linux: Adding spectre meltdown checker test suite

Spectre & Meltdown Checker description,

A shell script to tell if your system is vulnerable against the several
"speculative execution" CVEs that were made public in 2018.

CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
CVE-2018-3640 [rogue system register read] aka 'Variant 3a'
CVE-2018-3639 [speculative store bypass] aka 'Variant 4'
CVE-2018-3615 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow (SGX)'
CVE-2018-3620 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS)'
CVE-2018-3646 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM)'

Ref:
Add spectre-meltdown-checker to LKFT
https://projects.linaro.org/browse/KV-125

Change-Id: I1fdc3120cc575bf37bcea7f2cf0b02c3ad30e38a
Signed-off-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>

4 files changed, 5105 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/bin/LICENSE b/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/bin/LICENSE
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+option of following the terms and conditions either of that numbered
+version or of any later version published by the Free Software
+Foundation.  If the Program does not specify a version number of the
+GNU General Public License, you may choose any version ever published
+by the Free Software Foundation.
+
+  If the Program specifies that a proxy can decide which future
+versions of the GNU General Public License can be used, that proxy's
+public statement of acceptance of a version permanently authorizes you
+to choose that version for the Program.
+
+  Later license versions may give you additional or different
+permissions.  However, no additional obligations are imposed on any
+author or copyright holder as a result of your choosing to follow a
+later version.
+
+  15. Disclaimer of Warranty.
+
+  THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY
+APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT
+HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY
+OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM
+IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF
+ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
+
+  16. Limitation of Liability.
+
+  IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
+WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MODIFIES AND/OR CONVEYS
+THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY
+GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE
+USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF
+DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD
+PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS),
+EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+SUCH DAMAGES.
+
+  17. Interpretation of Sections 15 and 16.
+
+  If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided
+above cannot be given local legal effect according to their terms,
+reviewing courts shall apply local law that most closely approximates
+an absolute waiver of all civil liability in connection with the
+Program, unless a warranty or assumption of liability accompanies a
+copy of the Program in return for a fee.
+
+                     END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
+
+            How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
+
+  If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest
+possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it
+free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms.
+
+  To do so, attach the following notices to the program.  It is safest
+to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively
+state the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least
+the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
+
+    <one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
+    Copyright (C) <year>  <name of author>
+
+    This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+    the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+    (at your option) any later version.
+
+    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+    GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+    along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
+
+  If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short
+notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode:
+
+    <program>  Copyright (C) <year>  <name of author>
+    This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
+    This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
+    under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
+
+The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate
+parts of the General Public License.  Of course, your program's commands
+might be different; for a GUI interface, you would use an "about box".
+
+  You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school,
+if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary.
+For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see
+<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+  The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program
+into proprietary programs.  If your program is a subroutine library, you
+may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with
+the library.  If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General
+Public License instead of this License.  But first, please read
+<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-not-lgpl.html>.
diff --git a/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/bin/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh b/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/bin/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4cb46b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/bin/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,4331 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# shellcheck disable=SC2059
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+#
+# Spectre & Meltdown checker
+#
+# Check for the latest version at:
+# https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
+# git clone https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
+# or wget https://meltdown.ovh -O spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+# or curl -L https://meltdown.ovh -o spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+#
+# Stephane Lesimple
+#
+VERSION='0.40'
+
+trap 'exit_cleanup' EXIT
+trap '_warn "interrupted, cleaning up..."; exit_cleanup; exit 1' INT
+exit_cleanup()
+{
+	# cleanup the temp decompressed config & kernel image
+	[ -n "$dumped_config" ] && [ -f "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config"
+	[ -n "$kerneltmp"     ] && [ -f "$kerneltmp"     ] && rm -f "$kerneltmp"
+	[ -n "$kerneltmp2"    ] && [ -f "$kerneltmp2"    ] && rm -f "$kerneltmp2"
+	[ -n "$mcedb_tmp"     ] && [ -f "$mcedb_tmp"     ] && rm -f "$mcedb_tmp"
+	[ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ] && umount /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null
+	[ "$mounted_procfs"  = 1 ] && umount "$procfs" 2>/dev/null
+	[ "$insmod_cpuid"    = 1 ] && rmmod cpuid 2>/dev/null
+	[ "$insmod_msr"      = 1 ] && rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
+	[ "$kldload_cpuctl"  = 1 ] && kldunload cpuctl 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+# if we were git clone'd, adjust VERSION
+if [ -d "$(dirname "$0")/.git" ] && which git >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	describe=$(git -C "$(dirname "$0")" describe --tags --dirty 2>/dev/null)
+	[ -n "$describe" ] && VERSION=$(echo "$describe" | sed -e s/^v//)
+fi
+
+show_usage()
+{
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+	cat <<EOF
+	Usage:
+		Live mode:    $(basename $0) [options] [--live]
+		Offline mode: $(basename $0) [options] [--kernel <kernel_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>]
+
+	Modes:
+		Two modes are available.
+
+		First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
+		To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitly)
+
+		Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
+		You'll need to specify the location of the kernel file, config and System.map files:
+
+		--kernel kernel_file	specify a (possibly compressed) Linux or BSD kernel file
+		--config kernel_config	specify a kernel config file (Linux only)
+		--map kernel_map_file	specify a kernel System.map file (Linux only)
+
+	Options:
+		--no-color		don't use color codes
+		--verbose, -v		increase verbosity level, possibly several times
+		--explain		produce an additional human-readable explanation of actions to take to mitigate a vulnerability
+		--paranoid		require IBPB to deem Variant 2 as mitigated
+					also require SMT disabled + unconditional L1D flush to deem Foreshadow-NG VMM as mitigated
+
+		--no-sysfs		don't use the /sys interface even if present [Linux]
+		--sysfs-only		only use the /sys interface, don't run our own checks [Linux]
+		--coreos		special mode for CoreOS (use an ephemeral toolbox to inspect kernel) [Linux]
+
+		--arch-prefix PREFIX	specify a prefix for cross-inspecting a kernel of a different arch, for example "aarch64-linux-gnu-",
+					so that invoked tools will be prefixed with this (i.e. aarch64-linux-gnu-objdump)
+		--batch text		produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone
+		--batch short		produce only one line with the vulnerabilities separated by spaces
+		--batch json		produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
+		--batch nrpe		produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE
+		--batch prometheus      produce output for consumption by prometheus-node-exporter
+
+		--variant [1,2,3,3a,4,l1tf]	specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked
+		--cve [cve1,cve2,...]		specify which CVE you'd like to check, by default all supported CVEs are checked
+					can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3)
+		--hw-only		only check for CPU information, don't check for any variant
+		--no-hw			skip CPU information and checks, if you're inspecting a kernel not to be run on this host
+		--vmm [auto,yes,no]	override the detection of the presence of an hypervisor (for CVE-2018-3646), default: auto
+		--update-mcedb		update our local copy of the CPU microcodes versions database (from the awesome MCExtractor project)
+		--update-builtin-mcedb	same as --update-mcedb but update builtin DB inside the script itself
+
+	Return codes:
+		0 (not vulnerable), 2 (vulnerable), 3 (unknown), 255 (error)
+
+	IMPORTANT:
+	A false sense of security is worse than no security at all.
+	Please use the --disclaimer option to understand exactly what this script does.
+
+EOF
+}
+
+show_disclaimer()
+{
+	cat <<EOF
+Disclaimer:
+
+This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the
+collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee
+that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place.
+However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might
+falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
+
+Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these
+vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable,
+except some specific/old models, such as some early Atoms. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information
+from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs.
+
+The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected
+to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer
+explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
+
+Please also note that for Spectre vulnerabilities, all software can possibly be exploited, this tool only verifies that the
+kernel (which is the core of the system) you're using has the proper protections in place. Verifying all the other software
+is out of the scope of this tool. As a general measure, ensure you always have the most up to date stable versions of all
+the software you use, especially for those who are exposed to the world, such as network daemons and browsers.
+
+This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.
+
+EOF
+}
+
+os=$(uname -s)
+
+# parse options
+opt_kernel=''
+opt_config=''
+opt_map=''
+opt_live_explicit=0
+opt_live=1
+opt_no_color=0
+opt_batch=0
+opt_batch_format="text"
+opt_verbose=1
+opt_cve_list=''
+opt_cve_all=1
+opt_no_sysfs=0
+opt_sysfs_only=0
+opt_coreos=0
+opt_arch_prefix=''
+opt_hw_only=0
+opt_no_hw=0
+opt_vmm=-1
+opt_explain=0
+opt_paranoid=0
+
+global_critical=0
+global_unknown=0
+nrpe_vuln=""
+
+supported_cve_list='CVE-2017-5753 CVE-2017-5715 CVE-2017-5754 CVE-2018-3640 CVE-2018-3639 CVE-2018-3615 CVE-2018-3620 CVE-2018-3646'
+
+# find a sane command to print colored messages, we prefer `printf` over `echo`
+# because `printf` behavior is more standard across Linux/BSD
+# we'll try to avoid using shell builtins that might not take options
+echo_cmd_type=echo
+if which printf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	echo_cmd=$(which printf)
+	echo_cmd_type=printf
+elif which echo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	echo_cmd=$(which echo)
+else
+	# maybe the `which` command is broken?
+	[ -x /bin/echo        ] && echo_cmd=/bin/echo
+	# for Android
+	[ -x /system/bin/echo ] && echo_cmd=/system/bin/echo
+fi
+# still empty? fallback to builtin
+[ -z "$echo_cmd" ] && echo_cmd=echo
+__echo()
+{
+	opt="$1"
+	shift
+	_msg="$*"
+
+	if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then
+		# strip ANSI color codes
+		# some sed versions (i.e. toybox) can't seem to handle
+		# \033 aka \x1B correctly, so do it for them.
+		if [ "$echo_cmd_type" = printf ]; then
+			_interpret_chars=''
+		else
+			_interpret_chars='-e'
+		fi
+		_ctrlchar=$($echo_cmd $_interpret_chars "\033")
+		_msg=$($echo_cmd $_interpret_chars "$_msg" | sed -r "s/$_ctrlchar\[([0-9][0-9]?(;[0-9][0-9]?)?)?m//g")
+	fi
+	if [ "$echo_cmd_type" = printf ]; then
+		if [ "$opt" = "-n" ]; then
+			$echo_cmd "$_msg"
+		else
+			$echo_cmd "$_msg\n"
+		fi
+	else
+		# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+		$echo_cmd $opt -e "$_msg"
+	fi
+}
+
+_echo()
+{
+	if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then
+		shift
+		__echo '' "$*"
+	fi
+}
+
+_echo_nol()
+{
+	if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then
+		shift
+		__echo -n "$*"
+	fi
+}
+
+_warn()
+{
+	_echo 0 "\033[31m$*\033[0m" >&2
+}
+
+_info()
+{
+	_echo 1 "$*"
+}
+
+_info_nol()
+{
+	_echo_nol 1 "$*"
+}
+
+_verbose()
+{
+	_echo 2 "$*"
+}
+
+_verbose_nol()
+{
+	_echo_nol 2 "$*"
+}
+
+_debug()
+{
+	_echo 3 "\033[34m(debug) $*\033[0m"
+}
+
+explain()
+{
+	if [ "$opt_explain" = 1 ] ; then
+		_info ''
+		_info "> \033[41m\033[30mHow to fix:\033[0m $*"
+	fi
+}
+
+cve2name()
+{
+	case "$1" in
+		CVE-2017-5753) echo "Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass";;
+		CVE-2017-5715) echo "Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection";;
+		CVE-2017-5754) echo "Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load";;
+		CVE-2018-3640) echo "Variant 3a, rogue system register read";;
+		CVE-2018-3639) echo "Variant 4, speculative store bypass";;
+		CVE-2018-3615) echo "Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault";;
+		CVE-2018-3620) echo "Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault";;
+		CVE-2018-3646) echo "Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault";;
+	esac
+}
+
+is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=0
+_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached()
+{
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+	case "$1" in
+		CVE-2017-5753) return $variant1;;
+		CVE-2017-5715) return $variant2;;
+		CVE-2017-5754) return $variant3;;
+		CVE-2018-3640) return $variant3a;;
+		CVE-2018-3639) return $variant4;;
+		CVE-2018-3615) return $variantl1tf_sgx;;
+		CVE-2018-3620) return $variantl1tf;;
+		CVE-2018-3646) return $variantl1tf;;
+	esac
+	echo "$0: error: invalid variant '$1' passed to is_cpu_vulnerable()" >&2
+	exit 255
+}
+
+is_cpu_vulnerable()
+{
+	# param: one of the $supported_cve_list items
+	# returns 0 if vulnerable, 1 if not vulnerable
+	# (note that in shell, a return of 0 is success)
+	# by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.
+	# usage: is_cpu_vulnerable CVE-xxxx-yyyy && do something if vulnerable
+	if [ "$is_cpu_vulnerable_cached" = 1 ]; then
+		_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1"
+		return $?
+	fi
+
+	variant1=''
+	variant2=''
+	variant3=''
+	variant3a=''
+	variant4=''
+	variantl1tf=''
+
+	if is_cpu_specex_free; then
+		variant1=immune
+		variant2=immune
+		variant3=immune
+		variant3a=immune
+		variant4=immune
+		variantl1tf=immune
+	elif is_intel; then
+		# Intel
+		# https://github.com/crozone/SpectrePoC/issues/1 ^F E5200 => spectre 2 not vulnerable
+		# https://github.com/paboldin/meltdown-exploit/issues/19 ^F E5200 => meltdown vulnerable
+		# model name : Pentium(R) Dual-Core  CPU      E5200  @ 2.50GHz
+		if grep -qE '^model name.+ Pentium\(R\) Dual-Core[[:space:]]+CPU[[:space:]]+E[0-9]{4}K? ' "$procfs/cpuinfo"; then
+			variant1=vuln
+			[ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune
+			variant3=vuln
+		fi
+		if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then
+			# capability bit for future Intel processor that will explicitly state
+			# that they're not vulnerable to Meltdown
+			# this var is set in check_cpu()
+			[ -z "$variant3" ]    && variant3=immune
+			[ -z "$variantl1tf" ] && variantl1tf=immune
+			_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: RDCL_NO is set so not vuln to meltdown nor l1tf"
+		fi
+		if [ "$capabilities_ssb_no" = 1 ]; then
+			# capability bit for future Intel processor that will explicitly state
+			# that they're not vulnerable to Variant 4
+			# this var is set in check_cpu()
+			[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
+			_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: SSB_NO is set so not vuln to variant4"
+		fi
+		if is_cpu_ssb_free; then
+			[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
+			_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: cpu not affected by speculative store bypass so not vuln to variant4"
+		fi
+		# variant 4a for xeon phi
+		if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+			if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL" ] || [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM" ]; then
+				_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: xeon phi immune to variant 3a"
+				[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
+			fi
+		fi
+		# L1TF (RDCL_NO already checked above)
+		if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+			if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW"          ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL"     ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM"     ]; then
+
+				_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: intel family 6 but model known to be immune"
+				[ -z "$variantl1tf" ] && variantl1tf=immune
+			else
+				_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: intel family 6 is vuln"
+				variantl1tf=vuln
+			fi
+		elif [ "$cpu_family" -lt 6 ]; then
+			_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: intel family < 6 is immune"
+			[ -z "$variantl1tf" ] && variantl1tf=immune
+		fi
+	elif is_amd; then
+		# AMD revised their statement about variant2 => vulnerable
+		# https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/speculative-execution
+		variant1=vuln
+		variant2=vuln
+		[ -z "$variant3"  ] && variant3=immune
+		# https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/security-updates
+		# "We have not identified any AMD x86 products susceptible to the Variant 3a vulnerability in our analysis to-date."
+		[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
+		if is_cpu_ssb_free; then
+			[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
+			_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: cpu not affected by speculative store bypass so not vuln to variant4"
+		fi
+		variantl1tf=immune
+	elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = CAVIUM ]; then
+		variant3=immune
+		variant3a=immune
+		variantl1tf=immune
+	elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = ARM ]; then
+		# ARM
+		# reference: https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update
+		# some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers,
+		# an example is "bigLITTLE". we shouldn't rely on the first CPU only, so we check the whole list
+		i=0
+		for cpupart in $cpu_part_list
+		do
+			i=$(( i + 1 ))
+			# do NOT quote $cpu_arch_list below
+			# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+			cpuarch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $'$i' }')
+			_debug "checking cpu$i: <$cpupart> <$cpuarch>"
+			# some kernels report AArch64 instead of 8
+			[ "$cpuarch" = "AArch64" ] && cpuarch=8
+			if [ -n "$cpupart" ] && [ -n "$cpuarch" ]; then
+				# Cortex-R7 and Cortex-R8 are real-time and only used in medical devices or such
+				# I can't find their CPU part number, but it's probably not that useful anyway
+				# model R7 R8 A8  A9  A12 A15 A17 A57 A72 A73 A75 A76
+				# part   ?  ? c08 c09 c0d c0f c0e d07 d08 d09 d0a d0b?
+				# arch  7? 7? 7   7   7   7   7   8   8   8   8   8
+				#
+				# Whitelist identified non-vulnerable processors, use vulnerability information from 
+				# https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability
+				#
+				# Maintain cumulative check of vulnerabilities -
+				# if at least one of the cpu is vulnerable, then the system is vulnerable
+				if [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xc08 -e 0xc09 -e 0xc0d -e 0xc0e; then
+					variant1=vuln
+					variant2=vuln
+					[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
+					[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
+					[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: armv7 A8/A9/A12/A17 non vulnerable to variants 3, 3a & 4"
+				elif [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xc0f; then
+					variant1=vuln
+					variant2=vuln
+					[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
+					variant3a=vuln
+					[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: armv7 A15 non vulnerable to variants 3 & 4"
+				elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd07 -e 0xd08; then
+					variant1=vuln
+					variant2=vuln
+					[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
+					variant3a=vuln
+					variant4=vuln
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: armv8 A57/A72 non vulnerable to variants 3"
+				elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd09; then
+					variant1=vuln
+					variant2=vuln
+					[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
+					[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
+					variant4=vuln
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: armv8 A73 non vulnerable to variants 3 & 3a"
+				elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd0a; then
+					variant1=vuln
+					variant2=vuln
+					variant3=vuln
+					[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
+					variant4=vuln
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: armv8 A75 non vulnerable to variant 3a"
+				elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd0b; then
+					variant1=vuln
+					[ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune
+					[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
+					[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
+					variant4=vuln
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: armv8 A76 non vulnerable to variant 2, 3 & 3a"
+				elif [ "$cpuarch" -le 7 ] || ( [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && [ $(( cpupart )) -lt $(( 0xd07 )) ] ) ; then
+					[ -z "$variant1" ] && variant1=immune
+					[ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune
+					[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
+					[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
+					[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: arm arch$cpuarch, all immune (v7 or v8 and model < 0xd07)"
+				else
+					variant1=vuln
+					variant2=vuln
+					variant3=vuln
+					variant3a=vuln
+					variant4=vuln
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: arm unknown arch$cpuarch part$cpupart, considering vuln"
+				fi
+			fi
+			_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: for cpu$i and so far, we have <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3> <$variant3a> <$variant4>"
+		done
+		variantl1tf=immune
+	fi
+	_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: temp results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3> <$variant3a> <$variant4> <$variantl1tf>"
+	[ "$variant1"    = "immune" ] && variant1=1    || variant1=0
+	[ "$variant2"    = "immune" ] && variant2=1    || variant2=0
+	[ "$variant3"    = "immune" ] && variant3=1    || variant3=0
+	[ "$variant3a"   = "immune" ] && variant3a=1   || variant3a=0
+	[ "$variant4"    = "immune" ] && variant4=1    || variant4=0
+	[ "$variantl1tf" = "immune" ] && variantl1tf=1 || variantl1tf=0
+	variantl1tf_sgx="$variantl1tf"
+	# even if we are vulnerable to L1TF, if there's no SGX, we're safe for the original foreshadow
+	[ "$cpuid_sgx" = 0 ] && variantl1tf_sgx=1
+	_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: final results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3> <$variant3a> <$variant4> <$variantl1tf> <$variantl1tf_sgx>"
+	is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=1
+	_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1"
+	return $?
