa_g_paranoid_load)
+			flags |= DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES;
 		dfa = aa_dfa_unpack(blob + pad, size - pad, flags);
 
 		if (IS_ERR(dfa))
@@ -668,6 +671,7 @@ static int datacmp(struct rhashtable_compare_arg *arg, const void *obj)
 /**
  * unpack_profile - unpack a serialized profile
  * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns_name: pointer of newly allocated copy of %NULL in case of error
  *
  * NOTE: unpack profile sets audit struct if there is a failure
  */
@@ -744,18 +748,24 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 		goto fail;
 	if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_HAT)
 		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_HAT;
+	if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG1)
+		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_DEBUG1;
+	if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG2)
+		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_DEBUG2;
 	if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
 		goto fail;
-	if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_COMPLAIN || (e->version & FORCE_COMPLAIN_FLAG))
+	if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_COMPLAIN || (e->version & FORCE_COMPLAIN_FLAG)) {
 		profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
-	else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_ENFORCE)
+	} else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_ENFORCE) {
 		profile->mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
-	else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_KILL)
+	} else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_KILL) {
 		profile->mode = APPARMOR_KILL;
-	else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_UNCONFINED)
+	} else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_UNCONFINED) {
 		profile->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED;
-	else
+		profile->label.flags |= FLAG_UNCONFINED;
+	} else {
 		goto fail;
+	}
 	if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
 		goto fail;
 	if (tmp)
@@ -936,7 +946,7 @@ fail:
 }
 
 /**
- * verify_head - unpack serialized stream header
+ * verify_header - unpack serialized stream header
  * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
  * @required: whether the header is required or optional
  * @ns: Returns - namespace if one is specified else NULL (NOT NULL)
@@ -1052,6 +1062,7 @@ struct aa_load_ent *aa_load_ent_alloc(void)
 static int deflate_compress(const char *src, size_t slen, char **dst,
 			    size_t *dlen)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
 	int error;
 	struct z_stream_s strm;
 	void *stgbuf, *dstbuf;
@@ -1123,6 +1134,10 @@ fail_deflate_init:
 fail_deflate:
 	kvfree(stgbuf);
 	goto fail_stg_alloc;
+#else
+	*dlen = slen;
+	return 0;
+#endif
 }
 
 static int compress_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data)
@@ -1141,7 +1156,8 @@ static int compress_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data)
 		if (error)
 			return error;
 
-		kvfree(udata);
+		if (udata != data->data)
+			kvfree(udata);
 	} else
 		data->compressed_size = data->size;
 
@@ -1216,9 +1232,12 @@ int aa_unpack(struct aa_loaddata *udata, struct list_head *lh,
 			goto fail;
 		}
 	}
-	error = compress_loaddata(udata);
-	if (error)
-		goto fail;
+
+	if (aa_g_export_binary) {
+		error = compress_loaddata(udata);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+	}
 	return 0;
 
 fail_profile:
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c
index 7954cb23d5f2..0a969b2e03db 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ struct policy_unpack_fixture {
 	size_t e_size;
 };
 
-struct aa_ext *build_aa_ext_struct(struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf,
-				   struct kunit *test, size_t buf_size)
+static struct aa_ext *build_aa_ext_struct(struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf,
+					  struct kunit *test, size_t buf_size)
 {
 	char *buf;
 	struct aa_ext *e;
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_with_null_name(struct kunit *test)
 {
 	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
 	bool success;
-	u32 data;
+	u32 data = 0;
 
 	puf->e->pos += TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
 
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_with_name(struct kunit *test)
 	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
 	const char name[] = TEST_U32_NAME;
 	bool success;
-	u32 data;
+	u32 data = 0;
 
 	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
 
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)
 	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
 	const char name[] = TEST_U32_NAME;
 	bool success;
-	u32 data;
+	u32 data = 0;
 
 	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET;
 	puf->e->end = puf->e->start + TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u32);
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_with_null_name(struct kunit *test)
 {
 	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
 	bool success;
-	u64 data;
+	u64 data = 0;
 
 	puf->e->pos += TEST_U64_BUF_OFFSET;
 
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_with_name(struct kunit *test)
 	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
 	const char name[] = TEST_U64_NAME;
 	bool success;
-	u64 data;
+	u64 data = 0;
 
 	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET;
 
