diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 41 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 4 |
6 files changed, 48 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index f035b84b3601..7fa251aea32f 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -148,12 +148,17 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { int ret = 0; const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; + const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps; rcu_read_lock(); cred = current_cred(); child_cred = __task_cred(child); + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) + caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective; + else + caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted; if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && - cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) + cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps)) goto out; if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 1334e02ae8f4..3d145a3ffccf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/evm.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> #include "evm.h" int evm_initialized; @@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, xattr_value_len, calc.digest); if (rc) break; - rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); if (rc) rc = -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 7c22a15c7e4b..94a0bfc748d1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs"); } @@ -464,13 +465,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT; - /* - * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports - * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes. - */ - if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0) - sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT; - /* Initialize the root inode. */ rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); @@ -3660,6 +3654,38 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); } +static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) +{ + struct common_audit_data ad; + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + struct file_security_struct *fsec; + struct inode *inode; + u32 sid = current_sid(); + int rc; + + /* init_module */ + if (file == NULL) + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, + SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); + + /* finit_module */ + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; + ad.u.path = file->f_path; + + inode = file_inode(file); + isec = inode->i_security; + fsec = file->f_security; + + if (sid != fsec->sid) { + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, + SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad); +} + static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID); @@ -5950,6 +5976,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_from_file, selinux_kernel_module_from_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 5a4eef59aeff..b393d29ae857 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "setsockcreate", NULL } }, { "system", { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod", - "syslog_console", "module_request", NULL } }, + "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } }, { "capability", { "chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search", "fowner", "fsetid", "kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap", diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index ff81026f6ddb..7c57c7fcf5a2 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -398,12 +398,10 @@ static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead, */ static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode) { - switch (mode) { - case PTRACE_MODE_READ: - return MAY_READ; - case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH: + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) return MAY_READWRITE; - } + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) + return MAY_READ; return 0; } diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index d3c19c970a06..cb6ed10816d4 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, int rc = 0; /* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */ - if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) { + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) { switch (ptrace_scope) { case YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED: /* No additional restrictions. */ @@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, } } - if (rc) { + if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) { printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n", child->pid, current->comm, current->pid); |