+}
+
+is_cpu_specex_free()
+{
+	# return true (0) if the CPU doesn't do speculative execution, false (1) if it does.
+	# if it's not in the list we know, return false (1).
+	# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n882
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW,   X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW,  X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT,    X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL,     X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW,    X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,   5 },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     5 },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_NSC,       5 },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_ANY,       4 },
+	parse_cpu_details
+	if is_intel; then
+		if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+			if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW"  ]      || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT"   ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL"    ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW"   ]; then
+				return 0
+			fi
+		elif [ "$cpu_family" = 5 ]; then
+			return 0
+		fi
+	fi
+	[ "$cpu_family" = 4 ] && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+is_cpu_ssb_free()
+{
+	# return true (0) if the CPU isn't affected by speculative store bypass, false (1) if it does.
+	# if it's not in the list we know, return false (1).
+	# source1: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n945
+	# source2: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+	# Only list CPUs that speculate but are immune, to avoid duplication of cpus listed in is_cpu_specex_free()
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1	},
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT		},
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2	},
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD	},
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH		},
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		},
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		},
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x12,					},
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x11,					},
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x10,					},
+	#{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0xf,					},
+	parse_cpu_details
+	if is_intel; then
+		if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+			if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT"          ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD"  ]; then
+				return 0
+			elif [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH"          ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL"     ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM"     ]; then
+				return 0
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+	if is_amd; then
+		if [ "$cpu_family" = "18" ] || \
+			[ "$cpu_family" = "17" ] || \
+			[ "$cpu_family" = "16" ] || \
+			[ "$cpu_family" = "15" ]; then 
+			return 0
+		fi
+	fi			
+	[ "$cpu_family" = 4 ] && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+show_header()
+{
+	_info "Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION"
+	_info
+}
+
+[ -z "$HOME" ] && HOME="$(getent passwd "$(whoami)" | cut -d: -f6)"
+mcedb_cache="$HOME/.mcedb"
+update_mcedb()
+{
+	# We're using MCE.db from the excellent platomav's MCExtractor project
+	show_header
+
+	if [ -r "$mcedb_cache" ]; then
+		previous_mcedb_revision=$(awk '/^# %%% MCEDB / { print $4 }' "$mcedb_cache")
+	fi
+
+	# first download the database
+	mcedb_tmp="$(mktemp /tmp/mcedb-XXXXXX)"
+	mcedb_url='https://github.com/platomav/MCExtractor/raw/master/MCE.db'
+	_info_nol "Fetching MCE.db from the MCExtractor project... "
+	if which wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		wget -q "$mcedb_url" -O "$mcedb_tmp"; ret=$?
+	elif which curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		curl -sL "$mcedb_url" -o "$mcedb_tmp"; ret=$?
+	elif which fetch >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		fetch -q "$mcedb_url" -o "$mcedb_tmp"; ret=$?
+	else
+		echo ERROR "please install one of \`wget\`, \`curl\` of \`fetch\` programs"
+		return 1
+	fi
+	if [ "$ret" != 0 ]; then
+		echo ERROR "error $ret while downloading MCE.db"
+		return $ret
+	fi
+	echo DONE
+
+	# now extract contents using sqlite
+	_info_nol "Extracting data... "
+	if ! which sqlite3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		echo ERROR "please install the \`sqlite3\` program"
+		return 1
+	fi
+	mcedb_revision=$(sqlite3 "$mcedb_tmp" "select revision from MCE")
+	mcedb_date=$(sqlite3 "$mcedb_tmp" "select strftime('%Y/%m/%d', date, 'unixepoch') from MCE")
+	if [ -z "$mcedb_revision" ]; then
+		echo ERROR "downloaded file seems invalid"
+		return 1
+	fi
+	echo OK "MCExtractor database revision $mcedb_revision dated $mcedb_date"
+	if [ -n "$previous_mcedb_revision" ]; then
+		if [ "$previous_mcedb_revision" = "v$mcedb_revision" ]; then
+			echo "We already have this version locally, no update needed"
+			[ "$1" != builtin ] && return 0
+		fi
+	fi
+	echo "# Spectre & Meltdown Checker" > "$mcedb_cache"
+	echo "# %%% MCEDB v$mcedb_revision - $mcedb_date" >> "$mcedb_cache"
+	sqlite3 "$mcedb_tmp" "select '# I,0x'||cpuid||',0x'||version||','||max(yyyymmdd) from Intel group by cpuid order by cpuid asc; select '# A,0x'||cpuid||',0x'||version||','||max(yyyymmdd) from AMD group by cpuid order by cpuid asc" | grep -v '^# .,0x00000000,' >> "$mcedb_cache"
+	echo OK "local version updated"
+
+	if [ "$1" = builtin ]; then
+		newfile=$(mktemp /tmp/smc-XXXXXX)
+		awk '/^# %%% MCEDB / { exit }; { print }' "$0" > "$newfile"
+		awk '{ if (NR>1) { print } }' "$mcedb_cache" >> "$newfile"
+		cat "$newfile" > "$0"
+		rm -f "$newfile"
+	fi
+}
+
+parse_opt_file()
+{
+	# parse_opt_file option_name option_value
+	option_name="$1"
+	option_value="$2"
+	if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then
+		show_header
+		show_usage
+		echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2
+		exit 1
+	elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
+		show_header
+		echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2
+		exit 1
+	elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then
+		show_header
+		echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2
+		exit 1
+	elif [ ! -r "$option_value" ]; then
+		show_header
+		echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	echo "$option_value"
+	exit 0
+}
+
+while [ -n "$1" ]; do
+	if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then
+		opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2"); ret=$?
+		[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
+		shift 2
+		opt_live=0
+	elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then
+		opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2"); ret=$?
+		[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
+		shift 2
+		opt_live=0
+	elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then
+		opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2"); ret=$?
+		[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
+		shift 2
+		opt_live=0
+	elif [ "$1" = "--arch-prefix" ]; then
+		opt_arch_prefix="$2"
+		shift 2
+	elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then
+		opt_live_explicit=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
+		opt_no_color=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--no-sysfs" ]; then
+		opt_no_sysfs=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--sysfs-only" ]; then
+		opt_sysfs_only=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--coreos" ]; then
+		opt_coreos=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--coreos-within-toolbox" ]; then
+		# don't use directly: used internally by --coreos
+		opt_coreos=0
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--paranoid" ]; then
+		opt_paranoid=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--hw-only" ]; then
+		opt_hw_only=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--no-hw" ]; then
+		opt_no_hw=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--no-explain" ]; then
+		# deprecated, kept for compatibility
+		opt_explain=0
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--update-mcedb" ]; then
+		update_mcedb
+		exit $?
+	elif [ "$1" = "--update-builtin-mcedb" ]; then
+		update_mcedb builtin
+		exit $?
+	elif [ "$1" = "--explain" ]; then
+		opt_explain=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--batch" ]; then
+		opt_batch=1
+		opt_verbose=0
+		opt_no_color=1
+		shift
+		case "$1" in
+			text|short|nrpe|json|prometheus) opt_batch_format="$1"; shift;;
+			--*) ;;    # allow subsequent flags
+			'') ;;     # allow nothing at all
+			*)
+				echo "$0: error: unknown batch format '$1'" >&2
+				echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, nrpe, json" >&2
+				exit 255
+				;;
+		esac
+	elif [ "$1" = "-v" ] || [ "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then
+		opt_verbose=$(( opt_verbose + 1 ))
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--cve" ]; then
+		if [ -z "$2" ]; then
+			echo "$0: error: option --cve expects a parameter, supported CVEs are: $supported_cve_list" >&2
+			exit 255
+		fi
+		selected_cve=$(echo "$supported_cve_list" | grep -iwo "$2")
+		if [ -n "$selected_cve" ]; then
+			opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list $selected_cve"
+			opt_cve_all=0
+		else
+			echo "$0: error: unsupported CVE specified ('$2'), supported CVEs are: $supported_cve_list" >&2
+			exit 255
+		fi
+		shift 2
+	elif [ "$1" = "--vmm" ]; then
+		if [ -z "$2" ]; then
+			echo "$0: error: option --vmm (auto, yes, no)" >&2
+			exit 255
+		fi
+		case "$2" in
+			auto) opt_vmm=-1;;
+			yes)  opt_vmm=1;;
+			no)   opt_vmm=0;;
+		esac
+		shift 2
+	elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then
+		if [ -z "$2" ]; then
+			echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2, 3, 3a, 4 or l1tf)" >&2
+			exit 255
+		fi
+		case "$2" in
+			1)    opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2017-5753"; opt_cve_all=0;;
+			2)    opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2017-5715"; opt_cve_all=0;;
+			3)    opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2017-5754"; opt_cve_all=0;;
+			3a)   opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-3640"; opt_cve_all=0;;
+			4)    opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-3639"; opt_cve_all=0;;
+			l1tf) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-3615 CVE-2018-3620 CVE-2018-3646"; opt_cve_all=0;;
+			*)
+				echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2, 3, 3a, 4 or l1tf" >&2;
+				exit 255
+				;;
+		esac
+		shift 2
+	elif [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
+		show_header
+		show_usage
+		exit 0
+	elif [ "$1" = "--version" ]; then
+		opt_no_color=1
+		show_header
+		exit 0
+	elif [ "$1" = "--disclaimer" ]; then
+		show_header
+		show_disclaimer
+		exit 0
+	else
+		show_header
+		show_usage
+		echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'"
+		exit 255
+	fi
+done
+
+show_header
+
+if [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
+	_warn "Incompatible options specified (--no-sysfs and --sysfs-only), aborting"
+	exit 255
+fi
+
+if [ "$opt_no_hw" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_hw_only" = 1 ]; then
+	_warn "Incompatible options specified (--no-hw and --hw-only), aborting"
+	exit 255
+fi
+
+# print status function
+pstatus()
+{
+	if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ]; then
+		_info_nol "$2"
+	else
+		case "$1" in
+			red)    col="\033[41m\033[30m";;
+			green)  col="\033[42m\033[30m";;
+			yellow) col="\033[43m\033[30m";;
+			blue)   col="\033[44m\033[30m";;
+			*)      col="";;
+		esac
+		_info_nol "$col $2 \033[0m"
+	fi
+	[ -n "$3" ] && _info_nol " ($3)"
+	_info
+	unset col
+}
+
+# Print the final status of a vulnerability (incl. batch mode)
+# Arguments are: CVE UNK/OK/VULN description
+pvulnstatus()
+{
+	pvulnstatus_last_cve="$1"
+	if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ]; then
+		case "$1" in
+			CVE-2017-5753) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 1";;
+			CVE-2017-5715) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 2";;
+			CVE-2017-5754) aka="MELTDOWN";;
+			CVE-2018-3640) aka="VARIANT 3A";;
+			CVE-2018-3639) aka="VARIANT 4";;
+			CVE-2018-3615/3620/3646) aka="L1TF";;
+		esac
+
+		case "$opt_batch_format" in
+			text) _echo 0 "$1: $2 ($3)";;
+			short) short_output="${short_output}$1 ";;
+			json)
+				case "$2" in
+					UNK)  is_vuln="null";;
+					VULN) is_vuln="true";;
+					OK)   is_vuln="false";;
+				esac
+				json_output="${json_output:-[}{\"NAME\":\"$aka\",\"CVE\":\"$1\",\"VULNERABLE\":$is_vuln,\"INFOS\":\"$3\"},"
+				;;
+
+			nrpe)	[ "$2" = VULN ] && nrpe_vuln="$nrpe_vuln $1";;
+			prometheus)
+				prometheus_output="${prometheus_output:+$prometheus_output\n}specex_vuln_status{name=\"$aka\",cve=\"$1\",status=\"$2\",info=\"$3\"} 1"
+				;;
+		esac
+	fi
+
+	# always fill global_* vars because we use that do decide the program exit code
+	case "$2" in
+		UNK)  global_unknown="1";;
+		VULN) global_critical="1";;
+	esac
+
+	# display info if we're not in quiet/batch mode
+	vulnstatus="$2"
+	shift 2
+	_info_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
+	case "$vulnstatus" in
+		UNK)  pstatus yellow 'UNKNOWN'        "$@"; final_summary="$final_summary \033[43m\033[30m$pvulnstatus_last_cve:??\033[0m";;
+		VULN) pstatus red    'VULNERABLE'     "$@"; final_summary="$final_summary \033[41m\033[30m$pvulnstatus_last_cve:KO\033[0m";;
+		OK)   pstatus green  'NOT VULNERABLE' "$@"; final_summary="$final_summary \033[42m\033[30m$pvulnstatus_last_cve:OK\033[0m";;
+	esac
+}
+
+
+# The 3 below functions are taken from the extract-linux script, available here:
+# https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/scripts/extract-vmlinux
+# The functions have been modified for better integration to this script
+# The original header of the file has been retained below
+
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+# extract-vmlinux - Extract uncompressed vmlinux from a kernel image
+#
+# Inspired from extract-ikconfig
+# (c) 2009,2010 Dick Streefland <dick@streefland.net>
+#
+# (c) 2011      Corentin Chary <corentin.chary@gmail.com>
+#
+# Licensed under the GNU General Public License, version 2 (GPLv2).
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+kernel=''
+kernel_err=''
+check_kernel()
+{
+	_file="$1"
+	_desperate_mode="$2"
+	# checking the return code of readelf -h is not enough, we could get
+	# a damaged ELF file and validate it, check for stderr warnings too
+	_readelf_warnings=$("${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" -S "$_file" 2>&1 >/dev/null | tr "\n" "/"); ret=$?
+	_readelf_sections=$("${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" -S "$_file" 2>/dev/null | grep -c -e data -e text -e init)
+	_kernel_size=$(stat -c %s "$_file" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %z "$_file" 2>/dev/null || echo 10000)
+	_debug "check_kernel: ret=$? size=$_kernel_size sections=$_readelf_sections warnings=$_readelf_warnings"
+	if [ -n "$_desperate_mode" ]; then
+		if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$_file" | grep -Eq '^Linux version '; then
+			_debug "check_kernel (desperate): ... matched!"
+			return 0
+		else
+			_debug "check_kernel (desperate): ... invalid"
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ] && [ -z "$_readelf_warnings" ] && [ "$_readelf_sections" -gt 0 ]; then
+			if [ "$_kernel_size" -ge 100000 ]; then
+				_debug "check_kernel: ... file is valid"
+				return 0
+			else
+				_debug "check_kernel: ... file seems valid but is too small, ignoring"
+			fi
+		else
+			_debug "check_kernel: ... file is invalid"
+		fi
+	fi
+	return 1
+}
+
+try_decompress()
+{
+	# The obscure use of the "tr" filter is to work around older versions of
+	# "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern.
+
+	# Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here
+	_debug "try_decompress: looking for $3 magic in $6"
+	for     pos in $(tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$6" | grep -abo "^$2")
+	do
+		_debug "try_decompress: magic for $3 found at offset $pos"
+		if ! which "$3" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			kernel_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$5' package"
+			return 0
+		fi
+		pos=${pos%%:*}
+		# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+		tail -c+$pos "$6" 2>/dev/null | $3 $4 > "$kerneltmp" 2>/dev/null; ret=$?
+		if [ ! -s "$kerneltmp" ]; then
+			# don't rely on $ret, sometimes it's != 0 but worked
+			# (e.g. gunzip ret=2 just means there was trailing garbage)
+			_debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 failed (err=$ret)"
+		elif check_kernel "$kerneltmp" "$7"; then
+			kernel="$kerneltmp"
+			_debug "try_decompress: decompressed with $3 successfully!"
+			return 0
+		elif [ "$3" != "cat" ]; then
+			_debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 worked but result is not a kernel, trying with an offset"
+			[ -z "$kerneltmp2" ] && kerneltmp2=$(mktemp /tmp/kernel-XXXXXX)
+			cat "$kerneltmp" > "$kerneltmp2"
+			try_decompress '\177ELF' xxy 'cat' '' cat "$kerneltmp2" && return 0
+		else
+			_debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 worked but result is not a kernel"
+		fi
+	done
+	return 1
+}
+
+extract_kernel()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] || return 1
+	# Prepare temp files:
+	kerneltmp="$(mktemp /tmp/kernel-XXXXXX)"
+
+	# Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects:
+	if check_kernel "$1"; then
+		cat "$1" > "$kerneltmp"
+		kernel=$kerneltmp
+		return 0
+	fi
+
+	# That didn't work, so retry after decompression.