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)
 	struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv;
 	const char name[] = TEST_U64_NAME;
 	bool success;
-	u64 data;
+	u64 data = 0;
 
 	puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET;
 	puf->e->end = puf->e->start + TEST_U64_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u64);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index fde332e0ea7d..86ad26ef72ed 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static char *split_token_from_name(const char *op, char *args, u64 *token)
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_setprocattr_chagnehat - handle procattr interface to change_hat
+ * aa_setprocattr_changehat - handle procattr interface to change_hat
  * @args: args received from writing to /proc/<pid>/attr/current (NOT NULL)
  * @size: size of the args
  * @flags: set of flags governing behavior
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index ce545f99259e..24a0e23f1b2b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
-#include <linux/idr.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/xarray.h>
 
 #include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/lib.h"
@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@
  */
 #define AA_FIRST_SECID 2
 
-static DEFINE_IDR(aa_secids);
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(secid_lock);
+static DEFINE_XARRAY_FLAGS(aa_secids, XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ | XA_FLAGS_TRACK_FREE);
+
+int apparmor_display_secid_mode;
 
 /*
  * TODO: allow policy to reserve a secid range?
@@ -47,9 +48,9 @@ void aa_secid_update(u32 secid, struct aa_label *label)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&secid_lock, flags);
-	idr_replace(&aa_secids, label, secid);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&secid_lock, flags);
+	xa_lock_irqsave(&aa_secids, flags);
+	__xa_store(&aa_secids, secid, label, 0);
+	xa_unlock_irqrestore(&aa_secids, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -58,19 +59,14 @@ void aa_secid_update(u32 secid, struct aa_label *label)
  */
 struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)
 {
-	struct aa_label *label;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	label = idr_find(&aa_secids, secid);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-	return label;
+	return xa_load(&aa_secids, secid);
 }
 
 int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid);
+	int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT;
 	int len;
 
 	AA_BUG(!seclen);
@@ -78,15 +74,15 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 	if (!label)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (apparmor_display_secid_mode)
+		flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
+
 	if (secdata)
 		len = aa_label_asxprint(secdata, root_ns, label,
-					FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
-					FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT,
-					GFP_ATOMIC);
+					flags, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	else
-		len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, root_ns, label,
-					FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
-					FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT);
+		len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, root_ns, label, flags);
+
 	if (len < 0)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -126,19 +122,16 @@ int aa_alloc_secid(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret;
 
-	idr_preload(gfp);
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&secid_lock, flags);
-	ret = idr_alloc(&aa_secids, label, AA_FIRST_SECID, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&secid_lock, flags);
-	idr_preload_end();
+	xa_lock_irqsave(&aa_secids, flags);
+	ret = __xa_alloc(&aa_secids, &label->secid, label,
+			XA_LIMIT(AA_FIRST_SECID, INT_MAX), gfp);
+	xa_unlock_irqrestore(&aa_secids, flags);
 
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		label->secid = AA_SECID_INVALID;
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	AA_BUG(ret == AA_SECID_INVALID);
-	label->secid = ret;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -150,12 +143,7 @@ void aa_free_secid(u32 secid)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&secid_lock, flags);
-	idr_remove(&aa_secids, secid);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&secid_lock, flags);
-}
-
-void aa_secids_init(void)
-{
-	idr_init_base(&aa_secids, AA_FIRST_SECID);
+	xa_lock_irqsave(&aa_secids, flags);
+	__xa_erase(&aa_secids, secid);
+	xa_unlock_irqrestore(&aa_secids, flags);
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
index d17130ee6795..503dc0877fb1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/task.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -12,7 +12,12 @@
  * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
  */
 
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/task.h"
 
 /**
@@ -177,3 +182,112 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 
 	return 0;
 }
+
+/**
+ * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to static string
+ */
+static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+	switch (mask) {
+	case MAY_READ:
+		return "read";
+	case MAY_WRITE:
+		return "trace";
+	case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
+		return "readby";
+	case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
+		return "tracedby";
+	}
+	return "";
+}
+
+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
+static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
+				 audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
+
+		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
+					 audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
+		}
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
+/* TODO: conditionals */
+static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			     struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+			     struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+	aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+			       &perms);
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+			       struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+	if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+			       struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+	if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+		return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
+
+	/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+	if (&tracer->label == tracee)
+		return 0;
+
+	aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
+	aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
+	aad(sa)->request = 0;
+	aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+				    CAP_OPT_NONE);
+
+	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
+ * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task label to be traced
+ * @request: permission request
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+		  u32 request)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
+
+	return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+			profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
+			profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
+}