+	for mode in '' 'desperate'; do
+		try_decompress '\037\213\010'     xy    gunzip  ''      gunzip      "$1" "$mode" && return 0
+		try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000'     abcde unxz    ''      xz-utils    "$1" "$mode" && return 0
+		try_decompress 'BZh'              xy    bunzip2 ''      bzip2       "$1" "$mode" && return 0
+		try_decompress '\135\0\0\0'       xxx   unlzma  ''      xz-utils    "$1" "$mode" && return 0
+		try_decompress '\211\114\132'     xy    'lzop'  '-d'    lzop        "$1" "$mode" && return 0
+		try_decompress '\002\041\114\030' xyy   'lz4'   '-d -l' liblz4-tool "$1" "$mode" && return 0
+		try_decompress '\177ELF'          xxy   'cat'   ''      cat         "$1" "$mode" && return 0
+	done
+	_verbose "Couldn't extract the kernel image, accuracy might be reduced"
+	return 1
+}
+
+# end of extract-vmlinux functions
+
+mount_debugfs()
+{
+	if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
+		# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
+		mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
+	fi
+}
+
+load_msr()
+{
+	if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
+		if ! grep -e msr "$procfs/modules" 2>/dev/null; then
+			modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
+			_debug "attempted to load module msr, insmod_msr=$insmod_msr"
+		else
+			_debug "msr module already loaded"
+		fi	
+	else
+		if ! kldstat -q -m cpuctl; then
+			kldload cpuctl 2>/dev/null && kldload_cpuctl=1
+			_debug "attempted to load module cpuctl, kldload_cpuctl=$kldload_cpuctl"
+		else
+			_debug "cpuctl module already loaded"
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+load_cpuid()
+{
+	if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
+		if ! grep -e cpuid "$procfs/modules" 2>/dev/null; then
+			modprobe cpuid 2>/dev/null && insmod_cpuid=1
+			_debug "attempted to load module cpuid, insmod_cpuid=$insmod_cpuid"
+		else
+			_debug "cpuid module already loaded"
+		fi	
+	else
+		if ! kldstat -q -m cpuctl; then
+			kldload cpuctl 2>/dev/null && kldload_cpuctl=1
+			_debug "attempted to load module cpuctl, kldload_cpuctl=$kldload_cpuctl"
+		else
+			_debug "cpuctl module already loaded"
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+EAX=1; EBX=2; ECX=3; EDX=4;
+read_cpuid()
+{
+	# leaf is the value of the eax register when calling the cpuid instruction:
+	_leaf="$1"
+	# eax=1 ebx=2 ecx=3 edx=4:
+	_register="$2"
+	# number of bits to shift the register right to:
+	_shift="$3"
+	# mask to apply as an AND operand to the shifted register value
+	_mask="$4"
+	# wanted value (optional), if present we return 0(true) if the obtained value is equal, 1 otherwise:
+	_wanted="$5"
+	# in any case, the read value is globally available in $read_cpuid_value
+
+	read_cpuid_value=''
+	if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+		# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
+		load_cpuid
+	fi
+
+	if [ -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then
+		# Linux
+		if [ ! -r /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then
+			return 2
+		fi
+		# on some kernel versions, /dev/cpu/0/cpuid doesn't imply that the cpuid module is loaded, in that case dd returns an error
+		dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 count=1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || load_cpuid
+		# we need _leaf to be converted to decimal for dd
+		_leaf=$(( _leaf ))
+		# to avoid using iflag=skip_bytes, which doesn't exist on old versions of dd, seek to the closer multiple-of-16
+		_ddskip=$(( _leaf / 16 ))
+		_odskip=$(( _leaf - _ddskip * 16 ))
+		# now read the value
+		_cpuid=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip=$_ddskip count=$((_odskip + 1)) 2>/dev/null | od -j $((_odskip * 16)) -A n -t u4)
+	elif [ -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+		# BSD
+		if [ ! -r /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+			return 2
+		fi
+		_cpuid=$(cpucontrol -i "$_leaf" /dev/cpuctl0 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4,$5,$6,$7}')
+		# cpuid level 0x1: 0x000306d4 0x00100800 0x4dfaebbf 0xbfebfbff
+	else
+		return 2
+	fi
+
+	_debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf on cpu0, eax-ebx-ecx-edx: $_cpuid"
+	[ -z "$_cpuid" ] && return 2
+	# get the value of the register we want
+	_reg=$(echo "$_cpuid" | awk '{print $'"$_register"'}')
+	# Linux returns it as decimal, BSD as hex, normalize to decimal
+	_reg=$(( _reg ))
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2046
+	_debug "cpuid: wanted register ($_register) has value $_reg aka "$(printf "%08x" "$_reg")
+	_reg_shifted=$(( _reg >> _shift ))
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2046
+	_debug "cpuid: shifted value by $_shift is $_reg_shifted aka "$(printf "%x" "$_reg_shifted")
+	read_cpuid_value=$(( _reg_shifted & _mask ))
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2046
+	_debug "cpuid: after AND $_mask, final value is $read_cpuid_value aka "$(printf "%x" "$read_cpuid_value")
+	if [ -n "$_wanted" ]; then
+		_debug "cpuid: wanted $_wanted and got $read_cpuid_value"
+		if [ "$read_cpuid_value" = "$_wanted" ]; then
+			return 0
+		else
+			return 1
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	return 0
+}
+
+dmesg_grep()
+{
+	# grep for something in dmesg, ensuring that the dmesg buffer
+	# has not been truncated
+	dmesg_grepped=''
+	if ! dmesg | grep -qE -e '(^|\] )Linux version [0-9]' -e '^FreeBSD is a registered' ; then
+		# dmesg truncated
+		return 2
+	fi
+	dmesg_grepped=$(dmesg | grep -E "$1" | head -1)
+	# not found:
+	[ -z "$dmesg_grepped" ] && return 1
+	# found, output is in $dmesg_grepped
+	return 0
+}
+
+is_coreos()
+{
+	which coreos-install >/dev/null 2>&1 && which toolbox >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+parse_cpu_details()
+{
+	[ "$parse_cpu_details_done" = 1 ] && return 0
+
+	if [ -e "$procfs/cpuinfo" ]; then
+		cpu_vendor=$(  grep '^vendor_id'  "$procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $3}' | head -1)
+		cpu_friendly_name=$(grep '^model name' "$procfs/cpuinfo" | cut -d: -f2- | head -1 | sed -e 's/^ *//')
+		# special case for ARM follows
+		if grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x41' "$procfs/cpuinfo"; then
+			cpu_vendor='ARM'
+			# some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers,
+			# an example is "bigLITTLE", so we need to store the whole list, this is needed for is_cpu_vulnerable
+			cpu_part_list=$(awk '/CPU part/         {print $4}' "$procfs/cpuinfo")
+			cpu_arch_list=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3}' "$procfs/cpuinfo")
+			# take the first one to fill the friendly name, do NOT quote the vars below
+			# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+			cpu_arch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $1 }')
+			# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+			cpu_part=$(echo $cpu_part_list | awk '{ print $1 }')
+			[ "$cpu_arch" = "AArch64" ] && cpu_arch=8
+			cpu_friendly_name="ARM"
+			[ -n "$cpu_arch" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name v$cpu_arch"
+			[ -n "$cpu_part" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name model $cpu_part"
+
+		elif grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x43' "$procfs/cpuinfo"; then
+			cpu_vendor='CAVIUM'
+		fi
+
+		cpu_family=$(  grep '^cpu family' "$procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $4}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
+		cpu_model=$(   grep '^model'      "$procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
+		cpu_stepping=$(grep '^stepping'   "$procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
+		cpu_ucode=$(   grep '^microcode'  "$procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $3}' | head -1)
+	else
+		cpu_friendly_name=$(sysctl -n hw.model)
+	fi
+
+	# get raw cpuid, it's always useful (referenced in the Intel doc for firmware updates for example)
+	if read_cpuid 0x1 $EAX 0 0xFFFFFFFF; then
+		cpu_cpuid="$read_cpuid_value"
+	else
+		cpu_cpuid=0
+	fi
+
+	# under BSD, linprocfs often doesn't export ucode information, so fetch it ourselves the good old way
+	if [ -z "$cpu_ucode" ] && [ "$os" != Linux ]; then
+		load_cpuid
+		if [ -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+			# init MSR with NULLs
+			cpucontrol -m 0x8b=0 /dev/cpuctl0
+			# call CPUID
+			cpucontrol -i 1 /dev/cpuctl0 >/dev/null
+			# read MSR
+			cpu_ucode=$(cpucontrol -m 0x8b /dev/cpuctl0 | awk '{print $3}')
+			# convert to decimal
+			cpu_ucode=$(( cpu_ucode ))
+			# convert back to hex
+			cpu_ucode=$(printf "0x%x" "$cpu_ucode")
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	# if we got no cpu_ucode (e.g. we're in a vm), fall back to 0x0
+	[ -z "$cpu_ucode" ] && cpu_ucode=0x0
+
+	echo "$cpu_ucode" | grep -q ^0x && cpu_ucode=$(( cpu_ucode ))
+	ucode_found=$(printf "model 0x%x family 0x%x stepping 0x%x ucode 0x%x cpuid 0x%x" "$cpu_model" "$cpu_family" "$cpu_stepping" "$cpu_ucode" "$cpu_cpuid")
+
+	# also define those that we will need in other funcs
+	# taken from ttps://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+	{
+	INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH=$(( 0x0E ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM=$(( 0x0F ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L=$(( 0x16 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN=$(( 0x17 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_DUNNINGTON=$(( 0x1D ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM=$(( 0x1E ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G=$(( 0x1F ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP=$(( 0x1A ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX=$(( 0x2E ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE=$(( 0x25 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP=$(( 0x2C ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX=$(( 0x2F ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE=$(( 0x2A ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x2D ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE=$(( 0x3A ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x3E ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE=$(( 0x3C ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X=$(( 0x3F ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT=$(( 0x45 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E=$(( 0x46 ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE=$(( 0x3D ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E=$(( 0x47 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X=$(( 0x4F ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D=$(( 0x56 ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE=$(( 0x4E ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP=$(( 0x5E ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X=$(( 0x55 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE=$(( 0x8E ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP=$(( 0x9E ))
+
+	# /* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW=$(( 0x1C ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT=$(( 0x26 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL=$(( 0x27 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW=$(( 0x35 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW=$(( 0x36 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1=$(( 0x37 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2=$(( 0x4D ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT=$(( 0x4C ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD=$(( 0x4A ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD=$(( 0x5A ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT=$(( 0x5C ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON=$(( 0x5F ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE=$(( 0x7A ))
+
+	# /* Xeon Phi */
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL=$(( 0x57 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM=$(( 0x85 ))
+	}
+	parse_cpu_details_done=1
+}
+
+is_amd()
+{
+	[ "$cpu_vendor" = AuthenticAMD ] && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+is_intel()
+{
+	[ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ] && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+is_cpu_smt_enabled()
+{
+	# SMT / HyperThreading is enabled if siblings != cpucores
+	if [ -e "$procfs/cpuinfo" ]; then
+		_siblings=$(awk '/^siblings/  {print $3;exit}' "$procfs/cpuinfo")
+		_cpucores=$(awk '/^cpu cores/ {print $4;exit}' "$procfs/cpuinfo")
+		if [ -n "$_siblings" ] && [ -n "$_cpucores" ]; then
+			if [ "$_siblings" = "$_cpucores" ]; then
+				return 1
+			else
+				return 0
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+	# we can't tell
+	return 2
+}
+
+is_ucode_blacklisted()
+{
+	parse_cpu_details
+	# if it's not an Intel, don't bother: it's not blacklisted
+	is_intel || return 1
+	# it also needs to be family=6
+	[ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1
+	# now, check each known bad microcode
+	# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c#n105
+	# 2018-02-08 update: https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/02/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
+	# model,stepping,microcode
+	for tuple in \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x0B,0x80 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x0A,0x80 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x09,0x80 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,0x0A,0x80  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,0x09,0x80  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x03,0x0100013e  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x02000036  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003a  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003c  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE,0x04,0x28   \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E,0x01,0x1b   \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,0x02,0x14 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,0x03,0x07000011 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000023 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000025 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT,0x01,0x21      \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E,0x01,0x18     \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE,0x03,0x23     \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x02,0x3b        \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x04,0x10        \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X,0x04,0x42a     \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x06,0x61b   \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x07,0x712
+	do
+		model=$(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f1)
+		stepping=$(( $(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f2) ))
+		if [ "$cpu_model" = "$model" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" = "$stepping" ]; then
+			ucode=$(( $(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f3) ))
+			if [ "$cpu_ucode" = "$ucode" ]; then
+				_debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: we have a match! ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)"
+				return 0
+			fi
+		fi
+	done
+	_debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: no ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)"
+	return 1
+}
+
+is_skylake_cpu()
+{
+	# is this a skylake cpu?
+	# return 0 if yes, 1 otherwise
+	#if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+	#		boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
+	#		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+	#		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
+	#		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+	#		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
+	#		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
+	#		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+	#			return true;
+	parse_cpu_details
+	is_intel || return 1
+	[ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1
+	if [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE        ] || \
+		[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP  ] || \
+		[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X        ] || \
+		[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE  ] || \
+		[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP ]; then
+		return 0
+	fi
+	return 1
+}
+
+is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb()
+{
+	if is_intel && [ -z "$capabilities_rsba" ]; then
+		_warn "is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb() called before ARCH CAPABILITIES MSR was read"
+	fi
+	if is_skylake_cpu || [ "$capabilities_rsba" = 1 ]; then
+		return 0
+	fi
+	return 1
+}
+
+is_zen_cpu()
+{
+	# is this CPU from the AMD ZEN family ? (ryzen, epyc, ...)
+	parse_cpu_details
+	is_amd || return 1
+	[ "$cpu_family" = 23 ] && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+if [ -r "$mcedb_cache" ]; then
+	mcedb_source="$mcedb_cache"
+	mcedb_info="local MCExtractor DB "$(grep -E '^# %%% MCEDB ' "$mcedb_source" | cut -c13-)
+else
+	mcedb_source="$0"
+	mcedb_info="builtin MCExtractor DB "$(grep -E '^# %%% MCEDB ' "$mcedb_source" | cut -c13-)
+fi
+read_mcedb()
+{
+	awk '{ if (DELIM==1) { print $2 } } /^# %%% MCEDB / { DELIM=1 }' "$mcedb_source"
+}
+
+is_latest_known_ucode()
+{
+	# 0: yes, 1: no, 2: unknown
+	parse_cpu_details
+	if [ "$cpu_cpuid" = 0 ]; then
+		ucode_latest="couldn't get your cpuid"
+		return 2
+	fi
+	ucode_latest="latest microcode version for your CPU model is unknown"
+	if is_intel; then
+		cpu_brand_prefix=I
+	elif is_amd; then
+		cpu_brand_prefix=A
+	else
+		return 2
+	fi
+	for tuple in $(read_mcedb | grep "$(printf "^$cpu_brand_prefix,0x%08X," "$cpu_cpuid")")
+	do
+		ucode=$((  $(echo "$tuple" | cut -d, -f3) ))
+		ucode_date=$(echo "$tuple" | cut -d, -f4 | sed -r 's=(....)(..)(..)=\1/\2/\3=')
+		_debug "is_latest_known_ucode: with cpuid $cpu_cpuid has ucode $cpu_ucode, last known is $ucode from $ucode_date"
+		ucode_latest=$(printf "latest version is 0x%x dated $ucode_date according to $mcedb_info" "$ucode")
+		if [ "$cpu_ucode" -ge "$ucode" ]; then
+			return 0
+		else
+			return 1
+		fi
+	done
+	_debug "is_latest_known_ucode: this cpuid is not referenced ($cpu_cpuid)"
+	return 2
+}
+
+# ENTRYPOINT
+
+# we can't do anything useful under WSL
+if uname -a | grep -qE -- '-Microsoft #[0-9]+-Microsoft '; then
+	_warn "This script doesn't work under Windows Subsystem for Linux"
+	_warn "You should use the official Microsoft tool instead."
+	_warn "It can be found under https://aka.ms/SpeculationControlPS"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# check for mode selection inconsistency
+if [ "$opt_live_explicit" = 1 ]; then
+	if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ] || [ -n "$opt_config" ] || [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+		show_usage
+		echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, use either --live or --kernel/--config/--map" >&2
+		exit 255
+	fi
+fi
+if [ "$opt_hw_only" = 1 ]; then
+	if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 0 ]; then
+		show_usage
+		echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, --hw-only vs --variant" >&2
+		exit 255
+	else
+		opt_cve_all=0
+		opt_cve_list=''
+	fi
+fi
+
+# coreos mode
+if [ "$opt_coreos" = 1 ]; then
+	if ! is_coreos; then
+		_warn "CoreOS mode asked, but we're not under CoreOS!"
+		exit 255
+	fi
+	_warn "CoreOS mode, starting an ephemeral toolbox to launch the script"
+	load_msr
+	load_cpuid
+	mount_debugfs
+	toolbox --ephemeral --bind-ro /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu -- sh -c "dnf install -y binutils which && /media/root$PWD/$0 $* --coreos-within-toolbox"
+	exitcode=$?
+	exit $exitcode
+else
+	if is_coreos; then
+		_warn "You seem to be running CoreOS, you might want to use the --coreos option for better results"
+		_warn
+	fi
+fi
+
+# if we're under a BSD, try to mount linprocfs for "$procfs/cpuinfo"
+procfs=/proc
+if echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
+	_debug "We're under BSD, check if we have procfs"
+	procfs=$(mount | awk '/^linprocfs/ { print $3; exit; }')
+	if [ -z "$procfs" ]; then
+		_debug "we don't, try to mount it"
+		procfs=/proc
+		[ -d /compat/linux/proc ] && procfs=/compat/linux/proc
+		test -d $procfs || mkdir $procfs
+		if mount -t linprocfs linprocfs $procfs 2>/dev/null; then
+			mounted_procfs=1
+			_debug "procfs just mounted at $procfs"
+		else
+			procfs=''
+		fi
+	else
+		_debug "We do: $procfs"
+	fi
+fi
+
+parse_cpu_details
+if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+	# root check (only for live mode, for offline mode, we already checked if we could read the files)
+	if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
+		_warn "Note that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information."
+		_warn "We'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors."
+		_warn "To run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0"
+		_warn
+	fi
+	_info "Checking for vulnerabilities on current system"
+	_info "Kernel is \033[35m$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)\033[0m"
+	_info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m"
+
+	# try to find the image of the current running kernel
+	# first, look for the BOOT_IMAGE hint in the kernel cmdline
+	if [ -r "$procfs/cmdline" ] && grep -q 'BOOT_IMAGE=' "$procfs/cmdline"; then
+		opt_kernel=$(grep -Eo 'BOOT_IMAGE=[^ ]+' "$procfs/cmdline" | cut -d= -f2)
+		_debug "found opt_kernel=$opt_kernel in $procfs/cmdline"
+		# if the boot partition is within a btrfs subvolume, strip the subvolume name
+		# if /boot is a separate subvolume, the remainder of the code in this section should handle it
+		if echo "$opt_kernel" | grep -q "^/@"; then opt_kernel=$(echo "$opt_kernel" | sed "s:/@[^/]*::"); fi
+		# if we have a dedicated /boot partition, our bootloader might have just called it /
+		# so try to prepend /boot and see if we find anything
+		[ -e "/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$opt_kernel"
+		# special case for CoreOS if we're inside the toolbox
+		[ -e "/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel"
+		_debug "opt_kernel is now $opt_kernel"
+		# else, the full path is already there (most probably /boot/something)
+	fi
+	# if we didn't find a kernel, default to guessing
+	if [ ! -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
+		# Fedora:
+		[ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz" ] && opt_kernel="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz"
+		# Slackare:
+		[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz"             ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz"
+		# Arch:
+		[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux"       ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux"
+		# Arch aarch64:
+		[ -e "/boot/Image"               ] && opt_kernel="/boot/Image"
+		# Arch armv5/armv7:
+		[ -e "/boot/zImage"              ] && opt_kernel="/boot/zImage"
+		# Arch arm7:
+		[ -e "/boot/kernel7.img"         ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel7.img"
+		# Linux-Libre:
+		[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre"
+		# pine64
+		[ -e "/boot/pine64/Image"        ] && opt_kernel="/boot/pine64/Image"
+		# generic:
+		[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)"
+		[ -e "/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)"
+		[ -e "/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)"
+		# Gentoo:
+		[ -e "/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)"
+		# NixOS:
+		[ -e "/run/booted-system/kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/run/booted-system/kernel"
+		# systemd kernel-install:
+		[ -e "/etc/machine-id" ] && [ -e "/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux"
+		# Clear Linux:
+		str_uname=$(uname -r)
+		clear_linux_kernel="/lib/kernel/org.clearlinux.${str_uname##*.}.${str_uname%.*}"
+		[ -e "$clear_linux_kernel" ] && opt_kernel=$clear_linux_kernel
+	fi
+
+	# system.map
+	if [ -e "$procfs/kallsyms" ] ; then
+		opt_map="$procfs/kallsyms"
+	elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map" ] ; then
+		opt_map="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map"
+	elif [ -e "/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)" ] ; then
+		opt_map="/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)"
+	elif [ -e "/lib/kernel/System.map-$(uname -r)" ]; then
+		opt_map="/lib/kernel/System.map-$(uname -r)"
+	fi
+
+	# config
+	if [ -e "$procfs/config.gz" ] ; then
+		dumped_config="$(mktemp /tmp/config-XXXXXX)"
+		gunzip -c "$procfs/config.gz" > "$dumped_config"
+		# dumped_config will be deleted at the end of the script
+		opt_config="$dumped_config"
+	elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config" ]; then
+		opt_config="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config"
+	elif [ -e "/boot/config-$(uname -r)" ]; then
+		opt_config="/boot/config-$(uname -r)"
+	elif [ -e "/etc/kernels/kernel-config-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)" ]; then
+		opt_config="/etc/kernels/kernel-config-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)"
+	elif [ -e "/lib/kernel/config-$(uname -r)" ]; then
+		opt_config="/lib/kernel/config-$(uname -r)"
+	fi
+else
+	_info "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel"
+	_info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m"
+fi
+
+if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then
+	_verbose "Will use kernel image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m"
+else
+	_verbose "Will use no kernel image (accuracy might be reduced)"
+	bad_accuracy=1
+fi
+
+if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
+	if [ -n "$opt_config" ] && ! grep -q '^CONFIG_' "$opt_config"; then
+		# given file is invalid!
+		_warn "The kernel config file seems invalid, was expecting a plain-text file, ignoring it!"
+		opt_config=''
+	fi
+
+	if [ -n "$dumped_config" ] && [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
+		_verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m$procfs/config.gz (decompressed)\033[0m"
+	elif [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
+		_verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m"
+	else
+		_verbose "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)"
+		bad_accuracy=1
+	fi
+
+	if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+		_verbose "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m"
+	else
+		_verbose "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)"
+		bad_accuracy=1
+	fi
+
+	if [ "$bad_accuracy" = 1 ]; then
+		_warn "We're missing some kernel info (see -v), accuracy might be reduced"
+	fi
+fi
+
+if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
+	if ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		_debug "readelf not found"
+		kernel_err="missing '${opt_arch_prefix}readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package"
+	elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_hw_only" = 1 ]; then
+		kernel_err='kernel image decompression skipped'
+	else
+		extract_kernel "$opt_kernel"
+	fi
+else
+	_debug "no opt_kernel defined"
+	kernel_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal"
+fi
+if [ -z "$kernel" ] || [ ! -r "$kernel" ]; then
+	[ -z "$kernel_err" ] && kernel_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel"
+else
+	# vanilla kernels have with ^Linux version
+	# also try harder with some kernels (such as Red Hat) that don't have ^Linux version before their version string
+	# and check for FreeBSD
+	kernel_version=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -E \
+		-e '^Linux version ' \
+		-e '^[[:alnum:]][^[:space:]]+ \([^[:space:]]+\) #[0-9]+ .+ (19|20)[0-9][0-9]$' \
+		-e '^FreeBSD [0-9]' | head -1)
+	if [ -z "$kernel_version" ]; then
+		# try even harder with some kernels (such as ARM) that split the release (uname -r) and version (uname -v) in 2 adjacent strings
+		kernel_version=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -E -B1 '^#[0-9]+ .+ (19|20)[0-9][0-9]$' | tr "\n" " ")
+	fi
+	if [ -n "$kernel_version" ]; then
+		# in live mode, check if the img we found is the correct one
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			_verbose "Kernel image is \033[35m$kernel_version"
+			if ! echo "$kernel_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -r)"; then
+				_warn "Possible disrepancy between your running kernel '$(uname -r)' and the image '$kernel_version' we found ($opt_kernel), results might be incorrect"
+			fi
+		else
+			_info "Kernel image is \033[35m$kernel_version"
+		fi
+	else
+		_verbose "Kernel image version is unknown"
+	fi
+fi
+
+_info
+
+# end of header stuff
+
+# now we define some util functions and the check_*() funcs, as
+# the user can choose to execute only some of those
+
+sys_interface_check()
+{
+	file="$1"
+	regex="$2"
+	mode="$3"
+	[ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 ] && [ -r "$file" ] || return 1
+	[ -n "$regex" ] || regex='.*'
+	msg=$(grep -Eo "$regex" "$file")
+	if [ "$mode" = silent ]; then
+		_info "* Information from the /sys interface: $msg"
+		return 0
+	fi
+	_info_nol "* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: "
+	if echo "$msg" | grep -qi '^not affected'; then
+		# Not affected
+		status=OK
+		pstatus green YES "$msg"
+	elif echo "$msg" | grep -qi '^mitigation'; then
+		# Mitigation: PTI
+		status=OK
+		pstatus green YES "$msg"
+	elif echo "$msg" | grep -qi '^vulnerable'; then
+		# Vulnerable
+		status=VULN
+		pstatus yellow NO "$msg"
+	else
+		status=UNK
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$msg"
+	fi
+	_debug "sys_interface_check: $file=$msg (re=$regex)"
+	return 0
+}
+
+number_of_cpus()
+{
+	if echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
+		n=$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu 2>/dev/null || echo 1)
+	elif [ -e "$procfs/cpuinfo" ]; then
+		n=$(grep -c ^processor "$procfs/cpuinfo" 2>/dev/null || echo 1)
+	else
+		# if we don't know, default to 1 CPU
+		n=1
+	fi
+	return "$n"
+}
+
+# $1 - msr number
+# $2 - cpu index
+write_msr()
+{
+	# _msr must be in hex, in the form 0x1234:
+	_msr="$1"
+	# cpu index, starting from 0:
+	_cpu="$2"
+	if [ "$os" != Linux ]; then
+		cpucontrol -m "$_msr=0" "/dev/cpuctl$_cpu" >/dev/null 2>&1; ret=$?
+	else
+		# for Linux
+		# convert to decimal
+		_msr=$(( _msr ))
+		if [ ! -w /dev/cpu/"$_cpu"/msr ]; then
+			ret=200 # permission error
+		# if wrmsr is available, use it
+		elif which wrmsr >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ "$SMC_NO_WRMSR" != 1 ]; then
+			_debug "write_msr: using wrmsr"
+			wrmsr $_msr 0 2>/dev/null; ret=$?
+		# or if we have perl, use it, any 5.x version will work
+		elif which perl >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ "$SMC_NO_PERL" != 1 ]; then
+			_debug "write_msr: using perl"
+			ret=1
+			perl -e "open(M,'>','/dev/cpu/$_cpu/msr') and seek(M,$_msr,0) and exit(syswrite(M,pack('H16',0)))"; [ $? -eq 8 ] && ret=0
+		# fallback to dd if it supports seek_bytes
+		elif dd if=/dev/null of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 seek="$_msr" oflag=seek_bytes 2>/dev/null; then
+			_debug "write_msr: using dd"
+			dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/cpu/"$_cpu"/msr bs=8 count=1 seek="$_msr" oflag=seek_bytes 2>/dev/null; ret=$?
+		else
+			_debug "write_msr: got no wrmsr, perl or recent enough dd!"
+			return 201 # missing tool error
+		fi
+	fi
+	# normalize ret
+	[ "$ret" != 0 ] && ret=1
+	_debug "write_msr: for cpu $_cpu on msr $_msr, ret=$ret"
+	return $ret
+}
+
+read_msr()
+{
+	# _msr must be in hex, in the form 0x1234:
+	_msr="$1"
+	# cpu index, starting from 0:
+	_cpu="$2"
+	read_msr_value=''
+	if [ "$os" != Linux ]; then
+		_msr=$(cpucontrol -m "$_msr" "/dev/cpuctl$_cpu" 2>/dev/null); ret=$?
+		[ $ret -ne 0 ] && return 1
+		# MSR 0x10: 0x000003e1 0xb106dded
+		_msr_h=$(echo "$_msr" | awk '{print $3}');
+		_msr_h="$(( _msr_h >> 24 & 0xFF )) $(( _msr_h >> 16 & 0xFF )) $(( _msr_h >> 8 & 0xFF )) $(( _msr_h & 0xFF ))"
+		_msr_l=$(echo "$_msr" | awk '{print $4}');
+		_msr_l="$(( _msr_l >> 24 & 0xFF )) $(( _msr_l >> 16 & 0xFF )) $(( _msr_l >> 8 & 0xFF )) $(( _msr_l & 0xFF ))"
+		read_msr_value="$_msr_h $_msr_l"
+	else
+		# for Linux
+		# convert to decimal
+		_msr=$(( _msr ))
+		if [ ! -r /dev/cpu/"$_cpu"/msr ]; then
+			return 200 # permission error
+		# if rdmsr is available, use it
+		elif which rdmsr >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ "$SMC_NO_RDMSR" != 1 ]; then
+			_debug "read_msr: using rdmsr"
+			read_msr_value=$(rdmsr -r $_msr 2>/dev/null | od -t u8 -A n)
+		# or if we have perl, use it, any 5.x version will work
+		elif which perl >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ "$SMC_NO_PERL" != 1 ]; then
+			_debug "read_msr: using perl"
+			read_msr_value=$(perl -e "open(M,'<','/dev/cpu/$_cpu/msr') and seek(M,$_msr,0) and read(M,\$_,8) and print" | od -t u8 -A n)
+		# fallback to dd if it supports skip_bytes
+		elif dd if=/dev/null of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip="$_msr" iflag=skip_bytes 2>/dev/null; then
+			_debug "read_msr: using dd"
+			read_msr_value=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/"$_cpu"/msr bs=8 count=1 skip="$_msr" iflag=skip_bytes 2>/dev/null | od -t u8 -A n)
+		else
+			_debug "read_msr: got no rdmsr, perl or recent enough dd!"
+			return 201 # missing tool error
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$read_msr_value" ]; then
+			# MSR doesn't exist, don't check for $? because some versions of dd still return 0!
+			return 1
+		fi
+	fi
+	_debug "read_msr: MSR=$1 value is $read_msr_value"
+	return 0
+}
+
+check_cpu()
+{
+	_info "\033[1;34mHardware check\033[0m"
+
+	if ! uname -m | grep -qwE 'x86_64|i[3-6]86|amd64'; then
+		return
+	fi
+
+	_info     "* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques"
+	_info     "  * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)"
+	_info_nol "    * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: "
+	number_of_cpus
+	ncpus=$?
+	idx_max_cpu=$((ncpus-1))
+	if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+		# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
+		load_msr
+	fi
+	if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+		spec_ctrl_msr=-1
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is msr kernel module available?"
+	else
+		# the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
+		# we check if we have it for all cpus
+		val=0
+		cpu_mismatch=0
+		for i in $(seq 0 "$idx_max_cpu")
+		do
+			read_msr 0x48 "$i"; ret=$?
+			if [ "$i" -eq 0 ]; then
+				val=$ret
+			else
+				if [ "$ret" -eq $val ]; then
+					continue
+				else
+					cpu_mismatch=1
+				fi
+			fi
+		done
+		if [ $val -eq 0 ]; then
+			if [ $cpu_mismatch -eq 0 ]; then
+				spec_ctrl_msr=1
+				pstatus green YES
+			else
+				spec_ctrl_msr=1
+				pstatus green YES "But not in all CPUs"
+			fi
+		elif [ $val -eq 200 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is msr kernel module available?"
+			spec_ctrl_msr=-1
+		elif [ $val -eq 201 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing tool, install either msr-tools or perl"
+			spec_ctrl_msr=-1
+		else
+			spec_ctrl_msr=0
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "    * CPU indicates IBRS capability: "
+	# from kernel src: { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL,        CPUID_EDX,26, 0x00000007, 0 },
+	# amd: https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf
+	# amd: 8000_0008 EBX[14]=1
+	if is_intel; then
+		read_cpuid 0x7 $EDX 26 1 1; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit"
+			cpuid_spec_ctrl=1
+			cpuid_ibrs='SPEC_CTRL'
+		fi
+	elif is_amd; then
+		read_cpuid 0x80000008 $EBX 14 1 1; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES "IBRS_SUPPORT feature bit"
+			cpuid_ibrs='IBRS_SUPPORT'
+		fi
+	else
+		ret=-1
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown CPU"
+	fi
+	if [ $ret -eq 1 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is cpuid kernel module available?"
+		cpuid_spec_ctrl=-1
+	fi
+
+	if is_amd; then
+		_info_nol "    * CPU indicates preferring IBRS always-on: "
+		# amd
+		read_cpuid 0x80000008 $EBX 16 1 1; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "    * CPU indicates preferring IBRS over retpoline: "
+		# amd
+		read_cpuid 0x80000008 $EBX 18 1 1; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	# IBPB
+	_info     "  * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)"
+	_info_nol "    * PRED_CMD MSR is available: "
+	if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is msr kernel module available?"
+	elif [ ! -r /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -w /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "are you root?"
+	else
+		# the new MSR 'PRED_CTRL' is at offset 0x49, write-only
+		# we test if of all cpus
+		val=0
+		cpu_mismatch=0
+		for i in $(seq 0 "$idx_max_cpu")
+		do
+			write_msr 0x49 "$i"; ret=$?
+			if [ "$i" -eq 0 ]; then
+				val=$ret
+			else
+				if [ "$ret" -eq $val ]; then
+					continue
+				else
+					cpu_mismatch=1
+				fi
+			fi
+		done
+
+		if [ $val -eq 0 ]; then
+			if [ $cpu_mismatch -eq 0 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES
+			else
+				pstatus green YES "But not in all CPUs"
+			fi
+		elif [ $val -eq 200 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is msr kernel module available?"
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "    * CPU indicates IBPB capability: "
+	# CPUID EAX=0x80000008, ECX=0x00 return EBX[12] indicates support for just IBPB.
+	if [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" = 1 ]; then
+		# spec_ctrl implies ibpb
+		cpuid_ibpb='SPEC_CTRL'
+		pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit"
+	elif is_intel; then
+		if [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" = -1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is cpuid kernel module available?"
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+	elif is_amd; then
+		read_cpuid 0x80000008 $EBX 12 1 1; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			cpuid_ibpb='IBPB_SUPPORT'
+			pstatus green YES "IBPB_SUPPORT feature bit"
+		elif [ $ret -eq 1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		else
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is cpuid kernel module available?"
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	# STIBP
+	_info     "  * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)"
+	_info_nol "    * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: "
+	if [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 1 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES
+	elif [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 0 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	else
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is msr kernel module available?"
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "    * CPU indicates STIBP capability: "
+	# intel: A processor supports STIBP if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[27] as 1
+	# amd: 8000_0008 EBX[15]=1
+	if is_intel; then
+		read_cpuid 0x7 $EDX 27 1 1; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES "Intel STIBP feature bit"
+			#cpuid_stibp='Intel STIBP'
+		fi
+	elif is_amd; then
+		read_cpuid 0x80000008 $EBX 15 1 1; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES "AMD STIBP feature bit"
+			#cpuid_stibp='AMD STIBP'
+		fi
+	else
+		ret=-1
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown CPU"
+	fi
+	if [ $ret -eq 1 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is cpuid kernel module available?"
+	fi
+
+
+	if is_amd; then
+		_info_nol "    * CPU indicates preferring STIBP always-on: "
+		read_cpuid 0x80000008 $EBX 17 1 1; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	# variant 4
+	if is_intel; then
+		_info     "  * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)"
+		_info_nol "    * CPU indicates SSBD capability: "
+		read_cpuid 0x7 $EDX 31 1 1; ret24=$?; ret25=$ret24
+		if [ $ret24 -eq 0 ]; then
+			cpuid_ssbd='Intel SSBD'
+		fi
+	elif is_amd; then
+		_info     "  * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)"
+		_info_nol "    * CPU indicates SSBD capability: "
+		read_cpuid 0x80000008 $EBX 24 1 1; ret24=$?
+		read_cpuid 0x80000008 $EBX 25 1 1; ret25=$?
+		if [ $ret24 -eq 0 ]; then
+			cpuid_ssbd='AMD SSBD in SPEC_CTRL'
+			#cpuid_ssbd_spec_ctrl=1
+		elif [ $ret25 -eq 0 ]; then
+			cpuid_ssbd='AMD SSBD in VIRT_SPEC_CTRL'
+			#cpuid_ssbd_virt_spec_ctrl=1
+		elif [ "$cpu_family" -ge 21 ] && [ "$cpu_family" -le 23 ]; then
+			cpuid_ssbd='AMD non-architectural MSR'
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	if [ -n "$cpuid_ssbd" ]; then
+		pstatus green YES "$cpuid_ssbd"
+	elif [ "$ret24" = 2 ] && [ "$ret25" = 2 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is cpuid kernel module available?"
+	else
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	fi
+
+	if is_amd; then
+		# similar to SSB_NO for intel
+		read_cpuid 0x80000008 $EBX 26 1 1; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			amd_ssb_no=1
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	_info "  * L1 data cache invalidation"
+	_info_nol "    * FLUSH_CMD MSR is available: "
+	if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is msr kernel module available?"
+	elif [ ! -r /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -w /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "are you root?"
+	else
+		# the new MSR 'FLUSH_CMD' is at offset 0x10b, write-only
+		# we test if of all cpus
+		val=0
+		cpu_mismatch=0
+		for i in $(seq 0 "$idx_max_cpu")
+		do
+			write_msr 0x10b "$i"; ret=$?
+			if [ "$i" -eq 0 ]; then
+				val=$ret
+			else
+				if [ "$ret" -eq $val ]; then
+					continue
+				else
+					cpu_mismatch=1
+				fi
+			fi
+		done
+
+		if [ $val -eq 0 ]; then
+			if [ $cpu_mismatch -eq 0 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES
+				cpu_flush_cmd=1
+			else
+				pstatus green YES "But not in all CPUs"
+			fi
+		elif [ $val -eq 200 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is msr kernel module available?"
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+	fi
+	# CPUID of L1D
+	_info_nol "    * CPU indicates L1D flush capability: "
+	read_cpuid 0x7 $EDX 28 1 1; ret=$?
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES "L1D flush feature bit"
+	elif [ $ret -eq 1 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is cpuid kernel module available?"
+	fi
+
+	if is_intel; then
+		_info     "  * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)"
+		_info_nol "    * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: "
+		cpuid_arch_capabilities=-1
+		# A processor supports the ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[29] as 1
+		read_cpuid 0x7 $EDX 29 1 1; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+			cpuid_arch_capabilities=1
+		elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is cpuid kernel module available?"
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+			cpuid_arch_capabilities=0
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "    * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: "
+		capabilities_rdcl_no=-1
+		capabilities_ibrs_all=-1
+		capabilities_rsba=-1
+		capabilities_l1dflush_no=-1
+		capabilities_ssb_no=-1
+		if [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" = -1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+		elif [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" != 1 ]; then
+			capabilities_rdcl_no=0
+			capabilities_ibrs_all=0
+			capabilities_rsba=0
+			capabilities_l1dflush_no=0
+			capabilities_ssb_no=0
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		elif [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
+			spec_ctrl_msr=-1
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is msr kernel module available?"
+		else
+			# the new MSR 'ARCH_CAPABILITIES' is at offset 0x10a
+			# we check if we have it for all cpus
+			val=0
+			val_cap_msr=0
+			cpu_mismatch=0
+			for i in $(seq 0 "$idx_max_cpu")
+			do
+				read_msr 0x10a "$i"; ret=$?
+				capabilities=$read_msr_value
+				if [ "$i" -eq 0 ]; then
+					val=$ret
+					val_cap_msr=$capabilities
+				else
+					if [ "$ret" -eq "$val" ] && [ "$capabilities" -eq "$val_cap_msr" ]; then
+						continue
+					else
+						cpu_mismatch=1
+					fi
+				fi
+			done
+			capabilities=$val_cap_msr
+			capabilities_rdcl_no=0
+			capabilities_ibrs_all=0
+			capabilities_rsba=0
+			capabilities_l1dflush_no=0
+			capabilities_ssb_no=0
+			if [ $val -eq 0 ]; then
+				_debug "capabilities MSR is $capabilities (decimal)"
+				[ $(( capabilities >> 0 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_rdcl_no=1
+				[ $(( capabilities >> 1 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_ibrs_all=1
+				[ $(( capabilities >> 2 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_rsba=1
+				[ $(( capabilities >> 3 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_l1dflush_no=1
+				[ $(( capabilities >> 4 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_ssb_no=1
+				_debug "capabilities says rdcl_no=$capabilities_rdcl_no ibrs_all=$capabilities_ibrs_all rsba=$capabilities_rsba l1dflush_no=$capabilities_l1dflush_no ssb_no=$capabilities_ssb_no"
+				if [ "$capabilities_ibrs_all" = 1 ]; then
+					if [ $cpu_mismatch -eq 0 ]; then
+						pstatus green YES
+					else
+						pstatus green YES "But not in all CPUs"
+					fi
+				else
+					pstatus yellow NO
+				fi
+			elif [ $val -eq 200 ]; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is msr kernel module available?"
+			elif [ $val -eq 201 ]; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing tool, install either msr-tools or perl"
+			else
+				pstatus yellow NO
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO): "
+		if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = -1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+		elif [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Variant 4 (SSB_NO): "
+		if [ "$capabilities_ssb_no" = -1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+		elif [ "$capabilities_ssb_no" = 1 ] || [ "$amd_ssb_no" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * CPU/Hypervisor indicates L1D flushing is not necessary on this system: "
+		if [ "$capabilities_l1dflush_no" = -1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+		elif [ "$capabilities_l1dflush_no" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * Hypervisor indicates host CPU might be vulnerable to RSB underflow (RSBA): "
+		if [ "$capabilities_rsba" = -1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+		elif [ "$capabilities_rsba" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow YES
+		else
+			pstatus blue NO
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "  * CPU supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX): "
+	ret=1
+	cpuid_sgx=0
+	if is_intel; then
+		read_cpuid 0x7 $EBX 2 1 1; ret=$?
+	fi
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+		pstatus blue YES
+		cpuid_sgx=1
+	elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is cpuid kernel module available?"
+		cpuid_sgx=-1
+	else
+		pstatus green NO
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "  * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: "
+	if is_ucode_blacklisted; then
+		pstatus red YES "$ucode_found"
+		_warn
+		_warn "The microcode your CPU is running on is known to cause instability problems,"
+		_warn "such as intempestive reboots or random crashes."
+		_warn "You are advised to either revert to a previous microcode version (that might not have"
+		_warn "the mitigations for Spectre), or upgrade to a newer one if available."
+		_warn
+	else
+		pstatus blue NO "$ucode_found"
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "  * CPU microcode is the latest known available version: "
+	is_latest_known_ucode; ret=$?
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES "$ucode_latest"
+	elif [ $ret -eq 1 ]; then
+		pstatus red NO "$ucode_latest"
+	else
+		pstatus blue UNKNOWN "$ucode_latest"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_cpu_vulnerabilities()
+{
+	_info     "* CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants"
+	for cve in $supported_cve_list; do
+		_info_nol "  * Vulnerable to $cve ($(cve2name "$cve")): "
+		if is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+			pstatus yellow YES
+		else
+			pstatus green NO
+		fi
+	done
+}
+
+check_redhat_canonical_spectre()
+{
+	# if we were already called, don't do it again
+	[ -n "$redhat_canonical_spectre" ] && return
+
+	if ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		redhat_canonical_spectre=-1
+	elif [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
+		redhat_canonical_spectre=-2
+	else
+		# Red Hat / Ubuntu specific variant1 patch is difficult to detect,
+		# let's use the two same tricks than the official Red Hat detection script uses:
+		if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -qw noibrs && "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -qw noibpb; then
+			# 1) detect their specific variant2 patch. If it's present, it means
+			# that the variant1 patch is also present (both were merged at the same time)
+			_debug "found redhat/canonical version of the variant2 patch (implies variant1)"
+			redhat_canonical_spectre=1
+		elif "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -q 'x86/pti:'; then
+			# 2) detect their specific variant3 patch. If it's present, but the variant2
+			# is not, it means that only variant1 is present in addition to variant3
+			_debug "found redhat/canonical version of the variant3 patch (implies variant1 but not variant2)"
+			redhat_canonical_spectre=2
+		else
+			redhat_canonical_spectre=0
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+###################
+# SPECTRE 1 SECTION
+
+# bounds check bypass aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
+check_CVE_2017_5753()
+{
+	cve='CVE-2017-5753'
+	_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
+	if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
+		check_CVE_2017_5753_linux
+	elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
+		check_CVE_2017_5753_bsd
+	else
+		_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2017_5753_linux()
+{
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1"; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		# v0.33+: don't. some kernels have backported the array_index_mask_nospec() workaround without
+		# modifying the vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 file. that's bad. we can't trust it when it says Vulnerable :(
+		# see "silent backport" detection at the bottom of this func
+		sys_interface_available=1
+	fi
+	if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+		# no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways
+		_info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: "
+		# vanilla: look for the Linus' mask aka array_index_mask_nospec()
+		# that is inlined at least in raw_copy_from_user (__get_user_X symbols)
+		#mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
+		#cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
+		#jae bad_get_user
+		# /* array_index_mask_nospec() are the 2 opcodes that follow */
+		#+sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
+		#+and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+		#ASM_STAC
+		# x86 64bits: jae(0x0f 0x83 0x?? 0x?? 0x?? 0x??) sbb(0x48 0x19 0xd2) and(0x48 0x21 0xd0)
+		# x86 32bits: cmp(0x3b 0x82 0x?? 0x?? 0x00 0x00) jae(0x73 0x??) sbb(0x19 0xd2) and(0x21 0xd0)
+		#
+		# arm32
+		##ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+		##define CSDB	".inst.w 0xf3af8014"
+		##else
+		##define CSDB	".inst	0xe320f014"     e320f014
+		##endif
+		#asm volatile(
+		#	"cmp	%1, %2\n"      e1500003
+		#"	sbc	%0, %1, %1\n"  e0c03000
+		#CSDB
+		#: "=r" (mask)
+		#: "r" (idx), "Ir" (sz)
+		#: "cc");
+		#
+		# http://git.arm.linux.org.uk/cgit/linux-arm.git/commit/?h=spectre&id=a78d156587931a2c3b354534aa772febf6c9e855
+		if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
+		elif ! which perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
+		else
+			perl -ne '/\x0f\x83....\x48\x19\xd2\x48\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$kernel"; ret=$?
+			if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES "$ret occurrence(s) found of x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
+				v1_mask_nospec="x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
+			else
+				perl -ne '/\x3b\x82..\x00\x00\x73.\x19\xd2\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$kernel"; ret=$?
+				if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then
+					pstatus green YES "$ret occurrence(s) found of x86 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
+					v1_mask_nospec="x86 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
+				else
+					ret=$("${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" -d "$kernel" | grep -w -e f3af8014 -e e320f014 -B2 | grep -B1 -w sbc | grep -w -c cmp)
+					if [ "$ret" -gt 0 ]; then
+						pstatus green YES "$ret occurrence(s) found of arm 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
+						v1_mask_nospec="arm 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
+					else
+						pstatus yellow NO
+					fi
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "* Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: "
+		check_redhat_canonical_spectre
+		if [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = -1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+		elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = -2 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
+		elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 2 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES "but without IBRS"
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "* Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64): "
+		#.macro	mask_nospec64, idx, limit, tmp
+		#sub	\tmp, \idx, \limit
+		#bic	\tmp, \tmp, \idx
+		#and	\idx, \idx, \tmp, asr #63
+		#csdb
+		#.endm
+		#$ aarch64-linux-gnu-objdump -d vmlinux | grep -w bic -A1 -B1 | grep -w sub -A2 | grep -w and -B2
+		#ffffff8008082e44:       cb190353        sub     x19, x26, x25
+		#ffffff8008082e48:       8a3a0273        bic     x19, x19, x26
+		#ffffff8008082e4c:       8a93ff5a        and     x26, x26, x19, asr #63
+		#ffffff8008082e50:       d503229f        hint    #0x14
+		# /!\ can also just be "csdb" instead of "hint #0x14" for native objdump
+		#
+		# if we have v1_mask_nospec or redhat_canonical_spectre>0, don't bother disassembling the kernel, the answer is no.
+		if [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ] || [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" -gt 0 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		elif [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
+		elif ! which perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
+		elif ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+		else
+			"${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" -d "$kernel" | perl -ne 'push @r, $_; /\s(hint|csdb)\s/ && $r[0]=~/\ssub\s+(x\d+)/ && $r[1]=~/\sbic\s+$1,\s+$1,/ && $r[2]=~/\sand\s/ && exit(9); shift @r if @r>3'; ret=$?
+			if [ "$ret" -eq 9 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES "mask_nospec64 macro is present and used"
+				v1_mask_nospec="arm64 mask_nospec64"
+			else
+				pstatus yellow NO
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ] || ( [ -z "$v1_mask_nospec" ] && [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" != 1 ] && [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" != 2 ] ); then
+			# this is a slow heuristic and we don't need it if we already know the kernel is patched
+			# but still show it in verbose mode
+			_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE instructions following a jump in kernel... "
+			if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
+			else
+				if ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+					pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+				else
+					# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurrences of the LFENCE opcode
+					# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
+					# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
+					# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
+					# so let's push the threshold to 70.
+					# v0.33+: now only count lfence opcodes after a jump, way less error-prone
+					# non patched kernel have between 0 and 20 matches, patched ones have at least 40-45
+					nb_lfence=$("${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" -d "$kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -w -B1 lfence | grep -Ewc 'jmp|jne|je')
+					if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 30 ]; then
+						pstatus yellow NO "only $nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, should be >= 30 (heuristic)"
+					else
+						v1_lfence=1
+						pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, which is >= 30 (heuristic)"
+					fi
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+	else
+		# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+		msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+		status=UNK
+	fi
+
+	# report status
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
+		# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
+		if [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability ($v1_mask_nospec)"
+		elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ] || [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 2 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (Red Hat/Ubuntu patch)"
+		elif [ "$v1_lfence" = 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has PROBABLY been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (jump-then-lfence instructions heuristic)"
+		elif [ "$kernel_err" ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve UNK "Couldn't find kernel image or tools missing to execute the checks"
+			explain "Re-run this script with root privileges, after installing the missing tools indicated above"
+		else
+			pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			explain "Your kernel is too old to have the mitigation for Variant 1, you should upgrade to a newer kernel. If you're using a Linux distro and didn't compile the kernel yourself, you should upgrade your distro to get a newer kernel."
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (silent backport of array_index_mask_nospec)"
+		else
+			if [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then
+				msg="Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability"
+				_explain="Your kernel is too old to have the mitigation for Variant 1, you should upgrade to a newer kernel. If you're using a Linux distro and didn't compile the kernel yourself, you should upgrade your distro to get a newer kernel."
+			fi
+			pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
+			[ -n "$_explain" ] && explain "$_explain"
+			unset _explain
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2017_5753_bsd()
+{
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	else
+		pvulnstatus $cve VULN "no mitigation for BSD yet"
+	fi
+}
+
+###################
+# SPECTRE 2 SECTION
+
+# branch target injection aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
+check_CVE_2017_5715()
+{
+	cve='CVE-2017-5715'
+	_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
+	if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
+		check_CVE_2017_5715_linux
+	elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
+		check_CVE_2017_5715_bsd
+	else
+		_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2017_5715_linux()
+{
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		sys_interface_available=1
+	fi
+	if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+		_info "* Mitigation 1"
+
+		ibrs_can_tell=0
+		ibrs_supported=''
+		ibrs_enabled=''
+		ibpb_can_tell=0
+		ibpb_supported=''
+		ibpb_enabled=''
+
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			# in live mode, we can check for the ibrs_enabled file in debugfs
+			# all versions of the patches have it (NOT the case of IBPB or KPTI)
+			ibrs_can_tell=1
+			mount_debugfs
+			for dir in \
+				/sys/kernel/debug \
+				/sys/kernel/debug/x86 \
+				"$procfs/sys/kernel"; do
+				if [ -e "$dir/ibrs_enabled" ]; then
+					# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
+					# /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled: vanilla
+					# /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled: Red Hat (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
+					# /proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled: OpenSUSE tumbleweed
+					specex_knob_dir=$dir
+					ibrs_supported="$dir/ibrs_enabled exists"
+					ibrs_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibrs_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
+					_debug "ibrs: found $dir/ibrs_enabled=$ibrs_enabled"
+					# if ibrs_enabled is there, ibpb_enabled will be in the same dir
+					if [ -e "$dir/ibpb_enabled" ]; then
+						# if the file is there, we have IBPB compiled-in (see note above for IBRS)
+						ibpb_supported="$dir/ibpb_enabled exists"
+						ibpb_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibpb_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
+						_debug "ibpb: found $dir/ibpb_enabled=$ibpb_enabled"
+					else
+						_debug "ibpb: $dir/ibpb_enabled file doesn't exist"
+					fi
+					break
+				else
+					_debug "ibrs: $dir/ibrs_enabled file doesn't exist"
+				fi
+			done
+			# on some newer kernels, the spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in "$procfs/cpuinfo"
+			# is set when ibrs has been administratively enabled (usually from cmdline)
+			# which in that case means ibrs is supported *and* enabled for kernel & user
+			# as per the ibrs patch series v3
+			if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
+				if grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw spec_ctrl_ibrs; then
+					_debug "ibrs: found spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in $procfs/cpuinfo"
+					ibrs_supported="spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in $procfs/cpuinfo"
+					# enabled=2 -> kernel & user
+					ibrs_enabled=2
+					# XXX and what about ibpb ?
+				fi
+			fi
+			if [ -e "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2" ]; then
+				# when IBPB is enabled on 4.15+, we can see it in sysfs
+				if grep -q 'IBPB' "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then
+					_debug "ibpb: found enabled in sysfs"
+					[ -z "$ibpb_supported" ] && ibpb_supported='IBPB found enabled in sysfs'
+					[ -z "$ibpb_enabled"   ] && ibpb_enabled=1
+				fi
+				# when IBRS_FW is enabled on 4.15+, we can see it in sysfs
+				if grep -q ', IBRS_FW' "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then
+					_debug "ibrs: found IBRS_FW in sysfs"
+					[ -z "$ibrs_supported" ] && ibrs_supported='found IBRS_FW in sysfs'
+					ibrs_fw_enabled=1
+				fi
+				# when IBRS is enabled on 4.15+, we can see it in sysfs
+				if grep -q -e 'IBRS' -e 'Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation' "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then
+					_debug "ibrs: found IBRS in sysfs"
+					[ -z "$ibrs_supported" ] && ibrs_supported='found IBRS in sysfs'
+					[ -z "$ibrs_enabled"   ] && ibrs_enabled=3
+				fi
+			fi
+			# in live mode, if ibrs or ibpb is supported and we didn't find these are enabled, then they are not
+			[ -n "$ibrs_supported" ] && [ -z "$ibrs_enabled" ] && ibrs_enabled=0
+			[ -n "$ibpb_supported" ] && [ -z "$ibpb_enabled" ] && ibpb_enabled=0
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
+			check_redhat_canonical_spectre
+			if [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ]; then
+				ibrs_supported="Red Hat/Ubuntu variant"
+				ibpb_supported="Red Hat/Ubuntu variant"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ] && [ -n "$kernel" ]; then
+			if ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				:
+			else
+				ibrs_can_tell=1
+				ibrs_supported=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -Fw -e ', IBRS_FW' | head -1)
+				if [ -n "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
+					_debug "ibrs: found ibrs evidence in kernel image ($ibrs_supported)"
+					ibrs_supported="found '$ibrs_supported' in kernel image"
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+			ibrs_can_tell=1
+			if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
+				ibrs_supported="found spec_ctrl in symbols file"
+				_debug "ibrs: found '*spec_ctrl*' symbol in $opt_map"
+			fi
+		fi
+		# recent (4.15) vanilla kernels have IBPB but not IBRS, and without the debugfs tunables of Red Hat
+		# we can detect it directly in the image
+		if [ -z "$ibpb_supported" ] && [ -n "$kernel" ]; then
+			if ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				:
+			else
+				ibpb_can_tell=1
+				ibpb_supported=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -Fw -e 'ibpb' -e ', IBPB' | head -1)
+				if [ -n "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
+					_debug "ibpb: found ibpb evidence in kernel image ($ibpb_supported)"
+					ibpb_supported="found '$ibpb_supported' in kernel image"
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support: "
+		if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
+			if [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+				pstatus yellow NO
+			else
+				# if we're in offline mode without System.map, we can't really know
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "in offline mode, we need the kernel image and System.map to be able to tell"
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES "$ibrs_supported"
+			else
+				pstatus green YES
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "    * IBRS enabled and active: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then
+				# if ibpb=2, ibrs is forcefully=0
+				pstatus blue NO "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints"
+			else
+				# 0 means disabled
+				# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
+				# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
+				# 3 is enabled
+				case "$ibrs_enabled" in
+					0)
+						if [ "$ibrs_fw_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+							pstatus blue YES "for firmware code only"
+						else
+							pstatus yellow NO
+						fi
+						;;
+					1)	if [ "$ibrs_fw_enabled" = 1 ]; then pstatus green YES "for kernel space and firmware code"; else pstatus green YES "for kernel space"; fi;;
+					2)	if [ "$ibrs_fw_enabled" = 1 ]; then pstatus green YES "for kernel, user space, and firmware code" ; else pstatus green YES "for both kernel and user space"; fi;;
+					3)	if [ "$ibrs_fw_enabled" = 1 ]; then pstatus green YES "for kernel and firmware code"; else pstatus green YES; fi;;
+					*)	if [ "$cpuid_ibrs" != 'SPEC_CTRL' ] && [ "$cpuid_ibrs" != 'IBRS_SUPPORT' ] && [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" != -1 ]; 
+							then pstatus yellow NO; _debug "ibrs: known cpu not supporting SPEC-CTRL or IBRS"; 
+						else 
+							pstatus yellow UNKNOWN; fi;;
+				esac
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support: "
+		if [ -z "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
+			if [ "$ibpb_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+				pstatus yellow NO
+			else
+				# if we're in offline mode without System.map, we can't really know
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "in offline mode, we need the kernel image to be able to tell"
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES "$ibpb_supported"
+			else
+				pstatus green YES
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "    * IBPB enabled and active: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			case "$ibpb_enabled" in
+				"")
+					if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
+						pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+					else
+						pstatus yellow NO
+					fi
+					;;
+				0)
+					pstatus yellow NO
+					;;
+				1) pstatus green YES;;
+				2) pstatus green YES "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints";;
+				*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
+			esac
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+
+		_info "* Mitigation 2"
+		_info_nol "  * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm): "
+		if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+			bp_harden_can_tell=1
+			bp_harden=$(grep -w 'CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y' "$opt_config")
+			if [ -n "$bp_harden" ]; then
+				pstatus green YES
+				_debug "bp_harden: found '$bp_harden' in $opt_config"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$bp_harden" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+			bp_harden_can_tell=1
+			bp_harden=$(grep -w bp_hardening_data "$opt_map")
+			if [ -n "$bp_harden" ]; then
+				pstatus green YES
+				_debug "bp_harden: found '$bp_harden' in $opt_map"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$bp_harden" ]; then
+			if [ "$bp_harden_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+				pstatus yellow NO
+			else
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
+		# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
+		if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+			if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
+				pstatus green YES
+				retpoline=1
+				# shellcheck disable=SC2046
+				_debug 'retpoline: found '$(grep '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config"
+			else
+				pstatus yellow NO
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
+		fi
+
+		if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
+			# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
+			# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
+			# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
+			# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
+			# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
+			#
+			# if there is "retpoline" in the file and NOT "minimal", then it's full retpoline
+			# (works for vanilla and Red Hat variants)
+			if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ -e "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2" ]; then
+				if grep -qwi retpoline /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then
+					if grep -qwi minimal /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then
+						retpoline_compiler=0
+						retpoline_compiler_reason="kernel reports minimal retpoline compilation"
+					else
+						retpoline_compiler=1
+						retpoline_compiler_reason="kernel reports full retpoline compilation"
+					fi
+				fi
+			elif [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+				# look for the symbol
+				if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
+					retpoline_compiler=1
+					retpoline_compiler_reason="noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
+				fi
+			elif [ -n "$kernel" ]; then
+				# look for the symbol
+				if which "${opt_arch_prefix}nm" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+					# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
+					if "${opt_arch_prefix}nm" "$kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
+						retpoline_compiler=1
+						retpoline_compiler_reason="noretpoline_setup found in kernel symbols"
+					fi
+				elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$kernel"; then
+					# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
+					# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
+					retpoline_compiler=1
+					retpoline_compiler_reason="noretpoline_setup found in kernel"
+				fi
+			fi
+			if [ -n "$retpoline_compiler" ]; then
+				_info_nol "    * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
+				if [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
+					if [ -n "$retpoline_compiler_reason" ]; then
+						pstatus green YES "$retpoline_compiler_reason"
+					else
+						pstatus green YES
+					fi
+				else
+					if [ -n "$retpoline_compiler_reason" ]; then
+						pstatus red NO "$retpoline_compiler_reason"
+					else
+						pstatus red NO
+					fi
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		# only Red Hat has a tunable to disable it on runtime
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ -e "$specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled" ]; then
+				retp_enabled=$(cat "$specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
+				_debug "retpoline: found $specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled=$retp_enabled"
+				_info_nol "    * Retpoline is enabled: "
+				if [ "$retp_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+					pstatus green YES
+				else
+					pstatus yellow NO
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		# only for information, in verbose mode
+		if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
+			_info_nol "    * Local gcc is retpoline-aware: "
+			if which gcc >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				if [ -n "$(gcc -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern --version 2>&1 >/dev/null)" ]; then
+					pstatus blue NO
+				else
+					pstatus green YES
+				fi
+			else
+				pstatus blue NO "gcc is not installed"
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		if is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb || [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
+			_info_nol "  * Kernel supports RSB filling: "
+			if ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+			elif [ -z "$kernel" ]; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "kernel image missing"
+			else
+				rsb_filling=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -w 'Filling RSB on context switch')
+				if [ -n "$rsb_filling" ]; then
+					pstatus green YES
+				else
+					pstatus yellow NO
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+	elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
+		# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+		msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+		status=UNK
+	fi
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	else
+		if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ] && [ "$retp_enabled" != 0 ] && [ -n "$ibpb_enabled" ] && [ "$ibpb_enabled" -ge 1 ] && ( ! is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb || [ -n "$rsb_filling" ] ); then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability"
+		elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ] && [ "$retp_enabled" != 0 ] && [ "$opt_paranoid" = 0 ] && ( ! is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb || [ -n "$rsb_filling" ] ); then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full retpoline is mitigating the vulnerability"
+			if [ -n "$cpuid_ibpb" ]; then
+				_warn "You should enable IBPB to complete retpoline as a Variant 2 mitigation"
+			else
+				_warn "IBPB is considered as a good addition to retpoline for Variant 2 mitigation, but your CPU microcode doesn't support it"
+			fi
+		elif [ -n "$ibrs_enabled" ] && [ -n "$ibpb_enabled" ] && [ "$ibrs_enabled" -ge 1 ] && [ "$ibpb_enabled" -ge 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability"
+		elif [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ] && ! is_cpu_smt_enabled; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full IBPB is mitigating the vulnerability"
+		elif [ -n "$bp_harden" ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Branch predictor hardening mitigates the vulnerability"
+		elif [ -z "$bp_harden" ] && [ "$cpu_vendor" = ARM ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Branch predictor hardening is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			explain "Your kernel has not been compiled with the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option, recompile it with this option enabled."
+		elif [ "$opt_live" != 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ -n "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: kernel supports retpoline + IBPB to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			elif [ -n "$ibrs_supported" ] && [ -n "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: kernel supports IBRS + IBPB to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			elif [ "$ibrs_can_tell" != 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
+				explain "Re-run this script with root privileges, and give it the kernel image (--kernel), the kernel configuration (--config) and the System.map file (--map) corresponding to the kernel you would like to inspect."
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		# if we arrive here and didn't already call pvulnstatus, then it's VULN, let's explain why
+		if [ "$pvulnstatus_last_cve" != "$cve" ]; then
+			# explain what's needed for this CPU
+			if is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS+IBPB or retpoline+IBPB+RSB filling, is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+				explain "To mitigate this vulnerability, you need either IBRS + IBPB, both requiring hardware support from your CPU microcode in addition to kernel support, or a kernel compiled with retpoline and IBPB, with retpoline requiring a retpoline-aware compiler (re-run this script with -v to know if your version of gcc is retpoline-aware) and IBPB requiring hardware support from your CPU microcode. You also need a recent-enough kernel that supports RSB filling if you plan to use retpoline. For Skylake+ CPUs, the IBRS + IBPB approach is generally preferred as it guarantees complete protection, and the performance impact is not as high as with older CPUs in comparison with retpoline. More information about how to enable the missing bits for those two possible mitigations on your system follow. You only need to take one of the two approaches."
+			elif is_zen_cpu; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "retpoline+IBPB is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+				explain "To mitigate this vulnerability, You need a kernel compiled with retpoline + IBPB support, with retpoline requiring a retpoline-aware compiler (re-run this script with -v to know if your version of gcc is retpoline-aware) and IBPB requiring hardware support from your CPU microcode."
+			elif is_intel || is_amd; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS+IBPB or retpoline+IBPB is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+				explain "To mitigate this vulnerability, you need either IBRS + IBPB, both requiring hardware support from your CPU microcode in addition to kernel support, or a kernel compiled with retpoline and IBPB, with retpoline requiring a retpoline-aware compiler (re-run this script with -v to know if your version of gcc is retpoline-aware) and IBPB requiring hardware support from your CPU microcode. The retpoline + IBPB approach is generally preferred as the performance impact is lower. More information about how to enable the missing bits for those two possible mitigations on your system follow. You only need to take one of the two approaches."
+			else
+				# in that case, we might want to trust sysfs if it's there
+				if [ -n "$msg" ]; then
+					[ "$msg" = Vulnerable ] && msg="no known mitigation exists for your CPU vendor ($cpu_vendor)"
+					pvulnstatus $cve $status "$msg"
+				else
+					pvulnstatus $cve VULN "no known mitigation exists for your CPU vendor ($cpu_vendor)"
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		# if we are in live mode, we can check for a lot more stuff and explain further
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$vulnstatus" != "OK" ]; then
+			_explain_hypervisor="An updated CPU microcode will have IBRS/IBPB capabilities indicated in the Hardware Check section above. If you're running under an hypervisor (KVM, Xen, VirtualBox, VMware, ...), the hypervisor needs to be up to date to be able to export the new host CPU flags to the guest. You can run this script on the host to check if the host CPU is IBRS/IBPB. If it is, and it doesn't show up in the guest, upgrade the hypervisor. You may need to reconfigure your VM to use a CPU model that has IBRS capability; in Libvirt, such CPUs are listed with an IBRS suffix."
+			# IBPB (amd & intel)
+			if ( [ -z "$ibpb_enabled" ] || [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 0 ] ) && ( is_intel || is_amd ); then
+				if [ -z "$cpuid_ibpb" ]; then
+					explain "The microcode of your CPU needs to be upgraded to be able to use IBPB. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section). $_explain_hypervisor"
+				fi
+				if [ -z "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
+					explain "Your kernel doesn't have IBPB support, so you need to either upgrade your kernel (if you're using a distro) or recompiling a more recent kernel."
+				fi
+				if [ -n "$cpuid_ibpb" ] && [ -n "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
+					if [ -e "$specex_knob_dir/ibpb_enabled" ]; then
+						# newer (April 2018) Red Hat kernels have ibpb_enabled as ro, and automatically enables it with retpoline
+						if [ ! -w "$specex_knob_dir/ibpb_enabled" ] && [ -e "$specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled" ]; then
+							explain "Both your CPU and your kernel have IBPB support, but it is currently disabled. You kernel should enable IBPB automatically if you enable retpoline. You may enable it with \`echo 1 > $specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled\`."
+						else
+							explain "Both your CPU and your kernel have IBPB support, but it is currently disabled. You may enable it with \`echo 1 > $specex_knob_dir/ibpb_enabled\`."
+						fi
+					else
+						explain "Both your CPU and your kernel have IBPB support, but it is currently disabled. You may enable it. Check in your distro's documentation on how to do this."
+					fi
+				fi
+			elif [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ] && is_cpu_smt_enabled; then
+				explain "You have ibpb_enabled set to 2, but it only offers sufficient protection when simultaneous multi-threading (aka SMT or HyperThreading) is disabled. You should reboot your system with the kernel parameter \`nosmt\`."
+			fi
+			# /IBPB
+
+			# IBRS (amd & intel)
+			if ( [ -z "$ibrs_enabled" ] || [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 0 ] ) && ( is_intel || is_amd ); then
+				if [ -z "$cpuid_ibrs" ]; then
+					explain "The microcode of your CPU needs to be upgraded to be able to use IBRS. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section). $_explain_hypervisor"
+				fi
+				if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
+					explain "Your kernel doesn't have IBRS support, so you need to either upgrade your kernel (if you're using a distro) or recompiling a more recent kernel."
+				fi
+				if [ -n "$cpuid_ibrs" ] && [ -n "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
+					if [ -e "$specex_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled" ]; then
+						explain "Both your CPU and your kernel have IBRS support, but it is currently disabled. You may enable it with \`echo 1 > $specex_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled\`."
+					else
+						explain "Both your CPU and your kernel have IBRS support, but it is currently disabled. You may enable it. Check in your distro's documentation on how to do this."
+					fi
+				fi
+			fi
+			# /IBRS
+			unset _explain_hypervisor
+
+			# RETPOLINE (amd & intel)
+			if is_amd || is_intel; then
+				if [ "$retpoline" = 0 ]; then
+					explain "Your kernel is not compiled with retpoline support, so you need to either upgrade your kernel (if you're using a distro) or recompile your kernel with the CONFIG_RETPOLINE option enabled. You also need to compile your kernel with  a retpoline-aware compiler (re-run this script with -v to know if your version of gcc is retpoline-aware)."
+				elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 0 ]; then
+					explain "Your kernel is compiled with retpoline, but without a retpoline-aware compiler (re-run this script with -v to know if your version of gcc is retpoline-aware)."
+				elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ] && [ "$retp_enabled" = 0 ]; then
+					explain "Your kernel has retpoline support and has been compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler, but retpoline is disabled. You should enable it with \`echo 1 > $specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled\`."
+				fi
+			fi
+			# /RETPOLINE
+		fi
+	fi
+	# sysfs msgs:
+	#1 "Vulnerable"
+	#2 "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline"
+	#2 "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline"
+	# "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline"
+	# "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline"
+	# $MITIGATION + ", IBPB"
+	# $MITIGATION + ", IBRS_FW"
+	#5 $MITIGATION + " - vulnerable module loaded"
+	# Red Hat only:
+	#2 "Vulnerable: Minimal ASM retpoline",
+	#3 "Vulnerable: Retpoline without IBPB",
+	#4 "Vulnerable: Retpoline on Skylake+",
+	#5 "Vulnerable: Retpoline with unsafe module(s)",
+	# "Mitigation: Full retpoline",
+	# "Mitigation: Full retpoline and IBRS (user space)",
+	# "Mitigation: IBRS (kernel)",
+	# "Mitigation: IBRS (kernel and user space)",
+	# "Mitigation: IBP disabled",
+}
+
+check_CVE_2017_5715_bsd()
+{
+	_info     "* Mitigation 1"
+	_info_nol "  * Kernel supports IBRS: "
+	ibrs_disabled=$(sysctl -n hw.ibrs_disable 2>/dev/null)
+	if [ -z "$ibrs_disabled" ]; then
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	else
+		pstatus green YES
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "  * IBRS enabled and active: "
+	ibrs_active=$(sysctl -n hw.ibrs_active 2>/dev/null)
+	if [ "$ibrs_active" = 1 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES
+	else
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	fi
+
+	_info     "* Mitigation 2"
+	_info_nol "  * Kernel compiled with RETPOLINE: "
+	if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
+	else
+		if ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+		else
+			nb_thunks=$("${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" -s "$kernel" | grep -c -e __llvm_retpoline_ -e __llvm_external_retpoline_ -e __x86_indirect_thunk_)
+			if [ "$nb_thunks" -gt 0 ]; then
+				retpoline=1
+				pstatus green YES "found $nb_thunks thunk(s)"
+			else
+				pstatus yellow NO
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "Retpoline mitigates the vulnerability"
+	elif [ "$ibrs_active" = 1 ]; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
+	elif [ "$ibrs_disabled" = 0 ]; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS is supported by your kernel but your CPU microcode lacks support"
+		explain "The microcode of your CPU needs to be upgraded to be able to use IBRS. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section). To do a microcode update, you can search the ports for the \`cpupdate\` tool. Microcode updates done this way are not reboot-proof, so be sure to do it every time the system boots up."
+	elif [ "$ibrs_disabled" = 1 ]; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS is supported but administratively disabled on your system"
+		explain "To enable IBRS, use \`sysctl hw.ibrs_disable=0\`"
+	else
+		pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS is needed to mitigate the vulnerability but your kernel is missing support"
+		explain "You need to either upgrade your kernel or recompile yourself a more recent version having IBRS support"
+	fi
+}
+
+##################
+# MELTDOWN SECTION
+
+# no security impact but give a hint to the user in verbose mode
+# about PCID/INVPCID cpuid features that must be present to avoid
+# too big a performance impact with PTI
+# refs:
+# https://marc.info/?t=151532047900001&r=1&w=2
+# https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU
+pti_performance_check()
+{
+	_info_nol "  * Reduced performance impact of PTI: "
+	if [ -e "$procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw pcid; then
+		cpu_pcid=1
+	else
+		read_cpuid 0x1 $ECX 17 1 1; ret=$?
+		[ $ret -eq 0 ] && cpu_pcid=1
+	fi
+
+	if [ -e "$procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw invpcid; then
+		cpu_invpcid=1
+	else
+		read_cpuid 0x7 $EBX 10 1 1; ret=$?
+		[ $ret -eq 0 ] && cpu_invpcid=1
+	fi
+
+	if [ "$cpu_invpcid" = 1 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES 'CPU supports INVPCID, performance impact of PTI will be greatly reduced'
+	elif [ "$cpu_pcid" = 1 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES 'CPU supports PCID, performance impact of PTI will be reduced'
+	else
+		pstatus blue NO 'PCID/INVPCID not supported, performance impact of PTI will be significant'
+	fi
+}
+
+# rogue data cache load aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
+check_CVE_2017_5754()
+{
+	cve='CVE-2017-5754'
+	_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
+	if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
+		check_CVE_2017_5754_linux
+	elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
+		check_CVE_2017_5754_bsd
+	else
+		_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2017_5754_linux()
+{
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown"; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		sys_interface_available=1
+	fi
+	if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+		_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
+		kpti_support=''
+		kpti_can_tell=0
+		if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
+			kpti_can_tell=1
+			kpti_support=$(grep -w -e CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y -e CONFIG_KAISER=y -e CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0=y "$opt_config")
+			if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
+				_debug "kpti_support: found option '$kpti_support' in $opt_config"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$kpti_support" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+			# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
+			# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
+			# parse_kpti: arm
+			kpti_can_tell=1
+			kpti_support=$(grep -w -e kpti_force_enabled -e parse_kpti "$opt_map")
+			if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
+				_debug "kpti_support: found '$kpti_support' in $opt_map"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$kpti_support" ] && [ -n "$kernel" ]; then
+			# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only kernel, look for the
+			# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
+			# 'kpti=': arm
+			kpti_can_tell=1
+			if ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+			else
+				kpti_support=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -w -e nopti -e kpti=)
+				if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
+					_debug "kpti_support: found '$kpti_support' in $kernel"
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
+			if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES "found '$kpti_support'"
+			else
+				pstatus green YES
+			fi
+		elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		else
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
+		fi
+
+		mount_debugfs
+		_info_nol "  * PTI enabled and active: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			dmesg_grep="Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled"
+			dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|Kernel page table isolation enabled"
+			dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace"
+			# aarch64
+			dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|CPU features: detected( feature)?: Kernel page table isolation \(KPTI\)"
+			if grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw pti; then
+				# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
+				_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'pti' flag in $procfs/cpuinfo"
+				kpti_enabled=1
+			elif grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw kaiser; then
+				# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
+				_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'kaiser' flag in $procfs/cpuinfo"
+				kpti_enabled=1
+			elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
+				# Red Hat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
+				kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+				_debug "kpti_enabled: file /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled exists and says: $kpti_enabled"
+			fi
+			if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
+				dmesg_grep "$dmesg_grep"; ret=$?
+				if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+					_debug "kpti_enabled: found hint in dmesg: $dmesg_grepped"
+					kpti_enabled=1
+				elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+					_debug "kpti_enabled: dmesg truncated"
+					kpti_enabled=-1
+				fi
+			fi
+			if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
+				_debug "kpti_enabled: couldn't find any hint that PTI is enabled"
+				kpti_enabled=0
+			fi
+			if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES
+			elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "dmesg truncated, please reboot and relaunch this script"
+			else
+				pstatus yellow NO
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+
+		pti_performance_check
+
+	elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
+		# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+		msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+		status=UNK
+	fi
+
+
+	# Test if the current host is a Xen PV Dom0 / DomU
+	if [ -d "$procfs/xen" ]; then
+		# XXX do we have a better way that relying on dmesg?
+		dmesg_grep 'Booting paravirtualized kernel on Xen$'; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+			_warn "dmesg truncated, Xen detection will be unreliable. Please reboot and relaunch this script"
+		elif [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			if [ -e "$procfs/xen/capabilities" ] && grep -q "control_d" "$procfs/xen/capabilities"; then
+				xen_pv_domo=1
+			else
+				xen_pv_domu=1
+			fi
+			# PVHVM guests also print 'Booting paravirtualized kernel', so we need this check.
+			dmesg_grep 'Xen HVM callback vector for event delivery is enabled$'; ret=$?
+			if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+				xen_pv_domu=0
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+		# checking whether we're running under Xen PV 64 bits. If yes, we are affected by variant3
+		# (unless we are a Dom0)
+		_info_nol "* Running as a Xen PV DomU: "
+		if [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow YES
+		else
+			pstatus blue NO
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
+		# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
+			elif [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
+			elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM, PVH mode, or the Xen hypervisor must have the Xen's own PTI patch"
+				explain "Go to https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ for more information"
+			elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve UNK "couldn't find any clue of PTI activation due to a truncated dmesg, please reboot and relaunch this script"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+				if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
+					if [ -e "/sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled" ]; then
+						explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it's disabled, you can enable it with \`echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled\`"
+					elif grep -q -w -e nopti -e pti=off "$procfs/cmdline"; then
+						explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it has been disabled on command-line, remove the nopti or pti=off option from your bootloader configuration"
+					else
+						explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it has been disabled, check \`dmesg\` right after boot to find clues why the system disabled it"
+					fi
+				else
+					explain "If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
+				fi
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
+			elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+				explain "If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
+				explain "Re-run this script with root privileges, and give it the kernel image (--kernel), the kernel configuration (--config) and the System.map file (--map) corresponding to the kernel you would like to inspect."
+			fi
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
+			msg="Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
+			status="OK"
+		elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
+			msg="Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM, PVH mode, or the Xen hypervisor must have the Xen's own PTI patch"
+			status="VULN"
+			_explain="Go to https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ for more information"
+		elif [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then
+			msg="PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			_explain="If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
+		fi
+		pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
+		[ -z "$_explain" ] && [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && _explain="If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
+		[ -n "$_explain" ] && explain "$_explain"
+		unset _explain
+	fi
+
+	# Warn the user about XSA-254 recommended mitigations
+	if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
+		_warn
+		_warn "This host is a Xen Dom0. Please make sure that you are running your DomUs"
+		_warn "in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode to prevent any guest-to-host / host-to-guest attacks."
+		_warn
+		_warn "See https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ and XSA-254 for details."
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2017_5754_bsd()
+{
+	_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
+	kpti_enabled=$(sysctl -n vm.pmap.pti 2>/dev/null)
+	if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	else
+		pstatus green YES
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "  * PTI enabled and active: "
+	if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES
+	else
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	fi
+
+	pti_performance_check
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
+	elif [ -n "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is supported but disabled on your system"
+	else
+		pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+	fi
+}
+
+####################
+# VARIANT 3A SECTION
+
+# rogue system register read aka 'Variant 3a'
+check_CVE_2018_3640()
+{
+	cve='CVE-2018-3640'
+	_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
+
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+
+	_info_nol "* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: "
+	if [ -n "$cpuid_ssbd" ]; then
+		# microcodes that ship with SSBD are known to also fix variant3a
+		# there is no specific cpuid bit as far as we know
+		pstatus green YES
+	else
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	fi
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ -n "$cpuid_ssbd" ]; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability"
+	else
+		pvulnstatus $cve VULN "an up-to-date CPU microcode is needed to mitigate this vulnerability"
+		explain "The microcode of your CPU needs to be upgraded to mitigate this vulnerability. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section). The microcode update is enough, there is no additional OS, kernel or software change needed."
+	fi
+}
+
+###################
+# VARIANT 4 SECTION
+
+# speculative store bypass aka 'Variant 4'
+check_CVE_2018_3639()
+{
+	cve='CVE-2018-3639'
+	_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
+	if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
+		check_CVE_2018_3639_linux
+	elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
+		check_CVE_2018_3639_bsd
+	else
+		_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2018_3639_linux()
+{
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass"; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		sys_interface_available=1
+	fi
+	if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+		_info_nol "* Kernel supports speculation store bypass: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if grep -Eq 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:' "$procfs/self/status" 2>/dev/null; then
+				kernel_ssb="found in $procfs/self/status"
+				_debug "found Speculation.Store.Bypass: in $procfs/self/status"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$kernel" ]; then
+			kernel_ssb=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep spec_store_bypass | head -n1);
+			[ -n "$kernel_ssb" ] && _debug "found $kernel_ssb in kernel"
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+			kernel_ssb=$(grep spec_store_bypass "$opt_map" | head -n1)
+			[ -n "$kernel_ssb" ] && _debug "found $kernel_ssb in System.map"
+		fi
+
+		if [ -n "$kernel_ssb" ]; then
+			pstatus green YES "$kernel_ssb"
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+
+	elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
+		# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+		msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+		status=UNK
+	fi
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ -z "$msg" ] || [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then
+		# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
+		if [ -n "$cpuid_ssbd" ]; then
+			if [ -n "$kernel_ssb" ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "your system provides the necessary tools for software mitigation"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your kernel needs to be updated"
+				explain "You have a recent-enough CPU microcode but your kernel is too old to use the new features exported by your CPU's microcode. If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel from recent-enough sources."
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ -n "$kernel_ssb" ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your CPU doesn't support SSBD"
+				explain "Your kernel is recent enough to use the CPU microcode features for mitigation, but your CPU microcode doesn't actually provide the necessary features for the kernel to use. The microcode of your CPU hence needs to be upgraded. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section)."
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Neither your CPU nor your kernel support SSBD"
+				explain "Both your CPU microcode and your kernel are lacking support for mitigation. If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel from recent-enough sources. The microcode of your CPU also needs to be upgraded. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section)."
+			fi
+		fi
+	else
+		pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2018_3639_bsd()
+{
+	_info_nol "* Kernel supports speculation store bypass: "
+	if sysctl hw.spec_store_bypass_disable >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		kernel_ssb=1
+		pstatus green YES
+	else
+		kernel_ssb=0
+		pstatus yellow NO
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "* Speculation store bypass is administratively enabled: "
+	ssb_enabled=$(sysctl -n hw.spec_store_bypass_disable 2>/dev/null)
+	_debug "hw.spec_store_bypass_disable=$ssb_enabled"
+	case "$ssb_enabled" in
+		0) pstatus yellow NO "disabled";;
+		1) pstatus green YES "enabled";;
+		2) pstatus green YES "auto mode";;
+		*) pstatus yellow NO "unavailable";;
+	esac
+
+	_info_nol "* Speculation store bypass is currently active: "
+	ssb_active=$(sysctl -n hw.spec_store_bypass_disable_active 2>/dev/null)
+	_debug "hw.spec_store_bypass_disable_active=$ssb_active"
+	case "$ssb_active" in
+		1) pstatus green YES;;
+		*) pstatus yellow NO;;
+	esac
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	else
+		if [ "$ssb_active" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "SSBD mitigates the vulnerability"
+		elif [ -n "$cpuid_ssbd" ]; then
+			if [ "$kernel_ssb" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "you need to enable ssbd through sysctl to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your kernel needs to be updated"
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ "$kernel_ssb" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your CPU doesn't support SSBD"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Neither your CPU nor your kernel support SSBD"
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+###########################
+# L1TF / FORESHADOW SECTION
+
+# L1 terminal fault (SGX) aka 'Foreshadow'
+check_CVE_2018_3615()
+{
+	cve='CVE-2018-3615'
+	_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
+
+	_info_nol "* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: "
+	if [ "$cpu_flush_cmd" = 1 ] && [ "$cpuid_sgx" = 1 ]; then
+		# no easy way to detect a fixed SGX but we know that
+		# microcodes that have the FLUSH_CMD MSR also have the
+		# fixed SGX (for CPUs that support it)
+		pstatus green YES
+	elif [ "$cpuid_sgx" = 1 ]; then
+		pstatus red NO
+	else
+		pstatus blue N/A
+	fi
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ "$cpu_flush_cmd" = 1 ]; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability"
+	else
+		pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your CPU supports SGX and the microcode is not up to date"
+	fi
+}
+
+# L1 terminal fault (OS) aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS)'
+check_CVE_2018_3620()
+{
+	cve='CVE-2018-3620'
+	_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
+	if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
+		check_CVE_2018_3620_linux
+	elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
+		check_CVE_2018_3620_bsd
+	else
+		_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2018_3620_linux()
+{
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf" '^[^;]+'; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		sys_interface_available=1
+	fi
+	if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+		_info_nol "* Kernel supports PTE inversion: "
+		if ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			pteinv_supported=-1
+		else
+			if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -Fq 'PTE Inversion'; then
+				pstatus green YES "found in kernel image"
+				_debug "pteinv: found pte inversion evidence in kernel image"
+				pteinv_supported=1
+			else
+				pstatus yellow NO
+				pteinv_supported=0
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "* PTE inversion enabled and active: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 1 ]; then
+				if grep -q 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf; then
+					pstatus green YES
+					pteinv_active=1
+				else
+					pstatus yellow NO
+					pteinv_active=0
+				fi
+			else
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "sysfs interface not available"
+				pteinv_active=-1
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+	elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
+		# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+		msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+		status=UNK
+	fi
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
+		# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
+		if [ "$pteinv_supported" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$pteinv_active" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_live" != 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTE inversion mitigates the vunerability"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel supports PTE inversion but it doesn't seem to be enabled"
+			fi
+		else
+			pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel doesn't support PTE inversion, update it"
+		fi
+	else
+		pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2018_3620_bsd()
+{
+	_info_nol "* Kernel reserved the memory page at physical address 0x0: "
+	if sysctl hw.vmm.vmx.l1d_flush >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		# https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:09/l1tf-11.2.patch
+		# this is very difficult to detect that the kernel reserved the 0 page, but this fix
+		# is part of the exact same patch than the other L1TF CVE, so we detect it
+		# and deem it as OK if the other patch is there
+		pstatus green YES
+		bsd_zero_reserved=1
+	else
+		pstatus yellow NO
+		bsd_zero_reserved=0
+	fi
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	else
+		if [ "$bsd_zero_reserved" = 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "kernel mitigates the vulnerability"
+		else
+			pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your kernel needs to be updated"
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+# L1TF VMM
+check_CVE_2018_3646()
+{
+	cve='CVE-2018-3646'
+	_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
+	if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
+		check_CVE_2018_3646_linux
+	elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
+		check_CVE_2018_3646_bsd
+	else
+		_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2018_3646_linux()
+{
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf" 'VMX:.*' silent; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		sys_interface_available=1
+	fi
+	if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+		_info_nol "* This system is a host running an hypervisor: "
+		has_vmm=$opt_vmm
+		if [ "$has_vmm" = -1 ]; then
+			# FIXME enhance detection, this one is pretty basic/stupid
+			has_vmm=0
+			# shellcheck disable=SC2009
+			ps ax | grep -v -e grep -e '\[kvm' | grep -q -e qemu -e kvm && has_vmm=1
+		fi
+		if [ "$has_vmm" = 0 ]; then
+			if [ "$opt_vmm" != -1 ]; then
+				pstatus green NO "forced from command line"
+			else
+				pstatus green NO
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ "$opt_vmm" != -1 ]; then
+				pstatus blue YES "forced from command line"
+			else
+				pstatus blue YES
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		_info "* Mitigation 1 (KVM)"
+		_info_nol "  * EPT is disabled: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if ! [ -r /sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/ept ]; then
+				pstatus blue N/A "the kvm_intel module is not loaded"
+			elif [ "$(cat /sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/ept)" = N ]; then
+				pstatus green YES
+				ept_disabled=1
+			else
+				pstatus yellow NO
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+
+		_info "* Mitigation 2"
+		_info_nol "  * L1D flush is supported by kernel: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && grep -qw flush_l1d "$procfs/cpuinfo"; then
+			l1d_kernel="found flush_l1d in $procfs/cpuinfo"
+		fi
+		if [ -z "$l1d_kernel" ]; then
+			if ! which "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				l1d_kernel_err="missing '${opt_arch_prefix}strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+			elif [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
+				l1d_kernel_err="$kernel_err"
+			elif "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -qw flush_l1d; then
+				l1d_kernel='found flush_l1d in kernel image'
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		if [ -n "$l1d_kernel" ]; then
+			pstatus green YES "$l1d_kernel"
+		elif [ -n "$l1d_kernel_err" ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$l1d_kernel_err"
+		else
+			pstatus yellow NO
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * L1D flush enabled: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ -r "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf" ]; then
+				# vanilla: VMX: $l1dstatus, SMT $smtstatus
+				# Red Hat: VMX: SMT $smtstatus, L1D $l1dstatus
+				# $l1dstatus is one of (auto|vulnerable|conditional cache flushes|cache flushes|EPT disabled|flush not necessary)
+				# $smtstatus is one of (vulnerable|disabled)
+				if grep -Eq '(VMX:|L1D) (EPT disabled|vulnerable|flush not necessary)' "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf"; then
+					l1d_mode=0
+					pstatus yellow NO
+				elif grep -Eq '(VMX:|L1D) conditional cache flushes' "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf"; then
+					l1d_mode=1
+					pstatus green YES "conditional flushes"
+				elif grep -Eq '(VMX:|L1D) cache flushes' "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf"; then
+					l1d_mode=2
+					pstatus green YES "unconditional flushes"
+				else
+					l1d_mode=-1
+					pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unrecognized mode"
+				fi
+			else
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "can't find or read /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf"
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if grep -qw flush_l1d "$procfs/cpuinfo"; then
+				pstatus green YES "performance impact of the mitigation will be greatly reduced"
+			else
+				pstatus blue NO "flush will be done in software, this is slower"
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: "
+		is_cpu_smt_enabled; smt_enabled=$?
+		if [ "$smt_enabled" = 0 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow YES
+		elif [ "$smt_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus green NO
+		else
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+		fi
+
+	elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
+		# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+		msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+		status=UNK
+	fi
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ "$has_vmm" = 0 ]; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "this system is not running an hypervisor"
+	else
+		if [ "$ept_disabled" = 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "EPT is disabled which mitigates the vulnerability"
+		elif [ "$opt_paranoid" = 0 ]; then
+			if [ "$l1d_mode" -ge 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "L1D flushing is enabled and mitigates the vulnerability"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "disable EPT or enabled L1D flushing to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ "$l1d_mode" -ge 2 ]; then
+				if [ "$smt_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+					pvulnstatus $cve OK "L1D unconditional flushing and Hyper-Threading disabled are mitigating the vulnerability"
+				else
+					pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Hyper-Threading must be disabled to fully mitigate the vulnerability"
+				fi
+			else
+				if [ "$smt_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+					pvulnstatus $cve VULN "L1D unconditional flushing should be enabled to fully mitigate the vulnerability"
+				else
+					pvulnstatus $cve VULN "enable L1D unconditional flushing and disable Hyper-Threading to fully mitigate the vulnerability"
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+check_CVE_2018_3646_bsd()
+{
+	_info_nol "* Kernel supports L1D flushing: "
+	if sysctl hw.vmm.vmx.l1d_flush >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		pstatus green YES
+		kernel_l1d_supported=1
+	else
+		pstatus yellow NO
+		kernel_l1d_supported=0
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "* L1D flushing is enabled: "
+	kernel_l1d_enabled=$(sysctl -n hw.vmm.vmx.l1d_flush 2>/dev/null)
+	case "$kernel_l1d_enabled" in
+		0) pstatus yellow NO;;
+		1) pstatus green YES;;
+		"") pstatus yellow NO;;
+		*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
+	esac
+
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	else
+		if [ "$kernel_l1d_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "L1D flushing mitigates the vulnerability"
+		elif [ "$kernel_l1d_supported" = 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve VULN "L1D flushing is supported by your kernel but is disabled"
+		else
+			pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your kernel needs to be updated"
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+if [ "$opt_no_hw" = 0 ] && [ -z "$opt_arch_prefix" ]; then
+	check_cpu
+	check_cpu_vulnerabilities
+	_info
+fi
+
+# now run the checks the user asked for
+for cve in $supported_cve_list
+do
+	if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 1 ] || echo "$opt_cve_list" | grep -qw "$cve"; then
+		check_"$(echo "$cve" | tr - _)"
+		_info
+	fi
+done
+
+if [ -n "$final_summary" ]; then
+	_info "> \033[46m\033[30mSUMMARY:\033[0m$final_summary"
+	_info ""
+fi
+
+if [ "$bad_accuracy" = 1 ]; then
+	_warn "We're missing some kernel info (see -v), accuracy might be reduced"
+fi
+
+_vars=$(set | grep -Ev '^[A-Z_[:space:]]' | sort | tr "\n" '|')
+_debug "variables at end of script: $_vars"
+
+if [ "$opt_explain" = 0 ]; then
+	_info "Need more detailed information about mitigation options? Use --explain"
+fi
+
+_info "A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer"
+
+if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then
+	if [ ! -z "$nrpe_vuln" ]; then
+		echo "Vulnerable:$nrpe_vuln"
+	else
+		echo "OK"
+	fi
+fi
+
+if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "short" ]; then
+	_echo 0 "${short_output% }"
+fi
+
+if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "json" ]; then
+	_echo 0 "${json_output%?}]"
+fi
+
+if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "prometheus" ]; then
+	echo "# TYPE specex_vuln_status untyped"
+	echo "# HELP specex_vuln_status Exposure of system to speculative execution vulnerabilities"
+	printf "%b\n" "$prometheus_output"
+fi
+
+# exit with the proper exit code
+[ "$global_critical" = 1 ] && exit 2  # critical
+[ "$global_unknown"  = 1 ] && exit 3  # unknown
+exit 0  # ok
+
+# We're using MCE.db from the excellent platomav's MCExtractor project
+# The builtin version follows, the user can update it with --update-mcedb
+
+# wget https://github.com/platomav/MCExtractor/raw/master/MCE.db
+# sqlite3 MCE.db "select '%%% MCEDB v'||revision||' - '||strftime('%Y/%m/%d', date, 'unixepoch') from MCE; select '# I,0x'||cpuid||',0x'||version||','||max(yyyymmdd) from Intel group by cpuid order by cpuid asc; select '# A,0x'||cpuid||',0x'||version||','||max(yyyymmdd) from AMD group by cpuid order by cpuid asc"
+# %%% MCEDB v84 - 2018/09/27
+# I,0x00000611,0x00000B27,19961218
+# I,0x00000612,0x000000C6,19961210
+# I,0x00000616,0x000000C6,19961210
+# I,0x00000617,0x000000C6,19961210
+# I,0x00000619,0x000000D2,19980218
+# I,0x00000630,0x00000013,19960827
+# I,0x00000632,0x00000020,19960903
+# I,0x00000633,0x00000036,19980923
+# I,0x00000634,0x00000037,19980923
+# I,0x00000650,0x00000040,19990525
+# I,0x00000651,0x00000040,19990525
+# I,0x00000652,0x0000002D,19990518
+# I,0x00000653,0x00000010,19990628
+# I,0x00000660,0x0000000A,19990505
+# I,0x00000665,0x00000003,19990505
+# I,0x0000066A,0x0000000C,19990505
+# I,0x0000066D,0x00000007,19990505
+# I,0x00000670,0x00000007,19980602
+# I,0x00000671,0x00000003,19980811
+# I,0x00000672,0x00000010,19990922
+# I,0x00000673,0x0000000E,19990910
+# I,0x00000680,0x00000014,19990610
+# I,0x00000681,0x00000014,19991209
+# I,0x00000683,0x00000013,20010206
+# I,0x00000686,0x00000007,20000505
+# I,0x0000068A,0x00000004,20001207
+# I,0x00000690,0x00000004,20000206
+# I,0x00000691,0x00000001,20020527
+# I,0x00000692,0x00000001,20020620
+# I,0x00000694,0x00000002,20020926
+# I,0x00000695,0x00000007,20041109
+# I,0x00000696,0x00000001,20000707
+# I,0x000006A0,0x00000003,20000110
+# I,0x000006A1,0x00000001,20000306
+# I,0x000006A4,0x00000001,20000616
+# I,0x000006B0,0x0000001A,20010129
+# I,0x000006B1,0x0000001D,20010220
+# I,0x000006B4,0x00000002,20020111
+# I,0x000006D0,0x00000006,20030522
+# I,0x000006D1,0x00000009,20030709
+# I,0x000006D2,0x00000010,20030814
+# I,0x000006D6,0x00000018,20041017
+# I,0x000006D8,0x00000021,20060831
+# I,0x000006E0,0x00000008,20050215
+# I,0x000006E1,0x0000000C,20050413
+# I,0x000006E4,0x00000026,20050816
+# I,0x000006E8,0x0000003C,20060208
+# I,0x000006EC,0x0000005B,20070208
+# I,0x000006F0,0x00000005,20050818
+# I,0x000006F1,0x00000012,20051129
+# I,0x000006F2,0x0000005D,20101002
+# I,0x000006F4,0x00000028,20060417
+# I,0x000006F5,0x00000039,20060727
+# I,0x000006F6,0x000000D2,20101001
+# I,0x000006F7,0x0000006A,20101002
+# I,0x000006F9,0x00000084,20061012
+# I,0x000006FA,0x00000095,20101002
+# I,0x000006FB,0x000000C1,20111004
+# I,0x000006FD,0x000000A4,20101002
+# I,0x00000F00,0xFFFF0001,20000130
+# I,0x00000F01,0xFFFF0007,20000404
+# I,0x00000F02,0xFFFF000B,20000518
+# I,0x00000F03,0xFFFF0001,20000518
+# I,0x00000F04,0xFFFF0010,20000803
+# I,0x00000F05,0x0000000B,20000824
+# I,0x00000F06,0x00000004,20000911
+# I,0x00000F07,0x00000012,20020716
+# I,0x00000F08,0x00000008,20001101
+# I,0x00000F09,0x00000008,20010104
+# I,0x00000F0A,0x00000015,20020821
+# I,0x00000F11,0x0000000A,20030729
+# I,0x00000F12,0x0000002D,20030502
+# I,0x00000F13,0x00000005,20030508
+# I,0x00000F20,0x00000001,20010423
+# I,0x00000F21,0x00000002,20010529
+# I,0x00000F22,0x00000005,20030729
+# I,0x00000F23,0x0000000D,20010817
+# I,0x00000F24,0x00000021,20030610
+# I,0x00000F25,0x0000002C,20040826
+# I,0x00000F26,0x00000010,20040805
+# I,0x00000F27,0x00000038,20030604
+# I,0x00000F29,0x0000002D,20040811
+# I,0x00000F30,0x00000013,20030815
+# I,0x00000F31,0x0000000B,20031021
+# I,0x00000F32,0x0000000A,20040511
+# I,0x00000F33,0x0000000C,20050421
+# I,0x00000F34,0x00000017,20050421
+# I,0x00000F36,0x00000007,20040309
+# I,0x00000F37,0x00000003,20031218
+# I,0x00000F40,0x00000006,20040318
+# I,0x00000F41,0x00000017,20050422
+# I,0x00000F42,0x00000003,20050421
+# I,0x00000F43,0x00000005,20050421
+# I,0x00000F44,0x00000006,20050421
+# I,0x00000F46,0x00000004,20050411
+# I,0x00000F47,0x00000003,20050421
+# I,0x00000F48,0x0000000E,20080115
+# I,0x00000F49,0x00000003,20050421
+# I,0x00000F4A,0x00000004,20051214
+# I,0x00000F60,0x00000005,20050124
+# I,0x00000F61,0x00000008,20050610
+# I,0x00000F62,0x0000000F,20051215
+# I,0x00000F63,0x00000005,20051010
+# I,0x00000F64,0x00000004,20051223
+# I,0x00000F65,0x0000000B,20070510
+# I,0x00000F66,0x0000001B,20060310
+# I,0x00000F68,0x00000009,20060714
+# I,0x00001632,0x00000002,19980610
+# I,0x00010650,0x00000002,20060513
+# I,0x00010660,0x00000004,20060612
+# I,0x00010661,0x00000043,20101004
+# I,0x00010670,0x00000005,20070209
+# I,0x00010671,0x00000106,20070329
+# I,0x00010674,0x84050100,20070726
+# I,0x00010676,0x00000612,20150802
+# I,0x00010677,0x0000070D,20150802
+# I,0x0001067A,0x00000A0E,20150729
+# I,0x000106A0,0xFFFF001A,20071128
+# I,0x000106A1,0xFFFF000B,20080220
+# I,0x000106A2,0xFFFF0019,20080714
+# I,0x000106A4,0x00000013,20150630
+# I,0x000106A5,0x0000001D,20180511
+# I,0x000106C0,0x00000007,20070824
+# I,0x000106C1,0x00000109,20071203
+# I,0x000106C2,0x00000217,20090410
+# I,0x000106C9,0x00000007,20090213
+# I,0x000106CA,0x00000107,20090825
+# I,0x000106D0,0x00000005,20071204
+# I,0x000106D1,0x0000002A,20150803
+# I,0x000106E0,0xFFFF0022,20090116
+# I,0x000106E1,0xFFFF000D,20090206
+# I,0x000106E3,0xFFFF0011,20090512
+# I,0x000106E4,0x00000003,20130701
+# I,0x000106E5,0x0000000A,20180508
+# I,0x000106F0,0xFFFF0009,20090210
+# I,0x000106F1,0xFFFF0007,20090210
+# I,0x00020650,0xFFFF0008,20090218
+# I,0x00020651,0xFFFF0018,20090818
+# I,0x00020652,0x00000011,20180508
+# I,0x00020654,0xFFFF0007,20091124
+# I,0x00020655,0x00000007,20180423
+# I,0x00020661,0x00000105,20110718
+# I,0x000206A0,0x00000029,20091102
+# I,0x000206A1,0x00000007,20091223
+# I,0x000206A2,0x00000027,20100502
+# I,0x000206A3,0x00000009,20100609
+# I,0x000206A4,0x00000022,20100414
+# I,0x000206A5,0x00000007,20100722
+# I,0x000206A6,0x90030028,20100924
+# I,0x000206A7,0x0000002E,20180410
+# I,0x000206C0,0xFFFF001C,20091214
+# I,0x000206C1,0x00000006,20091222
+# I,0x000206C2,0x0000001F,20180508
+# I,0x000206D0,0x80000006,20100816
+# I,0x000206D1,0x80000106,20101201
+# I,0x000206D2,0x9584020C,20110622
+# I,0x000206D3,0x80000304,20110420
+# I,0x000206D5,0x00000513,20111013
+# I,0x000206D6,0x0000061D,20180508
+# I,0x000206D7,0x00000714,20180508
+# I,0x000206E0,0xE3493401,20090108
+# I,0x000206E1,0xE3493402,20090224
+# I,0x000206E2,0xFFFF0004,20081001
+# I,0x000206E3,0xE4486547,20090701
+# I,0x000206E4,0xFFFF0008,20090619
+# I,0x000206E5,0xFFFF0018,20091215
+# I,0x000206E6,0x0000000D,20180515
+# I,0x000206F0,0x00000004,20100630
+# I,0x000206F1,0x00000008,20101013
+# I,0x000206F2,0x0000003B,20180516
+# I,0x00030650,0x00000009,20120118
+# I,0x00030651,0x00000110,20131014
+# I,0x00030660,0x00000003,20101103
+# I,0x00030661,0x0000010F,20150721
+# I,0x00030669,0x0000010D,20130515
+# I,0x00030671,0x00000117,20130410
+# I,0x00030672,0x0000022E,20140401
+# I,0x00030673,0x00000326,20180110
+# I,0x00030678,0x00000837,20180125
+# I,0x00030679,0x0000090A,20180110
+# I,0x000306A0,0x00000007,20110407
+# I,0x000306A2,0x0000000C,20110725
+# I,0x000306A4,0x00000007,20110908
+# I,0x000306A5,0x00000009,20111110
+# I,0x000306A6,0x00000004,20111114
+# I,0x000306A8,0x00000010,20120220
+# I,0x000306A9,0x00000020,20180410
+# I,0x000306C0,0xFFFF0013,20111110
+# I,0x000306C1,0xFFFF0014,20120725
+# I,0x000306C2,0xFFFF0006,20121017
+# I,0x000306C3,0x00000025,20180402
+# I,0x000306D1,0xFFFF0009,20131015
+# I,0x000306D2,0xFFFF0009,20131219
+# I,0x000306D3,0xE3121338,20140825
+# I,0x000306D4,0x0000002B,20180322
+# I,0x000306E0,0x00000008,20120726
+# I,0x000306E2,0x0000020D,20130321
+# I,0x000306E3,0x00000308,20130321
+# I,0x000306E4,0x0000042D,20180425
+# I,0x000306E6,0x00000600,20130619
+# I,0x000306E7,0x00000714,20180425
+# I,0x000306F0,0xFFFF0017,20130730
+# I,0x000306F1,0x00000014,20140110
+# I,0x000306F2,0x0000003D,20180420
+# I,0x000306F3,0x0000000D,20160211
+# I,0x000306F4,0x00000012,20180420
+# I,0x00040650,0xFFFF000B,20121206
+# I,0x00040651,0x00000024,20180402
+# I,0x00040660,0xFFFF0011,20121012
+# I,0x00040661,0x0000001A,20180402
+# I,0x00040670,0xFFFF0006,20140304
+# I,0x00040671,0x0000001E,20180403
+# I,0x000406A0,0x80124001,20130521
+# I,0x000406A8,0x0000081F,20140812
+# I,0x000406A9,0x0000081F,20140812
+# I,0x000406C1,0x0000010B,20140814
+# I,0x000406C2,0x00000221,20150218
+# I,0x000406C3,0x00000367,20171225
+# I,0x000406C4,0x00000410,20180104
+# I,0x000406D0,0x0000000E,20130612
+# I,0x000406D8,0x0000012A,20180104
+# I,0x000406E1,0x00000020,20141111
+# I,0x000406E2,0x0000002C,20150521
+# I,0x000406E3,0x000000C6,20180417
+# I,0x000406E8,0x00000026,20160414
+# I,0x000406F0,0x00000014,20150702
+# I,0x000406F1,0x0B00002E,20180419
+# I,0x00050650,0x8000002B,20160208
+# I,0x00050651,0x8000002B,20160208
+# I,0x00050652,0x80000037,20170502
+# I,0x00050653,0x01000144,20180420
+# I,0x00050654,0x0200004D,20180515
+# I,0x00050655,0x0300000B,20180427
+# I,0x00050661,0xF1000008,20150130
+# I,0x00050662,0x00000017,20180525
+# I,0x00050663,0x07000013,20180420
+# I,0x00050664,0x0F000012,20180420
+# I,0x00050665,0x0E00000A,20180420
+# I,0x00050670,0xFFFF0030,20151113
+# I,0x00050671,0x000001B6,20180108
+# I,0x000506A0,0x00000038,20150112
+# I,0x000506C2,0x00000014,20180511
+# I,0x000506C8,0x90011010,20160323
+# I,0x000506C9,0x00000032,20180511
+# I,0x000506CA,0x0000000C,20180511
+# I,0x000506D1,0x00000102,20150605
+# I,0x000506E0,0x00000018,20141119
+# I,0x000506E1,0x0000002A,20150602
+# I,0x000506E2,0x0000002E,20150815
+# I,0x000506E3,0x000000C6,20180417
+# I,0x000506E8,0x00000034,20160710
+# I,0x000506F1,0x00000024,20180511
+# I,0x00060660,0x0000000C,20160821
+# I,0x00060661,0x0000000E,20170128
+# I,0x00060662,0x00000022,20171129
+# I,0x00060663,0x0000002A,20180417
+# I,0x000706A0,0x00000026,20170712
+# I,0x000706A1,0x0000002A,20180725
+# I,0x00080650,0x00000018,20180108
+# I,0x000806E9,0x00000098,20180626
+# I,0x000806EA,0x00000096,20180515
+# I,0x000806EB,0x00000098,20180530
+# I,0x000906E9,0x0000008E,20180324
+# I,0x000906EA,0x00000096,20180502
+# I,0x000906EB,0x0000008E,20180324
+# I,0x000906EC,0x0000009E,20180826
+# A,0x00000F00,0x02000008,20070614
+# A,0x00000F01,0x0000001C,20021031
+# A,0x00000F10,0x00000003,20020325
+# A,0x00000F11,0x0000001F,20030220
+# A,0x00000F48,0x00000046,20040719
+# A,0x00000F4A,0x00000047,20040719
+# A,0x00000F50,0x00000024,20021212
+# A,0x00000F51,0x00000025,20030115
+# A,0x00010F50,0x00000041,20040225
+# A,0x00020F10,0x0000004D,20050428
+# A,0x00040F01,0xC0012102,20050916
+# A,0x00040F0A,0x00000068,20060920
+# A,0x00040F13,0x0000007A,20080508
+# A,0x00040F14,0x00000062,20060127
+# A,0x00040F1B,0x0000006D,20060920
+# A,0x00040F33,0x0000007B,20080514
+# A,0x00060F80,0x00000083,20060929
+# A,0x000C0F1B,0x0000006E,20060921
+# A,0x000F0F00,0x00000005,20020627
+# A,0x000F0F01,0x00000015,20020627
+# A,0x00100F00,0x01000020,20070326
+# A,0x00100F20,0x010000CA,20100331
+# A,0x00100F22,0x010000C9,20100331
+# A,0x00100F40,0x01000085,20080501
+# A,0x00100F41,0x010000DB,20111024
+# A,0x00100F42,0x01000092,20081021
+# A,0x00100F43,0x010000C8,20100311
+# A,0x00100F62,0x010000C7,20100311
+# A,0x00100F80,0x010000DA,20111024
+# A,0x00100F81,0x010000D9,20111012
+# A,0x00100FA0,0x010000DC,20111024
+# A,0x00120F00,0x03000002,20100324
+# A,0x00200F30,0x02000018,20070921
+# A,0x00200F31,0x02000057,20080502
+# A,0x00200F32,0x02000034,20080307
+# A,0x00300F01,0x0300000E,20101004
+# A,0x00300F10,0x03000027,20111309
+# A,0x00500F00,0x0500000B,20100601
+# A,0x00500F01,0x0500001A,20100908
+# A,0x00500F10,0x05000029,20130121
+# A,0x00500F20,0x05000119,20130118
+# A,0x00580F00,0x0500000B,20100601
+# A,0x00580F01,0x0500001A,20100908
+# A,0x00580F10,0x05000028,20101124
+# A,0x00580F20,0x05000101,20110406
+# A,0x00600F00,0x06000017,20101029
+# A,0x00600F01,0x0600011F,20110227
+# A,0x00600F10,0x06000425,20110408
+# A,0x00600F11,0x0600050D,20110627
+# A,0x00600F12,0x0600063E,20180207
+# A,0x00600F20,0x06000852,20180206
+# A,0x00610F00,0x0600100E,20111102
+# A,0x00610F01,0x0600111F,20180305
+# A,0x00630F00,0x0600301C,20130817
+# A,0x00630F01,0x06003109,20180227
+# A,0x00660F00,0x06006012,20141014
+# A,0x00660F01,0x0600611A,20180126
+# A,0x00670F00,0x06006705,20180220
+# A,0x00680F00,0x06000017,20101029
+# A,0x00680F01,0x0600011F,20110227
+# A,0x00680F10,0x06000410,20110314
+# A,0x00700F00,0x0700002A,20121218
+# A,0x00700F01,0x07000110,20180209
+# A,0x00730F00,0x07030009,20131206
+# A,0x00730F01,0x07030106,20180209
+# A,0x00800F00,0x0800002A,20161006
+# A,0x00800F10,0x0800100C,20170131
+# A,0x00800F11,0x08001137,20180214
+# A,0x00800F12,0x08001227,20180209
+# A,0x00800F82,0x0800820B,20180620
+# A,0x00810F00,0x08100004,20161120
+# A,0x00810F10,0x0810100B,20180212
+# A,0x00810F80,0x08108002,20180605
+# A,0x00820F00,0x08200002,20180214
diff --git a/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/spectre-meltdown-checker-test.sh b/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/spectre-meltdown-checker-test.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ab66556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/spectre-meltdown-checker-test.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC1091
+. ../../lib/sh-test-lib
+OUTPUT="$(pwd)/output"
+RESULT_FILE="${OUTPUT}/result.txt"
+LOG_FILE="smc_logfile"
+export RESULT_FILE
+SMC_VERSION=v0.40
+SKIP_INSTALL="False"
+WGET_UPSTREAM="False"
+SMC_PATH=/opt/spectre-meltdown-checker
+
+usage() {
+    echo "Usage: $0 [-s <true|false>] [-v <smc_version>] [-w <true|false>]" 1>&2
+    exit 1
+}
+
+while getopts "s:v:w:h" o; do
+  case "$o" in
+    s) SKIP_INSTALL="${OPTARG}" ;;
+    v) SMC_VERSION="${OPTARG}" ;;
+    w) WGET_UPSTREAM="${OPTARG}" ;;
+    h|*) usage ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+smc_install() {
+    mkdir -p "${SMC_PATH}"
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2164
+    cd "${SMC_PATH}"
+    info_msg "Download spectre meltdown checker source code"
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2140
+    wget https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/archive/"${SMC_VERSION}".tar.gz
+    tar --strip-components=1 -xf "${SMC_VERSION}".tar.gz
+}
+
+# Parse SMC output
+parse_smc_output() {
+    awk '{print $1 " " $2}' "$1" \
+        | sed 's/://' \
+        | sed 's/OK/pass/; s/VULN/fail/; s/KO/fail/; s/UNK/skip/'  >> "${RESULT_FILE}"
+}
+
+smc_run() {
+    ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh  --no-color --batch | tee "${OUTPUT}/${LOG_FILE}.log"
+    parse_smc_output "${OUTPUT}/${LOG_FILE}.log"
+}
+
+# Create output directory
+create_out_dir "${OUTPUT}"
+
+if [ "${SKIP_INSTALL}" = "True" ] || [ "${SKIP_INSTALL}" = "true" ]; then
+    info_msg "install skipped"
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2164
+    cd "${SMC_PATH}"
+elif [ "${WGET_UPSTREAM}" = "True" ] || [ "${WGET_UPSTREAM}" = "true" ]; then
+    info_msg "install spectre meltdown checker"
+    smc_install
+else
+    # Use the pre-copied spectre-meltdown-checker.sh from
+    # cd test-definitions/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/bin
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2164
+    cd bin
+fi
+
+# Test run
+smc_run
diff --git a/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/spectre-meltdown-checker-test.yaml b/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/spectre-meltdown-checker-test.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..892141b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test/spectre-meltdown-checker-test.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+metadata:
+    name: spectre-meltdown-checker
+    format: "Lava-Test-Shell Test Definition 1.0"
+    description: "Run spectre meltdown checker"
+    maintainer:
+        - naresh.kamboju@linaro.org
+    os:
+        - debian
+        - fedora
+        - openembedded
+    scope:
+        - functional
+    devices:
+        - dragonboard410c
+        - hi6220-hikey
+        - juno
+        - x15
+        - x86
+        - i386
+    environment:
+        - lava-test-shell
+params:
+    # Spectre meltdown checker version
+    SMC_VERSION: v0.40
+    SKIP_INSTALL: "False"
+    WGET_UPSTREAM: "False"
+
+run:
+    steps:
+        - cd ./automated/linux/spectre-meltdown-checker-test
+        - ./spectre-meltdown-checker-test.sh -s "${SKIP_INSTALL}" -v "${SMC_VERSION}" -w "${WGET_UPSTREAM}"
+        - ../../utils/send-to-lava.sh ./output/result.txt